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ABSTRACT
Mediation theory has developed separately from mainstream theories explaining
foreign policy. Specifically, mediator motivations and constraints have often been
overlooked. I extend an argument explaining mediator motivations, and thus mediation
occurrence and strategy, in terms of domestic political institutions and leader
performance. The notion that leaders use foreign policy in order to help further their
domestic fortunes and those of their party is widely accepted in the international relations
literature, as is the notion that political survival is pre-eminent in any leader’s decisionmaking calculus. Scholars have also shown that leaders shift their focus to foreign policy
when institutional factors, such as an opposition controlled legislature, make addressing
poor domestic performance through legislation especially difficult. Empirical tests of
such arguments have been limited to the use of force and have not been extended to other
aspects of foreign policy such as third party mediation. Given that a leader is focused on
political survival, but is also constrained by domestic circumstances and evaluated by a
domestic audience, the use of military force to engineer a policy success is to be a risky
and potentially costly policy option, given the other policy options at his disposal.
Conflict mediation is a policy option that is both low-cost and low-risk, relative to
the use of force, which also has the potential to be billed as a high-profile success for an
administration. As such, leaders should be seen using mediation as a foreign policy
option when domestic policy options are unavailable or are considered inefficient for
demonstrating success.
This project examines the incentives (or motivations),
constraints, strategies, and benefits US Presidents confront when using mediation as a
policy tool, given this goal of developing a record of success in the eyes of a domestic
political audience. It tests whether engaging in mediation yields domestic political
benefits. I find limited support for the argument that leaders engage in mediation in
response to poor domestic conditions when domestic political configurations make the
passage of legislation difficult. There is also support for the argument that partisan
support in congress provides “cover” for the president to engage in mediation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“The act of mediation is not a neutral act: it is a… political act undertaken by the
mediator to achieve desired ends.” (Webb 1988)

Liberal Political Thought and Conflict Mediation
The mediation research program has emerged primarily out of the real world need
to understand the process by which conflicts can be resolved peacefully. There are
clearly several tangible and important benefits to understanding the process by which
political leaders can help to facilitate peace through negotiations and mediation.
Additionally, the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of democracies worldwide
have led scholars and policy makers to believe that the international community has the
capability to create and ensure widespread peace.1

Further, the advent of nuclear

weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has made the need for both peace and
stability in the international system of paramount importance. At the beginning of the
1990s, while the fears of systemic conflict were lifting, numerous regional and intra-state
conflicts previously obscured in an international system dominated by rival superpowers
were being exposed.2 Increased levels of economic interdependence worldwide mean
that small conflicts in remote parts of the globe have the potential to impact world

1

There was a drastic increase in the number of new mediation attempts worldwide beginning in 1991.
According to Jacob Bercovitch’s ICM dataset, there were 1,110 new mediation attempts worldwide during
the Cold War years (1945-1995), averaging 24.67 per year, with the highest one-year totals being 70
attempts in 1990 and 62 in 1976. In the short time for which data was collected in the post-Cold War Era
(1991-1995), a total of 1,005 new mediation attempts were made, with the lowest one-year total being 108
in 1991 and the highest 285 in 1994.
2
In fact, Luttwak (1994) contends that during the Cold War and prior, great powers “often instigated or at
least encouraged and materially supported” regional conflicts, ostensibly to keep both sides relatively weak
and thus easier to manage, but that the opposite is the case in the post-Cold-War setting. The absence of
great power interest has led to increased levels of violence in these conflicts.

1

politics in ways previously unseen.

As a result, political leaders and international

organizations have often sought to use the resources at their disposal to help bring about
peaceful conflict resolution and scholars have established a substantial research program
examining conflict management processes and the factors contributing to their successes.
Despite the presence of such a research program and liberal theories suggesting that the
proliferation of democracy should lead to a more peaceful world, conflict remains a
major problem in international relations, and conflict management attempts often fail.3
Third-party mediation is seen by many scholars and policy makers as the conflict
management strategy most likely to succeed in creating a peace settlement. Mediation
differs from other conflict management strategies because it is non-binding, but utilizes a
third party that can help to facilitate an agreement either because of its prestige, rapport
with the belligerents, or its resources, which it uses to induce the parties to come to an
agreement. It has several characteristics seen as favorable to bringing about conflict
resolution in the anarchic international system, as well in intra-state conflicts, where the
traditional security structures of the state have failed or the legitimacy of the government
in power has been disputed. Mediation allows both disputing parties to “save face” and,
in the case of international conflicts, maintain their sovereignty. Based on this notion,
scholars have done a great deal of work to explain how mediation works and what factors
are likely to yield a successful agreement (see Rubin, ed. 1981; Bercovitch, ed. 2002;
Bercovitch and Gartner, eds. 2009; Grieg and Regan 2008, Touval and Zartmann 1987,

3

Interestingly, more than 50% of mediation attempts are unsuccessful for the data period, compared with
only 4.26% of attempts yielding a full settlement of the dispute. There is no discernible change in success
during the post-Cold War period, despite the marked increase in mediation volume over that time period.

2

etc.). However, the mediating party and its incentives and constraints are often assumed
away in systematic and large-N studies of mediation, where mediators are categorized by
unchanging system-level and state-level characteristics.
One needs only to look at the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians
to see how pro-peace leaders can be constrained by their political audiences, and research
has begun to examine disputing parties from such a perspective (Melin and Svensson
2009).

A similar analysis should be applied to mediators’ entrance into conflict

management; they should be seen pursuing policy outcomes in a way most likely to
improve their political fortunes. Given that we see a great deal of variation in states’
interest in and commitment to conflict resolution over time and space (despite the almost
constant presence of conflict) these motivations and constraints should be important
factors in explaining the likelihood that conflict management is successful.
In this dissertation, I build on findings and conclusions from the mediation
research program that imply that mediator motivations are likely to play a significant role
in the strategies, timings, and level of commitment that mediators display when
attempting to end conflict. In doing so, I explain mediator motivations and commitment
as functions of domestic politics, which brings theories of conflict management in line
with more general, state-of-the-art theories of foreign policy decision making.
Specifically, I examine domestic institutional configurations and leaders’ political
vulnerability and argue that leaders have incentives to focus on mediation when they are
politically vulnerable and when domestic institutional configurations make passing
domestic policy legislation an inefficient way to build a record of policy success.
3

States and Mediation
Sovereign states are thought to be the most capable mediators because of their ability to
credibly commit resources to a conflict management effort that manipulates the payoffs
for both disputing parties in ways that induce a peaceful settlement (see Kleiboer 2002;
Pruitt 1981). While international organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations and
more regionally focused organizations such as the African Union and the Organization of
American States have a great deal of legitimacy in the international system, they are
faced with commitment problems when it comes to using resources to push disputants
closer to an agreement. These commitment problems, which are essentially collective
action problems, are well documented in the literature (see Krasner 1983, Baldwin, ed.
1993). Additionally, such organizations are often limited in their mandate to enforce
peace agreements, as was seen with the UN in the 1994 Rwanda genocide (see Fortna
2003), and research suggests that short-term interventions focusing on the promotion of
democracy are unlikely to be successful in the long term (Paris 1997).
Although the involvement of sovereign states often means a biased mediator in
which the mediator maneuvers for a negotiated outcome that asymmetrically benefits one
of the disputing parties, often the one with which the mediator has a relationship, such
mediations have been shown to be most likely to yield an agreement (Kydd 2003;
Crescezi, et al. 2012). Despite the presence of bias, powerful states such as the U.S.4

4

Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) find that the US, as world hegemon, occupies a special place in the
pantheon of mediators. As a result of its vast resources, it is called on to mediate more often than any other
country. They also argue that manipulative strategies can only be credibly employed by a select number of
powerful states, which they characterize as either permanent members of the UN Security Council, or
regional hegemons exerting their influence within their own region.

4

have the leverage to push disputants toward agreement by credibly introducing “carrots
and sticks.” However, the question of what factors induce states to focus on mediation
and use these manipulative strategies is an important piece of this conflict management
puzzle that remains unaddressed.
Despite the fact that powerful states can often use their resources to induce peace
agreements and subsequently enforce them, they vary in their willingness and
commitment to doing so. The extant research on mediation treats states as unchanging
actors, defining them in terms of their international power, regime type, or alliances, and
does not account for the factors that cause these states to choose mediating conflict as a
policy focus from the set of domestic and foreign policy options. In fact, much of the
literature on third party mediation has emerged separately from the foreign policy
decision making research program and attempts to reconcile the two have been few (see
Touval 2003; Greig and Beardsley 2010).
Because of the concrete, real world need for peaceful conflict resolution, research
on the subject often focuses on the factors leading to peace agreements, assuming away
mediator motivations. Thus, research has often assumed, explicitly stated or not, that
mediators’ primary goals are to peacefully resolve conflict. However, in his review
essay, Saadia Touval (2003) takes stock of the conflict resolution program and argues
that there has been a fundamental disconnect in its progression—it fails to recognize that
mediation is in fact a type of foreign policy and s driven by factors similar to those
driving other foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Touval correctly contends that
mediation occurs within the existing political environment and thus is a political act, as
5

Webb (1988) describes, undertaken with political goals and the potential ramifications
thereof in mind. While a moral motivation for conflict resolution almost certainly exists,
in the case of mediators from sovereign states, such motivations are likely subordinate to
those of political survival and success (see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003). Therefore, as
political motivations change, mediator availability, commitment, and strategy are likely
to change as well.

Such variation in mediator behavior should, in turn, affect the

likelihood that mediation efforts will be successful.
Domestic Politics, Leaders, and Mediation
An increasingly strong consensus among scholars of foreign policy decision
making holds that leaders make foreign policy decisions with their domestic
consequences in mind (Ostrom and Job 1986; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003). Because
leaders are ultimately beholden to domestic political audiences, which determine whether
or not they will continue in office, they are thought to make decisions that they believe
will be seen favorably those audiences (Downs 1957; Neustadt 1960). However, such a
rationale has not been applied to the choice to engage in diplomacy, especially when
pertaining to conflicts where the leader is a third party. Here I argue that the decision to
engage in mediation and the subsequent strategies employed stem from domestic political
conditions.
Given a leader’s need to build a record of policy successes to ensure re-election
both for himself and for members of his party, he will likely choose policies and employ
strategies that are likely to maximize the political benefits of success. A substantial body
of research has emerged suggesting that leaders tend to use the foreign policy arena to
6

build such a record when poor domestic political conditions exist (see Levy 1989;
Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992) and when domestic political
configurations make the use domestic policy difficult (Brulé 2006; Marshall and Prins
2011; Russett 1990; Gelpi 1997). In contrast, strong evidence exists contending that
democratically elected political leaders are ultimately punished by their domestic
audiences for using military force (Gaubatz 1991; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003;
Chiozza and Goemans 2003). However, the primary dependent variable in all of this
research has been the use of military force. I argue, however, that because rational
political leaders seeking to improve their electoral fortunes and those of their party
should be risk averse in their decision making, and because the use of military force is
risky, non-violent foreign policy options such as third party mediation should be
attractive policy options.

Thus, in situations in which leaders need to demonstrate

competence through policy success but legislative opposition makes the passage of
domestic policy difficult, they will seek to engage in diplomacy to achieve such a
success.
Dissertation Scope and Outline
In this dissertation, I argue that mediator motivations and constraints should be
pivotal factors in determining policy choices and subsequently the success of conflict
management efforts. By reviewing the relevant research from the conflict management,
foreign policy decision making, and leader survival literatures, I argue specifically that
given incentives to focus on foreign policy when domestic conditions require presidential
action and the makeup of Congress is not conducive to passing legislation, third-party
7

mediation should be an appealing outlet for presidents to create the image of competence
and success. Moreover, given the need for a policy victory, presidents should choose
mediation strategies that are most likely to yield short-term resolution of conflict. This
argument works to better our understanding of the dynamics of conflict resolution
processes and brings the study of conflict resolution in line with prevailing theories of
foreign policy decision making and leader behavior. I test my argument empirically
using a time-series modified version of Jacob Bercovitch’s International Conflict
Management dataset (see Bercovitch and Fretter 2007) for United States mediation
attempts from 1945-1995.

The empirical results are generally supportive of the

argument.
In the first empirical chapter, I focus specifically on how the interaction between
domestic political conditions and the makeup of Congress influences foreign policy
choices. I begin by analyzing models that suggest presidents are more likely to use
mediation in response to deteriorating approval ratings and when congressional support is
low. From there, I build on this argument by contending that the mediation strategy
employed in these situations should seek to manipulate the payoffs for the disputing
parties rather than simply facilitate negotiations, in order quickly to induce a peace
settlement—and thus better the chances of a president’s success in the upcoming election.
The second empirical chapter focuses on election cycles and the makeup of
Congress, and their subsequent impact on the frequency and strategy of mediation.
Similar to the way that deteriorating economic conditions and low approval ratings make
a president vulnerable, democratic elections are a built in vulnerability that presidents
8

must face. As such, it can be argued that presidents should engage in policy making
strategically to maximize their electoral prospects. Thus, I argue that as elections near,
presidents should seek to build a record of success through policy initiatives. When
confronted with nearing elections and a hostile Congress, presidents should be seen using
foreign policy as an avenue to build this record of success, because of their greater
autonomy in foreign policy making process. Coupled with the notion that leaders are
thought to be punished electorally for engagement in military conflict, non-violent
foreign policy endeavors, such as third party mediation, should be attractive to presidents.
Additionally, I argue that given their need to generate a series of high-profile successes
before campaigns get underway, manipulative strategies that are likely to induce
agreement should be employed. The results of these analyses largely suggest support for
the hypotheses, but also that more research should be done to explain all of the factors at
work in the process.
Finally, in the third empirical chapter I examine the effects that mediation has on
presidential approval. The dissertation to this point has focused on presidential behavior,
arguing that a president’s increasing vulnerability—due either to deteriorating approval,
low levels of congressional support, or selection institutions, will give him incentives to
focus resources on mediation. But does this focus on mediation have the desired effect?
I test the public’s response to mediation using the president’s approval rating as a
dependent variable. Empirical results largely support my argument.
The contributions of my findings are twofold. On the one hand, they contribute to
a growing literature on the nature of foreign policy decision making that suggests that
9

leaders use foreign policy like any other policy, to help them build a record success that
serves to improve their electoral fortunes. On the other hand, they inform the conflict
management literature on the dynamics of mediation processes. Because state mediators
are constrained and incentivized by domestic political considerations, such conditions
need to be taken into account when attempting to explain the factors that lead to
successful conflict resolution.

It is not enough simply to consider state mediators as

unchanging, unitary actors categorized by states’ international characteristics. Rather, the
mediator’s domestic situation must be taken into account. Such an approach should help
to explain why states pay varied levels of attention to mediation over time and why it is
often unsuccessful, despite mediators’ ability to commit many resources to the effort and
induce the disputants to come to a peaceful agreement.

10

Chapter Two: Literature Review
Introduction
Mediation5 has traditionally been studied through the normative lens of conflict
resolution, seeking to provide members of the international community with the tools to
successfully resolve international and civil conflict peacefully. However, such a goal
often led to the examination of conflict resolution processes from the perspective of the
disputing parties, and with the tacit assumption that the mediators’ primary goal in
mediating a conflict was to engineer a successful and lasting resolution (Touval 2003).
Additionally, mediation theory has emerged separately from theories of foreign policy
decision making, which have developed with a focus on the political incentives and
constraints that leaders confront both domestically and internationally.

As such,

mediators have been considered as unchanging, unitary actors when they are included in
models of conflict resolution processes, and their strategic political motivations for
engaging in mediation have not been taken into account. Even so, we see varying levels
of interest and commitment from the same mediators across time and space, suggesting
that this unitary state actor approach is insufficient to explain mediator behavior.6
Many case studies of mediation do mention that mediator motivations should be
considered when analyzing mediation processes (see Rubin, ed. 1981; Jabri 1990; Touval

5

For the purposes of this work, I use Bercovitch’s (1992) and Princen’s (1995) definition of mediation.
Mediation is defined as a form of triadic, non-binding conflict resolution that occurs when the two
disputing parties agree that there is a peaceful, negotiated outcome that can be reached, but require some
assistance in actually arriving at that outcome. While mediatiors may “sweeten or sour the deal” by adding
guarantees, they do not use punishment as a tactic, but rather rely on persuasion and rewards. For a
comprehensive discussion of the nature of mediation, see Bercovitch and Fretter 2007, 145-146.
6
For instance, the United States has been involved in several peacemaking attempts in the Middle East
since 1948, but its level of interest and commitment to peace have varied over time as evidenced by
different ranking mediators, and different mediator strategies, as well as the conspicuous absence thereof.
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1992; 1982), but such considerations have not been taken into account in systematic
studies of mediation across time and space.7 Despite the prevalence of the single case
study in early analyses of the mediation process, and although mediation must be a
flexible and adaptive enterprise, scholars have come to the consensus that it can be
studied systematically in a statistical fashion (Bercovitch 1992, 127, Schrodt and Gerner
2004, 325). Such a conclusion has led to numerous studies and a significant body of
research surrounding mediation, primarily focusing on the factors leading to mediation
success.

Where mediator strategies and motivations have been taken into account,

however, scholarship has focused overwhelmingly on describing mediator characteristics
and how variation in these characteristics influences the conflict resolution process. It
has not, though, focused on leaders’ political motivations behind choosing such to engage
in mediation, their tactics when doing so, or, especially in unsuccessful cases, the factors
that constrain them from using more extreme measures to bring about peaceful conflict
resolution. Such an analysis will better inform discussions of when, where, and how
mediation is likely to be offered, which should in turn play a significant role in
determining the potential for a peaceful settlement, as well as the characteristics of that
settlement.

7

Grieg and Regan’s (2008) primary focus is on the motivations for accepting an offer of mediation, rather
than the motivations. They posit a liberal interdepence argument and find that mediation is most likely to
be accepted when there are historical or economic ties between the mediator and a state involved in a civil
war. From such a conclusion, it can be implied that states have economic and cultural motivations to offer
conflict mediation to states with which they have strong economic and historical ties. Several studies
address bias (see Kydd 2003; Crescenzi et. al), which I discuss later in this chapter. However, the presence
of bias is addressed in the context of the willingness of disputants to accept mediation, and not regarding
the motivation to offer it.
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In this chapter, I outline mediation as a political process and take stock of the
mediation research program, highlighting findings suggesting that applying a strategic
decision making approach is both appropriate and necessary to explain the variation in
occurrence and commitment to conflict resolution by state mediators. Then I review the
foreign policy decision making literature focusing on two-level games, the strategic use
of foreign policy and foreign policy substitutability, to synthesize an argument
contending that this variation in focus on and commitment to mediation is driven by
domestic politics, political vulnerability, and the availability of domestic policy outlets.
The Disputants’ Perspective: Why Mediation?
Case studies of conflict mediation attempt to trace the mediation process and
highlight the factors that contributed to or hindered peaceful resolution of the conflict.
While theory generation has not always been the primary goal of these case studies, they
have generated a number of conclusions that characterize the nature of mediation
processes.

From a rationalist, state-centered perspective, third-party mediation is

appealing to states and factions engaged in military conflict because such conflict is
thought to be ex-post inefficient; the agreement made at the end of the conflict is often
one that could be made prior to violence. Disputes are not settled peacefully because of
the lack of information about each side’s capabilities and their resolve to get what they
want, as well as issue indivisibilities where there is a constant sum payoff at stake
(Fearon 1995). Thus, the extreme nature of conflict outcomes (clear winners and losers
and the intervening human, political, and economic devastation) make a negotiated
settlement appealing to leaders and publics alike, but difficult to realize because of the
13

high stakes involved and the difficulty of reaching a mutually agreeable compromise
(Rubin 1981). Much of this difficulty stems from the fact that leaders of the disputing
factions are politically vulnerable, although often to different extents, and thus cannot
agree to a settlement that is unsatisfactory to their domestic political constituencies,
which they have likely spent a great deal of political capital motivating to fight.
However, as the costs of conflict compound, especially if hostilities near a stalemate, the
marginal utility of continuing conflict decreases and the parties’ resolve will begin to
wane, meaning that their domestic constituencies are likely to begin to favor a settlement
over continued hostilities.
While it is common that strategies for conflict management are multi-faceted and
tailored to the specific nature of the conflict, scholars have identified a typology of
intervention or “conflict management” strategies that has made systematic inquiry
possible. While the term “intervention,” when used referring to disputes, can have many
meanings—ranging from military activity as a belligerent to an arbitrator with decisionmaking power—the conflict management literature uses the term to refer to the latter part
of this spectrum, focusing specifically on peaceful attempts made by a third-party to be
an intermediary and to peacefully end conflict (Frazier and Dixon 2009, 46).8

As

mentioned above, multilateralism tends to be the norm in conflict management, at least
initially (Frazier and Dixon 2009), while unilateral, manipulative strategies tend to induce
outcomes (Kleiboer 2003, Touval 1992, Touval and Zartmann 1985). One of the major
problems with multilateralism and international organizations, especially with regard to

8

In this work, “intervention” and “conflict management attempt” are used interchangeably.
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the use of traditional peacekeeping missions and standing arbitrators is that such outlets
were created to deal with conflicts in a state-centered environment. However, given that
an increasing number of conflicts on the world stage involve non-state entities and deal
with problems more complex than sovereignty and border disputes, more flexible and
specifically-tailored strategies are necessary.
The variation in how parties in conflict attempt to come to a peaceful agreement is
great, and despite numerous efforts, such agreements that substantively create peace are
rare, despite the fact that attempts are numerous. However, three major types of conflict
management have emerged: negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.

Each of these

vehicles for conflict resolution is different with respect to the amount of sovereignty
(control and decision-making power over their own obligations) that the parties retain and
the proximity to the adversary with which discussions take place. Thus, with each of
these conflict management types, leaders are faced with the question of which
concessions to make, which concessions to ask for, and which means to use in getting
them. A major component of their decision is whether leaders should give up their
sovereignty in order to guarantee that a peace agreement will become a reality. On one
hand, relying on a third party may give them the leverage they need to gain the necessary
concessions from their adversaries, thus impressing key domestic constituencies by
producing peace. On the other hand, the devolution of decision-making power to a third
party may signal a leader’s weakness and expose him to political criticism, and thus make
him more vulnerable to removal. A third-party may also strengthen a leader’s domestic
standing, because the concessions that he made are not direct ones. Working through a
15

third party can even provide distance and cover for leaders who might otherwise be
politically unable to make controversial concessions. Additionally, in the case of civil
conflicts, where one of the disputants is a non-state actor, agreeing to negotiate through a
third party adds to that actor’s credibility and legitimacy as a political entity (Beardsley
2009).
Issue Indivisibilities and Commitment Problems– Problems with Peacekeeping,
Arbitration, and Adjudication
The United Nations has, since its inception, held a special place among
international institutions because of its mission to peacefully prevent and resolve conflict
between states. However, the end of the Cold War has led to a greater focus on, and need
for, resolution of conflicts within states or between non-state actors (Paris 1997, 54-55).
Such a change has led to a need for new strategies and exposed the limits of traditional
peacekeeping along with some of the deficiencies of international organizations in the
conflict management arena.
Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping missions, as the name would suggest, have traditionally focused on
preventing conflict as much as resolving it. The most common peacekeeping strategy in
the postwar period has been to use UN troops and international observers to serve as a
buffer between conflicting parties. Such a strategy has proven successful in numerous
conflicts where there is a clear geographical separator of the belligerents such as a
border.9 However, peacekeeping missions have had less success where the belligerents

9

Prime examples are the UN peacekeeping missions after the 1956 Suez Crisis, the UN presence in the
Korean de-militarized zone from 1953-1967, and the ongoing UN presence in Cyprus to prevent conflict
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are not easily separated geographically and where protracted conflicts between enduring
rivals have flared into violence (Goertz and Diehl 1993).

Moreover, most modern

peacekeeping missions have occurred alongside attempts at wholesale liberalization of
both politics and economics within the conflict region. Paris (1997, 85) aptly points out
that such liberalization can hinder the prospects for peace due to the fact that liberal
policies often create competition for power and political dissensus that hinder the overall
prospects for peace, largely because there is no political culture reinforcing democratic
values or historic precedent for upholding the rule of law.10
Instances such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide and UN failures in Bosnia
Herzegovina further illustrate the limits of traditional peacekeeping missions and
international institutions attempting to resolve intra-state conflicts (Fortna 2003, Paris
1997, Regan 2000).

In conflicts such as these, underlying factors such as lack of

development, ethnic tensions, and power struggles make physically separating the
conflicting parties impossible. Moreover, the extent of the geographic integration of the
conflicting parties and the scarcity of resources create issue indivisibilities, such as which
side’s leaders will hold the most political power after a settlement is forged or who will
have access to scarce resources; consequently, the current range of potential payoffs may

between ethnic Turkish and ethnic Greek Cypriots. In each of these cases, the peacekeeping force’s goal
was to keep the belligerents on their side of a predetermined border (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). In
these cases, the role of the peacekeepers was to keep belligerents apart from one another once a cease-fire
had been agreed upon.
10
Paris continues by arguing that the key to true and lasting resolution of conflict in troubled regions must
occur through a long-term, multi-faceted approach that includes conciliation, investment, and political and
military support, much like the US strategy in the Marshall Plan after World War II. His conclusions
support those of Yuen and Werner (2005) that contend that manipulated peace agreements are most likely
to see relapses in violence, due to the fragile nature of such agreements and the failure to address the
underlying causes of conflict.
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be unsatisfactory to those involved. Therefore, scholars have prescribed longer-term,
active attempts to change and improve conditions on the ground, ones that are
specifically-tailored to the situation. In particular, research has demonstrated that state
actors who seek to manipulate the conflicting factions by providing incentives that
increase the payoffs for both sides and provide some guarantee of peace are the most
successful in ending or curtailing conflict (Svenson 2009, Bercovitch and Regan 2004,
Zartmann and Touval 1985).
Negotiations
Bilateral negotiations involve only the conflicting parties engaging in peace talks
(Merills 2005; Druckman 1997).

There are several obstacles that make the mere

occurrence of bilateral negotiations difficult.

Due to the fact that the parties have

recently been in conflict with one another, often with high and indivisible stakes, purely
bilateral negotiations might appear unlikely to yield substantive results. Moreover, the
conflicting factions often require a starting mechanism, some externality that makes the
stakes of the conflict more transparent, thus inducing negotiations (Druckman 1997).
Finally, there are strategic barriers to engaging in negotiations (Bercovitch and Jackson
2009). Conflicting factions, especially in civil wars, do not recognize their adversary as a
politically legitimate entity, and often at least one of the factions lacks broad recognition
from the international community. Therefore, they are often reluctant to engage in
negotiation, as the very practice of doing so concedes at least some legitimacy to the
other side, as well as precludes the prospect of total victory, thus potentially exposing
political leaders to domestic criticism.
18

Within the scope of negotiations, there are two major perspectives from which
negotiators are thought to work: problem solving and bargaining (Hoppman 2001).
Where negotiators are political actors, either political leaders or their deputies who are
beholden to some domestic political audience, bargaining often trumps problem solving.
Because negotiating can make a leader appear weak to his domestic supporters and, in
cases where conflict has reached a relative stalemate, the zero-sum nature of the payoffs
often reduces the utility of concessions. Furthermore, leaders have incentives to err on
the side of security, which often precludes the making of concessions necessary for
substantive negotiation (Druckman 1997).

Thus, the factions are often caught in a

security dilemma, whereby making concessions (especially being the first to move) is
politically, and perhaps militarily, risky. As such, these political actors are constrained
from agreeing to terms that weaken their domestic political position, even if they might
result in peace. As a result, negotiation cannot happen successfully while the belligerents
view the conflict as zero-sum in nature (Starkey, Boyer, and Wilkenfeld 2009).
However, negotiations are thought to have some utility after hostilities because the
process of the conflict provides each side with previously unknown information about the
other’s resolve and capabilities—and this occurs at the point where the conflict itself is
beginning to have negative effects on leaders, as the result of a stalemate.
Despite the obstacles, certain characteristics of negotiation make it an appealing
policy strategy for leaders. Negotiations allow the parties to maintain full sovereignty in
the bargaining process.

Maintaining sovereignty is important for political leaders

because the delegation or devolution thereof can expose them to criticism from domestic
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political adversaries seeking to characterize them as weak or ineffective.

Thus, in

negotiating bilaterally after hostilities, political leaders address the decreasing utility of
conflict with new information about their adversary. Negotiations are also likely to be
the safest, or at least most conservative, political option leaders can select when choosing
a conflict resolution strategy.

However, likely because of the intractability of the

disputing parties’ positions (Merrills 2005), negotiations are unsuccessful more than half
of the time, and are successful in bringing about a full settlement only slightly more than
four percent of the time. ( 2.1)11
Arbitration and Adjudication
Arbitration is a more binding form of conflict resolution that can occur when both
parties agree to give up their own decision-making power and agree to the terms put forth
by a court, tribunal, or other organization prior to knowing what those terms are (Merrills
2005). Such a remedy can have several appealing benefits to belligerents, but is also the
least likely to occur (see Figure 2.2), most likely because there are several obstacles to
getting both sides to agree to arbitration. Similar explanations can be given for the
inability of freestanding arbitrators to successfully curtail many of these modern
conflicts. Pre-existing tribunals such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) were
created to adjudicate “legal” disputes between state actors. However, as Bilder (1997:

11

“Success” in the ICM dataset is defined as the cessation of hostilities and/or the agreement of the
belligerent parties on some or all the terms over which they were fighting. Success is further disaggregated
into the following categories: cease-fire (temporary agreement to stop hostilities in search of a peaceful
solution), partial settlement (peaceful agreement on some of the issues over which they had been fighting),
full settlement (agreement on all issues over which they had been fighting). Success is not defined in terms
of the longevity or durability of the agreement. In fact, even in cases where conflict management (all
types) yields a full settlement, conflict re-emerges at some level roughly 77% of the time. Thus, the
definition of success is a weak one, with a short-term focus.
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Negotiation Outcomes by Frequency

Figure 2.1: Summary of Bilateral Negotiation Outcomes (from ICM Dataset 19451995, N=1144)
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Conflict Management Types by Frequency

Figure 2.2: Conflict Management types by frequency (from ICM Dataset 1945-1995,
N=3479)
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166) points out, many of the disputes needing resolution today are “political” conflicts
and therefore actors involved consider them inappropriate for adjudication. Arbitration is
a political solution in that leaders must weigh the costs and benefits of agreeing to
arbitration given the potential for all possible outcomes. For both sides to agree to
arbitration, they must both consider the arbitrator to be sufficiently neutral, which is
likely difficult to achieve given the depth of many conflict issues and the incentives for
third parties seeking to serve as an arbitrator.12 This is especially the case in issue areas
involving a party’s honor or interests considered to be vital to its existence or purpose.
Given that arbitration and adjudication are measures that generally involve a clear winner
and loser, the expected utility for one of the parties to continue the conflict should usually
outweigh the expected utility of losing an arbitrated settlement. However, given the fact
that the win set of possible outcomes is likely to include indivisible issues, such as who
holds power after the conflict, agreement to abide by such a decision is unlikely13 (Bilder
1997, Maoz and Terris 2009). Finally, adjudicating bodies such as the ICJ are designed
to work in a state-centered system. However, given the prominence of conflict with nonstate actors, such institutions are unable to provide a functional solution.
In the case of international conflict, pre-existing tribunals such as the ICJ may be
employed to settle disputes, although jurisdiction is often limited and vague. However, in
the case of civil wars or other intra-state conflicts, arbitration is less likely to be agreed

12

Bias on the part of an arbitrator is likely to hinder conflict resolution attempts since arbitration more
clearly yields a winner and loser. However, with mediation, which is discussed later in the chapter, several
scholars (see Kydd 2003; Crescenzi, et al. 2012) argue that bias on the part of a mediator is desirable,
because it is more likely to induce concessions,
13
For parties to agree to any form of conflict management, the expected utility of the outcome must
outweigh that of continuing conflict (see Maoz and Terris 2009, Grieg 2005 for examples).
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to.14 Because in order for arbitration/adjudication to occur in a civil war, the status quo
power, who was recognized internationally as the sovereign before the start of hostilities,
must acknowledge that their adversary is a legitimate political entity whose plight
deserves some consideration from external arbitrator—which is unlikely to happen
because it significantly diminishes the differential in legitimate power between the two.15
While an arbitrator or tribunal will give a definitive decision on how conflict is to be
settled, the disputing parties must agree ex ante to abide by the terms and conditions that
an arbitrator decides (Merrills 2005). Thus, except in the case of pre-existing arbitrators
or tribunals, agreeing on an ad hoc arbitrator is difficult and unlikely.
Despite the fact that it sees the highest full settlement rate and lowest
unsuccessful rate of the conflict management types, arbitration occurs the fewest times
over the observation period. ( 2.3)

As such, arbitration is likely to be limited in its

relevance to certain types of conflicts. Moreover, guarantees or enforcement mechanisms
for the terms the arbitrator lays out are likely to be limited, depending on who the
arbitrator is or represents.

Thus, the ability of the arbitrator to lay down a “full

settlement” as defined by Becovitch and Fretter (2007) is undermined by the fact that in

14

Arbitration and referral to/adjudication by an international organization are similar in that both conflict
management types involve an adjudicating third party, whose ruling is theoretically binding. The primary
difference is the consent of the belligerents. Arbitration must be agreed to by both parties, whereas a preexisting body with some level of monitoring or enforcement power, such as the UN Security Council, can
refer states or conflicts to tribunals whose jurisdiction and mandate pre-exists that conflict, and, in other
cases, one of the parties can bring the issue to before the tribunal without prior consent of the other.
15
While arbitration is the rarest of conflict management types, due to the difficulty of agreeing to
arbitration, it is even rarer in civil/intra-state conflicts. It occurs roughly three times more often in interstate
conflicts than in civil conflicts. Similarly, interstate conflicts are referred to international or regional
organizations at a rate approximately three times greater than that of intrastate/civil wars.
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Figure 2.3: Summary of Arbitration Outcomes (from ICM Dataset 1945-1995,
N=29)
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an anarchical international system, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are
necessary to guarantee that both sides abide by such a settlement.
Additionally, the adjudication of military conflict by international or regional
organizations is rare and, for the data observation period, never yields a full settlement (
2.4). Because international organizations and their associated tribunals are limited in
their jurisdiction and mandate, it is difficult for them to effectively address all aspects of
grievances between two belligerent parties, be they states or other entities. Moreover,
while prominent international organizations, such as the UN or World Trade
Organization (WTO), may have stronger enforcement mechanisms at their disposal,
many international and regional organizations are less able to enforce their tribunal’s
decisions.16 While many international organizations exist to prevent conflict, they are
less adept at stopping it once it has begun, especially through peaceful means.17
Mediation
Mediation can be seen as a middle ground strategy between negotiation and
arbitration that, on its face, overcomes many of the obstacles to negotiation and
arbitration/adjudication. As such, it is the most common type of conflict management
strategy employed (see Figure 2.2). It is a more flexible form of conflict resolution that
can allow both sides to save face, while coming to a peace agreement (Rubin 1981;

16

For example, the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Tribunal ruled against the
Mugabe Regime’s eviction of white farmers in 2008. However, during the court’s proceedings, Mugabe’s
representatives left in protest. Once the court had ruled in favor of the white farmers, Mugabe simply
withdrew Zimbabwe from the international agreement empowering the SADC Tribunal. The SADC
Tribunal lacked enforcement mechanisms and has, as result, of Zimbabwe’s action been examined the
SADC members for decommissioning.
17
The ICM Dataset does not contain information on military interventions used in conjunction with
peaceful conflict management efforts, although such information is likely relevant to this discussion since
peacekeeping, and increasingly peacemaking, is a regular component to conflict management.
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Figure 2.4: Summary of Adjudication by International/Regional Organizations
(ICM Dataset 1945-1995, N=155)
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Merrills 2005), as well as one that can overcome commitment problems and problems
with the lack of credible information between the two parties (Bercovitch 2002; Touval
and Zartman 1985). Leaders can save face by coming to an agreement in a way that does
not admit or concede defeat, but effectively ends hostilities. In addition, they are not
bound to terms ex ante, meaning that leaders are more likely to agree to mediation,
probing the range of possible peaceful outcomes, rather than being forced to accept one
that is decided by external actors.
Because of its flexible nature, mediation has become seen by scholars and
politicians as the optimal way for conflicting parties to come to a peaceful agreement.
However, despite its appeal and prevalence as a conflict management strategy,
empirically, mediation is no more successful than other types of conflict management in
bringing about successful conflict resolution, even by the weak definition of success
being employed here. ( 2.5). Thus, the question must be asked as to why it is no more
successful than other strategies, especially given the extent of the resources some
mediators are willing to put toward the effort. The answer, I argue, is not just in the
capabilities of the mediators, but also in their motivations. In the next sections, I describe
different mediation strategies and mediator types, and argue that state mediators have the
greatest capabilities to bring about peaceful settlements of conflict due to their unique
ability to effectively use manipulation strategies, and also because most likely to be
motivated by political factors in their execution of the mediation process.
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Figure 2.5: Summary of Mediation Outcomes (ICM Dataset 1945-1995, N=2111)
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Traditional Approaches to the Study of Mediation
Traditionally, scholars of mediation have sought to understand the factors that
lead to successful conflict resolution, thus creating a theoretical recipe that practitioners
can then institute. The research program has yielded several generalizable conclusions
about the scope and nature of mediation as a conflict resolution strategy. Bercovitch
(1986) finds that three conditions are thought to most affect the likelihood that mediation
is successful: the identity of the disputing parties, the nature of the conflict, and the
characteristics of the mediator. Among these three factors, the nature of the dispute and
the identity/characteristics of the conflicting parties have received the overwhelming
majority of attention in the scholarly research.

Because mediation is ultimately a

voluntary exercise, the disputing parties have received the most scholarly attention.
Mediators, however, play an important role in the conflict resolution process because of
their ability to change the nature of the conflict, its potential outcomes, and the likelihood
that peace can be arranged. Additionally, an emerging literature suggests that the conflict
resolution research program should be brought into line with prevailing theories of
foreign policy decision making, as the decision to offer, engage in, and accept mediation
are political decisions. As such, theories explaining foreign policy behavior should try to
be used to explain the dynamics of conflict resolution. Thus, from the perspective of the
mediator, the decision to offer mediation is a strategic one, made from a range of policy
options, both foreign and domestic.
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Mediation Strategies
Mediators have several tools at their disposal, depending on who they are and
who they represent, to bring about a peaceful resolution to conflict. The key to mediation
success is for the appropriate actor to use the proper tools and resources to effectively
address the nature of the conflict (Bercovitch 1992; 2002). In each case, however, there
are several similarities in the mediator’s goals. Specifically, the mediator is trying to do
three things: change the conflict resolution environment, change disputants’ perceptions
of the stakes/payoffs, and change the level/nature of motivation that disputants have to
come to an agreement (Bercovitch 1992:16). At the lowest level, they can use their good
offices, and the prestige and persuading power of the government or the organization that
they represent, to provide credible information about their adversary’s intentions,
capabilities, etc.; they can also use their own resources and information provision
capabilities to guarantee that each side upholds the agreement. In many cases, however,
mediators go beyond this simple provision of information by providing a venue and
change the stakes of the conflict by introducing “carrots and sticks” to induce a certain
end to the conflict, often with their own interests in mind.
Because mediation has generally been characterized within the normative
framework of conflict resolution, it is assumed as a “good” at face value (Bercovitch
2002, 4). Success through mediation has thus become the primary dependent variable in
academic studies. However, it has been made clear by scholars that not all mediation
attempts and not all mediators should be considered equal in what they are able to
achieve or willing to do (Bercovitch 1997: 137). Touval and Zartman (1985) outline a
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typology of mediation that allows scholars to examine the range of mediation techniques
systematically.

Specifically, mediators have been shown to take three general

approaches: information strategies, formulation strategies, and manipulation strategies.
Such a typology focuses on mediator behavior, rather than the disputants, and introduces
the notion that mediator actions are strategic, chosen to induce specific outcomes.
Communication strategies are those in which the mediator primarily serves as a
facilitator of information (Touval and Zartman 1985). These mediations occur when
communication between the disputing parties is strained or difficult to realize and when
there is a minimal level of trust of between them. In these cases, a mediator has rapport
with both parties and serves as a conduit between them, laying the groundwork for
further substantive progress in the conflict resolution process. As such, information
strategies are often executed away from negotiating tables, but work to create an
environment in which the parties are willing to come together. Tactically, information
provision works to clarify the grievances each side has with the other, to identify the key
issues to be discussed, and to supply each side with a more transparent view of the
situation by providing missing proprietary information. These mediations rarely resolve
conflicts in their entirety, but rather pave the way for more formal discussions about a
peace agreement.18
Formulation strategies are those where a mediator serves as a facilitator for actual
negotiations by providing a meeting place, moderating discussions in such a way that the

18

Much of Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” in the 1970s involved the provision of information to the
Israelis and Egyptians. Kissinger’s primary goal in shuttling back and forth between them was to build a
framework for further negotiations by clarifying the key issues, encouraging communication between the
two sides, and suggesting that a peaceful agreement between them was feasible (see Rubin, ed. 1982)
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disputing parties can save face and begin to suggest substantive measures and
concessions for each side to make (Touval and Zartman 1985). The key goal with
formulation strategies is to limit the number of variables in play during discussions and to
manage the environment under they take place. Examples of tactics used in by mediators
in formulation strategies are choosing/providing a meeting place, controlling the
intensity/formality of discussions, and controlling the external environment (Bercovitch
1992:17). Thus, mediators can help to reduce tensions by providing secrecy and thus
limiting the extent to which outside influences not at the table play a role in the outcomes
of the talks.19 However, the mediator remains fairly removed from deciding the actual
stakes and payoffs of any agreements, as well as the provision of guarantees or
enforcement mechanisms.
Finally, manipulative strategies are those used when a mediator actively engages
the parties and adds a dimension to the payoff structure for one or both of the disputing
parties, whether it is an incentive or a guarantee (Bercovitch 1997, 137-138). Because of
the “carrots and sticks” nature of this type of mediation, it is usually carried out by
powerful actors who can “sweeten” or “sour” the deal for disputing parties.20

19

Moreover,

Norway’s role in the Oslo Accords negotiations in August 1993 is prime example of a formulation
strategy. The Norwegians did little to influence the actual nature of the agreement, but were able to
provide an environment in which substantive discussions could take place. By providing secrecy and
security, the press, pundits, and potential spoilers, such as HAMAS, were unable to take actions that would
derail the process, thus allowing keen negotiators to focus on coming to an agreement (see Jones 1999).
20
The US government’s role in the discussions leading up to the Camp David Accords signed in 1978 is an
example of a mixed strategy with characteristics of both formulation and manipulative strategies. During
the actual negotiations, the Carter administration worked to control the negotiation environment by setting
an agenda and imposing time limits on sessions, thus working to keep representatives of both sides eager to
forge an agreement. However, it also took an active role in carrying out the peace agreement, providing
both sides with substantial amounts of military aid in addition to a guarantee to use its military power to
enforce the agreement.
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because the mediating party is taking responsibility for some aspect of the resolution,
whether it be monitoring, enforcement, or rewards for concessions (Bercovitch 1992:17),
it is the strategy most likely to be driven by the mediator’s own political motivations.
As the previous paragraphs imply, different parties are best-suited to serve as
mediators based on the strategy that is being employed (Bercovitch 1987). Individuals,
acting on their own behalf, whether it be formally or informally, have a great deal more
latitude to experiment with when acting as a mediator, but are unable to provide the
guarantees or the “carrots and sticks” that are necessary to manipulate the disputing
parties by changing their payoff structures. Similarly, international organizations have
commitment problems when attempting to try to manipulate disputing parties because of
their inability to guarantee security or certain payouts over the long term, largely because
such organizations lack the clout that state actors have (Bercovitch 1997, Touval and
Zartmann 1985, Kleiboer 2002).

Thus, it is state leaders and those high level

representatives thereof who are able to provide the most clear guarantees to disputing
parties and, as a result, make their incentives to negotiate and come to a resolution
strongest. The nuances and consequences of mediator types are discussed in the next
section.
Mediator Types
Third-party mediation can be carried out by several different types of actors, from
private individuals to international organizations whose members comprise most of the
sovereign states in the international system.

Variation in mediator type largely

determines the process of the mediation effort due to the fact that different types of
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mediators have different capabilities, in terms of the types of peaceful agreements they
are able to broker and in terms of the different motivations for agreeing to or seeking to
engage in mediation. Research has shown that individual mediators are often not judged
on their ability to successfully resolve a conflict (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000). States
or individuals who have a track record as successful mediators are not necessarily chosen
to be mediators in other conflicts. Instead, a state’s status on the international scene plays
the most prominent role in how often it is a mediator, with the United States’ role as
hegemon having the largest effect (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, Kleiboer 2002,
Touval 1992). Such a finding suggests that perhaps only prominent and wealthy states
have the wherewithal to engage in mediation, but also that they are more likely to have
incentives to mediate.

This result is coupled with another that suggests mediator

neutrality is not important in the “market for mediation” (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000,
145). Such a conclusion suggests that states involved in mediation are motivated by
more than simply success. A further discussion of the variation and relevant literature
follows in the proceeding sections.
Private Citizens as Mediators
Private citizens of some prestige have attempted to mediate military conflicts and
are thought to most credibly be neutral mediators whose purpose for engaging as
mediator is altruistic. Often times private citizens who mediate use their status as a
former official, religious leader, or academic expert to gain favor with the disputing
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parties.21 Mediations by private individuals can be formal or informal, each having its
own advantages. For instance, while formal mediators have procedural advantages in
terms of creating agreements, in cases of civil conflict, informal mediators are often more
successful because they are acting as a conduit between asymmetrical actors—such as
where one is a state entity and the other a breakaway group (Hare 1992). Therefore,
formal mediation would amount to formal recognition of both parties as politically
legitimate political actors, a risk that most leaders will be unwilling to take. In these
cases, mediators are usually not formally invited, but instead find a way, often through
means of providing humanitarian relief, to earn the confidence of disputing parties.22
Because they lack direct political ties, private citizens are thought to able to be
more flexible than representatives of states or international organizations and thus can
suggest a broader range of potential agreements and outcomes (Bercovitch and Schneider
2000).

However, in cases where the mediator represents a non-governmental

organization or religious institution, the mediator may limit their efforts to outcomes
synchronous with their organization’s doctrine or ideology.23 Because of the mutual trust

21

Perhaps the best example of a private citizen acting as a high-profile mediator is former Jimmy Carter’s
work in Haiti and Korea. While Carter carried the prestige associated with being a former president of the
United States, he did not carry a political mandate to negotiate on behalf of the US administration. Thus,
his reputation as a committed peacemaker gave him the necessary credibility with both parties to facilitate
negotiations.
22
Quaker mediation in 1984 Sri Lanka demonstrates how informal mediation can be beneficial to building
a framework for peaceful discussions. At a time when the Sinhalese majority was unwilling to publicly
recognize the Tamil rebels, Joseph Elder of the London Quaker office was dispatched to help facilitate
communication between the two parties. His efforts required that each side keep knowledge that the
discussions were occurring secret and limited only to the top officials. Because of his powerless political
position and his commitment to confidentiality (which meant receiving no formal credit for his work) Elder
was able to carry messages between the two parties and begin to facilitate a peace process (Princen 1992;
1994; Bailey 1985).
23
Quaker mediators have often focused on achieving consensus among parties before moving forward with
peace discussions, as consensus is consistent with Quaker religious governance (Bailey 1985). Similarly,
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the disputants often have in the mediator, he or she is thought to be most helpful in
overcoming misunderstandings between them, but often lacks the power and capabilities
to add substantive guarantees or oversight to the effort. Such guarantees are often
necessary to assuage concerns the disputing parties have that the other will renege on any
agreement that is made. Thus, the ability of private citizens to engineer peace on their
own is considered to be somewhat limited.
The literature shows, however, that private citizens and other apolitical mediators
can often play a substantive role in peace processes. Because of their relative lack of
political ties, and thus political motivations, private citizens are more adept at providing
information to both sides of a dispute. As previously discussed, conflict is often thought
to be the result of information problems and the inability of actors to credibly
demonstrate their resolve and capabilities to achieve their political goals (Fearon 1995).
Consequently, individuals as mediators can play a key role in what Greig and Diehl
(2001) call a “softening up” process—making both sides more amenable to a peaceful
settlement by informing them about their adversary and creating a framework for
subsequent discussions. In doing so, mediators are largely trying to change the culture or
mindset of the disputants from one of a zero-sum game to one with mutually beneficial
outcomes (Antrim and Sebenius 1992). Then, as both sides become more amenable to
conflict resolution, more powerful mediators can enter the negotiations and attempt to
add the necessary guarantees and enforcement mechanisms to create a peace agreement.

the Vatican has been criticized for seeking to mediate conflicts in Latin America in ways that protect its
interests there (Princen 1992a; 1992b)

37

International Organizations as Mediators
Major international organizations, such as the United Nations, have a great deal of
prestige in the international system as well as a great number of resources that can be
brought to bear in guaranteeing the terms of peaceful agreements. Such organizations are
thought to be relatively neutral in their approach to conflict resolution, as their reason for
existence is to facilitate peace in the international system. However, they are thought to
be less effective mediators than state actors when success is measured as a full
settlement.
The most salient problems that international organizations have as mediators are
collective action problems.

Because international organizations are comprised of

sovereign states, members have incentives to try to benefit from the actions of the
organization, without contributing their own resources to those actions.

As such,

mediation attempts by international organizations often lack credibility from the
perspective of guarantees and enforcement, although their ability to provide information
and transparency may still be greater. Beyond that, the range of potential mediation
strategies and conflict resolution outcomes is often limited by strategic bargaining by
member states through institutional structures, such as the veto power held by permanent
members of the UN Security Council.

Because the decision to mediate, the mediation

strategy, and the choice of enforcement and guarantee mechanisms are all political in
nature, actions that the organization takes are often watered-down after several rounds of
political compromising. Thus, member states’ international political goals and concerns
are likely to limit international organizations from putting their full weight behind peace
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efforts.

Along these lines, Zartman and Amoo (1992: 131) argue that regional

organizations “are under pressure to endorse rather than to mediate.” Thus, while the
stated goal of the organization might be to preserve peace and security in a region, its
abilities to do so are subservient to its member states’ political and security goals.
Accordingly, peace efforts by these international organizations are often cumbersome and
rarely yield a full settlement of the conflict.
In a similar vein, the extent to which international organizations can induce
conflicting parties to make concessions is limited, along with the extent to which they are
able to provide guarantees and enforcement mechanisms. Unlike in arbitration and
adjudication, where bias is seen as an obstacle to success, researchers have contended
that a biased mediator may actually be more likely to engineer a successful conflict
resolution agreement (Walter 2002, Kydd 2003, Crescenzi, et al. 2012). For instance,
Kydd (2003) suggests that the Palestinian Authority was most willing to accept the
United States as a mediator, despite a clear pro-Israel bias, because of its ability to best
draw concessions from the Israeli government. Thus, neutral mediators who do not have
a clear political stake in the outcome, other than perhaps the universal benefits the
members of the international system enjoy from increased peace and stability, are less
able induce the conflicting factions to make peace.
States as Mediators
State actors are thought to occupy a special place in the market for mediators due
to the characteristic of sovereignty (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Kleiboer 2002;
Touval 1992; 2003). Sovereignty, on its face, allows states to overcome the collective
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action problems that international organizations face when seeking to induce conflicting
parties to come to a peaceful agreement, and they possess more resources and thus
greater capabilities to engineer such an agreement. As such, research has shown that
powerful states are the most sought after mediators (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000).24
Additionally, the likelihood that states will receive more mediation mandates does not
increase with a record of mediation successes and states that have policies of neutrality
are not more commonly involved in mediation than non-neutral states (Bercovitch and
Schneider 2000). Therefore, it can be argued that powerful states are most often able to
engage in mediation because of their unique ability to credibly commit substantial
amounts of resources and political capital to a mediation attempt. Similarly, it can be
argued that because they most often seek to manipulate the disputing parties using
“carrots and sticks” to create more desirable payoffs, state mediators are ultimately
attempting to improve their own political standing by mediating.
However, because states are political actors and thus their primary motivations
for using such manipulation are unlikely to be altruistic or humanitarian, it can be said
that they have their own payoffs for mediating conflict, which exist on different
dimensions than those of the disputing parties (Kleiboer 2002, Touval 2003, Yuen and
Werner 2005). In fact, state actors often seek to engage in mediation, even if it appears
that an attempt at conflict resolution will be unsuccessful from the outset (Greig 2005;
Bercovitch 1992). Along these lines, research shows that manipulated payoffs are likely
to lead to relapses in violence, because both sides recognize that added resources may

24

Nation-states accounted for roughly 53% of all mediations for the 1945-1995.

40

help their cause in the long run and give them an opportunity to regroup. Similarly, they
argue because the agreement is not brought about “organically,” meaning that neither
party is ready or willing to agree to terms without outside incentives, it is likely to break
down (Yuen and Werner 2005). Further, sustained peace becomes incumbent on the
mediator, who becomes the guarantor of the agreement and does not necessarily quell
discord between the two factions (Pruitt 1982). Such a situation is most visible with the
Camp David Accords where the large amounts of military aid and military guarantees
that the US gives to both Israel and Egypt were the keystones of the agreement, and
without which, no settlement would have been made. As such, the literature suggests that
a greater examination of what these political motivations are needs to be done, in order to
understand why mediators would knowingly mediate conflict in such a way that is
unlikely to yield peace.
In order to bring about such an understanding, it should first be noted that
different types of states are likely to engage in mediation for different reasons. For
instance, as I discuss more thoroughly below, power considerations are likely to influence
strong and weak states differently (Touval and Zartman 1985). Moreover, democratic
states engage in mediation a great deal more regularly than do non-democratic states
(Bercovitch and Schneider 2002). However, I argue that the common thread behind
states’ motivations is the domestic standing of political leaders. For instance, as I outline
further in the next sections, weaker states often seek to mediate in order to increase their
international prestige and to open doors to trade agreements, which serves to help the
incumbent leader’s domestic standing. In a similar vein, leaders of powerful states seek
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to use their resources in ways that portray their regimes as competent when dealing with
key international issues.
Weak States as Mediators
While powerful state actors are the most common mediators, and the USA is most
common by an overwhelming margin, the occurrence of weaker state mediators may play
an important role in the conflict resolution dynamic.

Beardsley (2010) argues that

belligerents will often seek out weaker states as mediators to provide themselves with
political cover when making concessions.

As discussed above, the making of

concessions can make a political leader appear weak to his domestic constituency.
Therefore, by seeking out mediation, the conflicting parties are seeking to manipulate
their domestic audiences, deflecting some of the negative fallout for making concessions
onto the mediator and the peace process.
The weak state mediator benefits from the international prestige that it gains as a
peacemaker and the leaders thereof demonstrate competence handling difficult
international problems (Beardsley 2010). Algeria’s mediation of the Iran Hostage Crisis
demonstrates several of these aspects of small state mediation (Slim 1992). Since its
independence, Algeria struggled to find its own national identity and sought to build
strong relationships with strategic allies. By helping to negotiate the hostage crisis,
Algeria forged a relationship with Iran that enhanced its position in OPEC as well as
demonstrated to the world and to rank and file Algerians that it was a viable political
entity on the international stage. Similarly, the mediation effort worked to improve
relations between Algeria and the United States, opening several trade doors in the
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process. Finally, as a result of the international prestige Algeria gained from successfully
managing conflict between two international heavyweights, President Chadli Ben Hadid
bettered his domestic position by demonstrating managerial competence as a leader (Slim
1992; Tarar 2006).
Powerful States as Mediators
Despite the fact that several rationales exist for weak state mediation, it remains
the exception to the rule. Powerful state actors are the most common state mediators (the
USA being most common by an overwhelming margin).25 They appeal to conflicting
parties because of their ability to introduce guarantees and incentives to the conflict
resolution process and change the landscape of negotiations. However, strong states
commonly seek out mediation opportunities, rather than passively wait to be asked to do
so (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Bercovitch and Fretter 2007). Such occurrences
suggest that state actors see the potential for political gain through mediation. Thus, an
understanding of how and where these actors expect to see political gains is necessary to
fully understand whether or not the conflict resolution attempt will actually bring about
peace and to understand the full dynamic of the conflict resolution process.
The sum result of these findings suggests that state actors’ primary motivations
are not resolution of the conflict, but rather some political benefit, whether it is
international or domestic. As such, the motivations of the state and its political actors

25

Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) report that the US mediated without help from other parties 84 times
for the period 1945-1995, which accounts for roughly 31% of single-state mediation attempts. Permanent
members of the UN Security Council account for roughly 42.5% of all single-state mediation attempts.
However, China does not mediate on its own at all for that data period and the Soviet Union mediates only
5 times, accounting for less than 2% of all one-state mediations.
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should be taken into account when assessing the likelihood that mediation will be offered
and whether or not mediation attempts will be successful (Grieg and Beardsley 2009;
Touval and Zartman 1985; Touval 1992), and whether or not the agreement reached will
last (Yuen and Werner 2005). The question that stems from this broad analysis of state
actors as mediators is: What political incentives drive states to want to engage in
mediation?
Given that powerful states are most adept at using manipulative mediation
strategies, taken along with research suggesting that manipulative interventions most
often lead to short-lived agreements, it can be argued that state actors engaging in
mediation are primarily driven by the political benefits of such a short-term agreement.
In addition, it suggests that these leaders deem that the resources and effort needed to
ensure a more durable peace agreement to yield little marginal political benefit. Because
state leaders’ primary goal is to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003), which is
accomplished by compiling a record of policy successes (Neustadt 1960), mediation can
be characterized as a tool to achieve that end. Also, because leaders stay in power by
appealing to a domestic audience, it can be argued that the primary goal of any mediation
attempt is to impress that domestic audience.26 Thus, an understanding of mediation
within the dynamics of leader decision making is necessary to fully explain its occurrence
and process.

26

Due to the lack of mediation attempts by internationally powerful, non-democratic states, such a
statement can really only be made with regard to a democratic audience. While leaders of non-democracies
must satisfy domestic audience, albeit often much smaller, to stay in power (see Bueno de Msequita, et al.
2003), it is unlikely that mediation or other forms of diplomacy can be used to appeal to such an audience.
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Mediation as a Foreign Policy Decision
Those who have examined mediator motivations systematically have argued that
the decision to mediate occurs within the context of the existing foreign policy landscape
and have criticized the conflict resolution program for largely ignoring such a fact
(Touval 2003; Touval and Zartman 1985).

However, to the extent that mediator

motivations have been tested, examinations have been limited to structural explanations
of foreign policy, focusing on alliance, economic, and historical ties (Kleiboer 2002;
Greig and Regan 2008; Touval and Zartman 1985); more importantly, these studies have
not focused on how domestic political factors affect leader decision making. Such an
approach fits well within the Cold War thinking that international relations trumped
domestic politics and that states acted in the international arena as rational unitary actors
constantly seeking to increase their security (Waltz 1979). For instance, Kleiboer (2002)
suggests that the United States sent Alexander Haig to help mediate the Falklands Crisis
because conflict between two key Cold War allies, the United Kingdom, a prominent
NATO ally, and Argentina, an influential member of the Organization of American
States, threatened its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Using a similar rationale,
scholars have made several attempts to explain where states are likely to offer their
services as mediators. However, in doing so, they overlook key dynamics in the conflict
resolution process. Specifically, these explanations have difficulty distilling why we see
variation in states’ willingness to engage in mediation across time (even within one
conflict) and why there is variation in the mediation strategies that states employ.

45

While Cold War stability was likely the overarching factor contributing to US
involvement in the Falklands, inter-bloc armed conflict of this type is rare. In addition,
we see a great deal of variation in interest from states in resolving ongoing conflicts over
time.

For instance, the US has at times committed large amounts of resources to

resolving the ongoing conflict between Israelis, Palestinians, and the neighboring Arab
states, including a great deal of the President’s political capital, while at other times, the
incumbent administration focuses its attention elsewhere. Such an occurrence suggests
that a simple state-centric model of mediator motivation is too simple to explain the
politics behind the decision to focus on conflict resolution.
Seeking to explain mediation occurrence (and offers) requires a more nuanced
approach to foreign policy decision making that recognizes that diplomacy is chosen as
one policy option out of the many that state leaders have at their disposal. And, moreover,
a calculated decision process takes place in choosing to focus on mediation from this
range of policy options, which includes domestic and international endeavors. In recent
years, the field of international relations and the study of foreign policy have focused on
political leaders as the key players in decision making. Specifically, because leaders act
in both the domestic and international political realms, but are ultimately held
accountable by a democratic voting audience, foreign policy endeavors are likely to be
undertaken with their domestic political ramifications in mind. Similarly, leaders can
attempt to use foreign policy as a tool to improve their domestic political standing. Thus,
not only do international factors influence domestic politics, as neorealism contends, but
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domestic motivations and constraints influence the way that leaders behave on the
international scene (Putnam 1988; Gourevitch 1978).
Theory of Mediator motivations, Political Survival, and Two-level Games
The concept of two-level games focuses on the notion that domestic politics and
international politics are linked, but only through certain specific actors, political leaders,
who function in both areas and make decisions strategically to further their political
fortunes (Putnam 1988). Thus, the domestic political landscape is not only driven by
international factors, such as the distribution of international power, as neorealism claims,
but also by the domestic political sphere influences international politics. These domestic
factors, such as economic performance, public sentiment and institutional configurations
(veto players, etc.) and institutional makeups (partisan makeup of the legislature) can
expand and constrain the number of potential policy options a leader is likely to have
available to them based on their political goals, the most paramount of which is political
survival. As such, political leaders choose policy options from the range of options
available to them, given domestic and international conditions.
To fully understand how such constraints are likely to influence mediation
behavior, it is first important to understand the cognitive calculus leaders are thought to
perform when making policy choices. Political leaders are thought to value their political
survival above all else (Neustadt 1960; Bueno be Mesquita, et al. 2003). This finding has
led to an emerging consensus among international relations scholars contending that
foreign policy, like domestic policy, is aimed at enhancing a leader’s domestic political
fortunes (e.g., Ostrom and Job, 1986; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et
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al., 2003). Thus, rational political leaders will not select policy options that hinder their
political fortunes or those of their co-partisans. Yet, systematic studies of mediator
motivations, up to this point, have been largely silent as to this possibility. Additionally,
the primary methodological approach to studying the motives of mediating parties has
been the case study (e.g., Touval 2002; 1982; Kleiboer 2009). Examining the decision to
engage in mediation systematically, in light of these domestic political conditions, the
variations in which are likely to change incentives to engage in mediation, will yield a
more complete understanding of the factors affecting such a decision-making process.
Diversionary and Political Uses of Foreign Policy
The notion that political leaders use international politics to improve their
domestic political fortunes has been debated at length when it comes to the use of
military force (see Levy 1989; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Meernik 2001; Fordham 1998;
Foster 2006; Foster and Palmer 2006; Brulé 2006; Brulé and Hwang 2010; Tarar 2006).
The academic debate surrounding the political use of force has centered on identifying
the causal mechanism: What is it about a focus on foreign policy that leaders believe will
improve their domestic political standing? Two schools of thought have emerged: the
rally effects hypothesis and the managerial competence hypothesis, both of which are
outlined and discussed in the next sections.
Party Cover
The prevailing scholarly sentiment about when leaders choose to focus on foreign
policy is embodied in Howell and Pevehouse’s (2007) “party cover” conjecture. Their
argument contends that the president is likely to focus on foreign policy endeavors when
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he enjoys broad support in congress, so as to diffuse responsibility for the endeavor
across branches of government and to keep partisan criticism to a minimum. Similar
arguments suggest that presidents do not want to take actions which may later be
hindered or by congress (Kriner 2006). Thus, while the president enjoys a great deal of
autonomy in foreign policy dealings, his actions are not completely unilateral and the
congress can function as a check on presidential behavior in the foreign policy realm,
even if it does so in the form of partisan criticism or through ex post measures such as the
withholding of funding for the president’s agreements.
Despite the notion of the president’s needing partisan support to “cover” the
administration’s actions, several arguments have been made suggesting that domestic
political conditions, and not necessarily partisan support, create incentives for
engagement in foreign policy. Several scholars suggest that foreign policy, especially the
use of military force, is an appealing policy arena for politically vulnerable leaders
seeking to better their domestic political standing.

The next sections discuss the

prevailing arguments in the literature concerning the matter.
Rally Effects
The initial explanation for how the use of military force can improve a leader’s
domestic political standing involves “rally effects.” The rally effect occurs as result of
the in-group/out-group dynamic (Simmel 1955), whereby presidents seek to divert
attention from poor economic performance (James and Oneal 1991) or other domestic
political woes (such as scandal) by using military force overseas. Thus, they create
domestic political cohesion by shifting the focus of their domestic political audience
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toward a common plight against a foreign adversary—invoking patriotism in the process.
Research has shown, however, that when these rallies do occur, they are often short-lived
and small, lasting only 1-2 months (Russett 1990:35) and yielding only a 2-3% increase
in approval, which ultimately regresses to original levels (Lian and Oneal 1993:283).
Beyond that, research suggests that the “prudent public” is capable of discerning the
policy objectives and calculating the potential risks of a use of force; consequently, they
are unlikely to blindly support the use of force (Jentleson 1992). In sum, these findings
call into question the idea that a leader can actively choose to use force overseas in order
to bolster his domestic approval ratings in an electorally substantive fashion.
The causal mechanism used to explain rally effects in the diversionary literature is
an indirect one, which assumes that an increase in patriotic sentiment or domestic
cohesion translates into approval for the president (Levy 1989). While this correlation
likely does exist in the very short term, many uses of force—the fleeting spike in George
W. Bush’s approval after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for instance—suggests that
substantive boosts in presidential approval are more closely tied to policy success, or at
least the image thereof, than to a public rally in response to the presence of a foreign
adversary.
Managerial Competence
A second explanation for the strategic political use of foreign policy suggests that
the president’s goal is to use international politics as an arena to demonstrate managerial
competence when dealing with complex political issues, thus inducing an increase in his
level of domestic political support (Tarar 2006). This explanation fits well with the
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notions of policy availability and policy substitution (see Brulé 2006; Russet 1990; Gelpi
1997; Marshall and Prins 2011). Such arguments characterize the president as a rational
actor using the resources and processes available to his office to engineer the image of
success, given the institutional constraints he faces.
The policy availability argument, which is most clearly discussed in terms of the
American case, specifically takes into account both the level of congressional support
that the president enjoys, which in turn dictates the policies available to him, as well as
how he is viewed by the public, either directly, through approval surveys, or indirectly,
through economic performance.27

Presidents must act in response to deteriorating

domestic conditions in order to maintain credibility as a leader and favor with the
electorate. However, they are constrained in the number of policy options available to
them based on domestic institutional conditions, specifically an opposing Congress.
Thus, while the passage of domestic legislation is most likely the ideal remedy, under
such conditions an opposition Congress can act as a veto player on presidential attempts
to change domestic policy, causing the president to fall out of favor with the public (see
Mayer 2001, Howell 2005, Tsebelis 1995).
Research has shown, though, that this opposition alone is insufficient to
significantly alter presidential behavior (see Foster and Palmer 2006). However, when
there is congressional opposition and domestic conditions appear to be particularly poor,
such as in times of economic decline, presidential action is necessary to maintain

27

My analysis in this project is limited to the United States and its mediation efforts, primarily for reasons
of manageability. The US can be characterized as a “most-likely” case, thus somewhat limiting the
theoretical generalizability of the results. However, given the prominence of the US a mediator and the
large proportion that US mediations comprise of all mediation make such a limitation a worthwhile one.

51

credibility as a leader and to help his electoral fortunes and also those of his party. As a
result, the President must go outside the domestic policy arena to demonstrate this
competence (See Brulé 2006). In these situations, policy choices must be made from the
range of available policies, which often do not directly address the source of domestic
discontent but rather substitute opportunities for the president to make policy, build good
will, and be portrayed positively in the media to the public. International relations has
been shown to be a ripe policy area for such substitutions because of the president’s
relative autonomy in the foreign policy-making process (Howell 2005: 417, Johnson and
McCormick 1977:117-123, Mayer 2001).
The managerial competence explanation aligns theories of foreign policy and
domestic policy motivation. Like domestic policy, the central goal of foreign policy,
from the president’s perspective, is to help establish a record of successful policies and
proposals that reap some domestic political benefit. Thus, he has incentives to mobilize
the numerous resources and processes available to his office to achieve that end. This
explanation also fits with theories of a “prudent public” and their interpretations of
presidential action (Jentleson 1992).

Rather than simply diverting attention from

domestic problems by channeling patriotism, the president attempts to build a record of
success through foreign policy and thus bolster support for himself domestically. While
blind patriotism is likely to wane, a record of policy successes is more likely to help the
president’s political fortunes over the long term. Because foreign policy is often highly
visible and because the president has a great deal of agenda-setting power in that arena
(see Cohen 1995; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Villalobos and Sirin 2012; Andrade and
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Young 1996), attention to foreign policy issues is likely to provide him with many
opportunities for success.
Policy Availability and Mediation
In applying this rationale to mediation, I begin with the assumption that presidents
attempt to establish a record of policies, proposals, and positions that enhance their
electoral fortunes or those of their party (e.g., Neustadt 1960; Bond and Fleisher 1990;
Richards, et al. 1993). When poor domestic circumstances arise, the president proposes
remedial policies in an effort to curtail potential voter dissatisfaction. If a president
succeeds in implementing policies that are credited with alleviating the problem, the
success of his legislative initiatives may contribute to his reputation as a skilled leader. In
addition, partisan support for the president in congress is likely to provide “cover” for
policy initiatives by diffusing responsibility for endeavors.

The presence of an

uncooperative Congress, however, reduces the number of remedial policies available
(Bond and Fleisher 1990), compelling the president to look beyond the domestic arena
for opportunities to demonstrate his competence (Richards, et al. 1993). This greater
focus on foreign policy issues and the international arena increases the likelihood that the
president pursues mediation during periods of domestic hardship and congressional
opposition.
When an opposition Congress prevents the president from directly addressing
poor economic performance, the president may concentrate on problems that either do
not require the cooperation of Congress, or issues that transcend partisan and ideological
lines. Success in addressing these types of issues may indicate to the public that the
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president is an adept manager of national problems (Richards, et al. 1993).

The

president’s de facto ascendancy in foreign policy provides an obvious stage for such
demonstrations (see e.g., Hinckley 1994; Meernik 1994; Howell and Pevehouse 2005).
In this regard, the president may focus intently on international affairs, taking
positions and offering solutions for international dilemmas. Because foreign policy
issues frequently transcend partisan and ideological lines (e.g., Stoll 1987; Schultz 2001),
a legislative opposition may be unwilling or unable to block foreign policy proposals in
the same manner as they oppose the executive’s socio-economic policy initiatives.
Consequently, presidents should have a greater capacity to affect foreign policy than
social or economic policy. In the context of international mediation, such capacity
translates into greater credibility the president or his surrogates, increasing the likelihood
that a mediation offer is accepted and ultimately, successful.
Mediation as an Appealing Policy Option
In positing this argument, it is important to note the unique characteristics that
mediation has as a policy option that set it apart from others, and traits that are likely to
make it appealing to leaders seeking to use foreign policy to improve their domestic
political standing.
The literature on policy substitutions suggests that foreign policy substitution is
possible, largely because the president enjoys a greater amount of latitude when it comes
to such issues (Most and Starr 1984; Howell 2005, Johnson and McCormick 1977; Mayer
2001). Much of the empirical literature on this substitution effect has used the political
use of force as the primary dependent variable. However, the theoretical argument can be
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made that when faced with the domestic conditions of a worsening economy and
congressional opposition, mediation should be an attractive policy for US Presidents due
to the number of opportunities that such engagement provides for speeches, photo
opportunities, and other outlets to build the image of being competent, as well as the
chance to successfully create policy without the check of the opposing Congress.
Because the President is also constrained by the sentiments of potential voters,
mediation should be attractive due to its low audience cost (see Bueno de Mesquita, et al.
2003). While the political use of force overseas has a higher potential audience cost
because of the chance that lives will be lost, because other states in the system might be
angered, or because the overall campaign will be billed as a loss, mediation, which is
non-coercive, is relatively costless because it leaves the ultimate decision-making power
in the hands of the disputing parties. Furthermore, the use of mediation as substitute for
domestic policy under such conditions reconciles the policy availability argument with
notion of strategic conflict avoidance, a critique of the diversionary use of force
hypothesis. The strategic conflict avoidance theory contends that leaders in foreign states
act strategically in response to the domestic conditions that face a US President. Because
leaders know that a US President is likely to be more risk-accepting when faced with
domestic opposition, coupled with the argument that democratic states are unlikely to
lose conflicts that the initiate, they are less likely to make provocative statements or
otherwise induce conflict (see Fordham 1998; Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal
1991; Maoz and Russett 1993). Therefore, while an argument has been made that the use
of force is less likely to be an available policy for the President when facing domestic
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opposition, mediation will still be an available option due to its non-binding, non-violent
nature.
Additionally, the range of possible outcomes for a mediation effort is greater than
those for the use of military force. While military endeavors are most often portrayed as
wins and losses, or successful and unsuccessful missions, diplomatic endeavors have
many more “in-between” outcomes, all of which can potentially frame the president as a
competent manager of complex political issues, if not be framed a policy win. Thus,
engaging in military force, especially where victory, or more often “success” is not
assured, is a risky proposition for leaders even if it may have some political payoffs. As
previously discussed, most mediation efforts are unsuccessful, meaning no negotiated
settlement occurs. However, given that an overwhelming proportion of mediation offers
are accepted (90%), it is plausible that the mere ability to get two disputing factions to
come together for peace talks can be framed as a policy success for a leader. Similarly,
the ability to broker a cease-fire or partial settlement can be portrayed as a policy success
as the result of a competent leader. Because, mediation is so often unsuccessful, it can be
characterized as a difficult endeavor requiring a competent manager. Such a
characteristic, which, unlike the use of force in many cases, satisfies Tarar’s (2005)
contention that diversionary endeavors will only lead to improved domestic standing for
leaders if the public recognizes them as sufficiently difficult.
While mediation has not been directly tested, scholarly evidence shows that the
American public regularly rallies in support of peace-oriented foreign policy (Page and
Shapiro 1992; Brace and Hinckley 1992), suggesting that there are political incentives for
56

mediation by US Presidents. Additionally, the practice of acting “dovish” in foreign
policy in order to bolster domestic approval has been employed by several
administrations in the post-World War II period (Burbach 2004). For example, Dwight
Eisenhower’s administration sought to position him as a peacemaker at the conclusion of
the Korean War, and, to that end, he was vocal in calling for an improvement in USSoviet relations.

In this regard, he engaged in a high-profile meeting with Nikita

Khrushchev as the 1960 elections neared, in order to improve the prospects of Republican
candidates, despite Eisenhower’s being a lame duck (Hughes 1962:106-117, Adams
1961). Similarly, Lyndon Johnson consciously sought to appear as a peacemaker in in
1968, halting strategic bombings of Vietnam in the lead-up to elections. Even Richard
Nixon, perhaps the most visible proponent of US operations in Vietnam, attempted to
appear dovish, timing troop withdrawals to maintain public support (see Burbach 2004).
When taken in consideration with the risks associated with the use of force, thirdparty mediation should be attractive to presidents. Unlike the use of force, mediation has
less potential to be a politically expensive policy choice because it incurs few costs up
front and does not ultimately bear many of the costs of failure. Mediating an overseas
dispute not only lacks the potential for violent loss of life associated with military force,
it also requires a minimum commitment of resources and political capital from the
mediator at the outset, which in turn minimizes the risk that he must accept in attempting
to extract a political benefit. Failure to succeed is also less likely to negatively affect a
president’s fortunes. As was seen in the case of the Iran Hostage Crisis, where the failure
of a military operation negatively affected President Jimmy Carter’s domestic standing
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and chance of re-election, failure in the use of force is likely to have dire consequences
for a president. As a mediator, however, a president has less to lose. Should a president
deem that mediation of a particular conflict will not yield the previously expected
political benefits, or, if negotiations should break down, he can walk away having
committed very few resources to the process. In cases where talks break down, the
president can deflect much of the criticism for such a failure onto the conflicting parties,
especially in cases where he sought to manipulate the payoffs with significant
concessions or guarantees to one or both sides. Moreover, a presidential administration
can claim victory, without having to share the credit with Congress, as the administration
has a monopoly on formal foreign policy proceedings undertaken on behalf of the state.
As a result, acting as a mediator is lower-risk policy option than the use of military force
for leaders seeking to use foreign policy to demonstrate their competence as a leader to a
domestic audience.
Models of Media and the Presidency
In addition to mediation’s unique characteristics, leaders, such as the US
president, have the ability to ensure that mediation attempts are sufficiently high-profile,
so as to yield a positive through manipulation of information in the media.

The

presidency carries with it significant national prestige in the form of a high level of media
attention, which the president can seek to manipulate for his political benefit and that of
his party (Bennett 1990, Altheide and Snow 1991, Bennett, et al. 2007). This attention is
primarily focused on the actions of the president himself, but a disproportionate amount
of media attention is also focused on his high-level surrogates—such as the vice
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president, cabinet secretaries, and special envoys—who are tasked by the president with
representing the US in negotiating foreign policy issues requiring specific attention and
expertise.

A prominent explanation of the asymmetrical coverage of high level

government officials is Bennett’s (1990) indexing hypothesis.

According to this

argument, the media relies upon the volume of reports, press conferences, sound bites,
and other media moments provided by the president, his staff, and other components of
government for a consistent supply of news. Such reliance, married with the numerous
resources that the president has to craft his message and image, creates news that
primarily serves to generate support for the government’s position.
In applying this framework to mediation, it appears as though the president and
his high-level surrogates have a great deal of power to manipulate the manner in which
they are depicted to the public via the media. Third-party mediation is highly visible in
the media when conducted by high-level officials (Burbach 2004).28 Therefore, when
mediation is attempted and is likely to be successful, or to at least project the image of
success, it is probable that the president will play a key role in the process in order to
magnify the political benefits to be extracted as a result of a high level of media
attention.29 Likewise, high-level officials will likely serve as mediators when success is
still probable, but not in cases where the administration expects little marginal benefit to

28

Burbach’s data collection of New York Times articles pertaining to US mediations showed 20 front page
stories pertaining on Kissinger’s 1974 “shuttle diplomacy,” 11 on the Dayton meeting to end hostilities in
Bosnia in 1995, and 15 on Clinton’s Wye River conference in 1998.
29
Perhaps the clearest demonstration of a president’s involvement increasing the political salience and
media coverage of a mediation event is President Bill Clinton’s role at the signing of the Oslo Accords in
1993. Although he was not directly involved in the mediation process, the signing ceremony on the White
House lawn and his image shaking hands with Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat increased the Accords’
visibility immensely and portrayed Clinton in a positive light as a peacemaker.
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direct presidential involvement. In contrast, by employing lower level diplomats and
officials to deal with the latter, the president can attempt to avoid policy issues that are
not expected to generate political capital, could be potentially damaging, or could be
disproportionately costly. By avoiding these pitfalls, the president can shift his policy
focus, and thus media coverage, to areas and issues where he is likely to be more
successful. Additionally, low-level officials can be employed in diplomacy to pay “lip
service” to certain domestic constituencies who have an interest in some foreign policy
outcome without occupying an inordinate number of the administration’s resources.
Coupled with mediation’s minimal risk, especially relative to other available policy
options, the president’s capacity to manipulate the news to project an image of success—
along with the high level of media attention paid to presidential actions—suggests that an
administration can expect to see political gains from engagement in mediation.
Findings in the Mediation Literature Suggesting Strategic Mediation
Mediator motivation is an aspect of the diplomatic process that has been largely
unaddressed in the academic literature, despite theoretical and empirical evidence that
suggests that mediators are motivated by more than the altruism associated with
peacefully resolving a conflict (see e.g. Touval 2001, Kleiboer 2002). Some scholars
have criticized the mediation research program for its lack of theoretical integration with
the foreign policy literature (see Touval 2003), but little work has been done to reconcile
the two. Because mediation is a voluntary, non-binding form of conflict resolution, the
study of mediation has fallen under the greater normative auspices of conflict resolution
and therefore focused primarily on the sources of mediation success (Touval 2003). As
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previously discussed, scholars have often made the assumption that mediators are
motivated primarily by conflict resolution, and the many factors thought to contribute to
foreign policy motivations are not examined.

Although several scholars note that

mediation should not be seen as a purely altruistic enterprise (Bercovitch 2002, Kleiboer
2002) and that mediators have their own set of payoffs separate from those of the
conflicting parties (Touval 1992, Princen 1992), these propositions have rarely been
included in empirical tests. Instead, policy prescriptions in the form of systematically
collected conclusions about peacefully resolving conflicts have dominated the mediation
research program.
Where mediator motivation has been addressed, it has been explained in terms of
structure level factors such as alliance ties (Bobrow 1981, Kleiboer 2002) or economic
and historical ties (Grieg and Regan 2008), and mediators have been coded as
unchanging in their capabilities and resolve toward mediation success. However, if
mediation is to be considered an instrument/tool of foreign policy, then the factors
driving leaders to engage in mediation should be taken into account when examining
outcomes. Because of this strong consensus emerging in the foreign policy literature
contending that leaders use foreign policy to enhance their own domestic political
fortunes (and those of their party), structural and/or liberal explanations alone are not
sufficient to explain leaders’ foreign policy behavior (Ostrom and Job 1986; Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003). These conclusions have primarily been tested in studies that
examine the use of force (see Brulé 2006; Marshall and Prins 2011; Foster and Palmer
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2006), although their theoretical underpinnings suggest an application to the entire range
of foreign policy options available to presidents.
Despite the lack of focus on mediator motivations, there are several findings in
the mediation literature that highlight the discrepancy between mediators’ goals and those
of the belligerent parties in a conflict and thus indirectly suggest that mediators are using
mediation as a tool to sure up their domestic political standing. First, mediators are the
most common initiators of the mediation process, responsible for initiating roughly 50%
of all mediations (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Bercovitch and Fretter 2007). Such
activity on the part of leaders suggests that there is some political benefit to be gained by
such action, especially given the primacy of political survival in leader’s decision
calculus. Additionally, mediators are most likely to intervene in a conflict when it is
most hostile, and thus when the belligerent parties are least likely to be amenable to
mediation (Greig 2005). However, overseas conflicts are most visible to the media and to
voters at times when they are most hostile. By offering to mediate at such times, state
leaders can be argued to be focusing primarily on the potential domestic benefits that can
be gained through attempting conflict management and less on a long-term, durable
peace agreement, the political benefits of which are likely more diffuse.
Beyond these considerations, conflicts in which mediators have used their power
and resources to manipulate the belligerents’ payoffs under a conflict resolution scheme
are likely to experience relapses in violence (Yuen and Werner 2005). Such a finding
suggests that manipulative mediation strategies, which powerful state mediators are most
adept at using, are sufficient for inducing a short-term settlement, but not sufficient for
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effectively guaranteeing long-term peace. Such a solution is likely politically beneficial
to the mediator, who has incentives to focus on much shorter political horizons (those of
the election cycle and domestic politics) than the belligerents, who have incentives to
focus on the longer-term.
Similarly, Pruitt (1981) highlights the problems likely to stem from such mediator
behavior in his analysis of Henry Kissinger’s work in the Middle East. He argues that
because Kissinger, and later President Jimmy Carter, used the US’s resources to
compensate both the Israelis and the Egyptians, they complicated the conflict resolution
process. By compensating both sides for making concessions, the mediator assumes
more responsibility for conflict resolution and each of the disputants gains incentives to
try to improve their lot vis-à-vis the third party. These findings, taken together, suggest
that mediators choose to become involved in conflict management efforts at times when
conflicts are most visible to their respective domestic audiences, and that they use their
many resources to induce a peaceful settlement, despite the fact that the mediation’s
timing and the orientation of the disputants are likely to preclude, or, at least complicate,
a successful agreement over the long term. In sum, these findings point the act of
mediation as a political one, most likely focused on its domestic political impact, rather
than long term peace.
Implications of the Literature and Theory
This discussion of mediation, diversion, and foreign policy decision making
suggests that several previously un-tested domestic factors play a role in the decision to
seek out and engage in mediation. By integrating the conflict resolution literature with
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the mainstream foreign policy literature, one can argue that presidents have incentives to
use mediation in response to poor domestic performance, such as declining economic
performance and declining approval ratings as a result of scandal, policy failure, etc.,
especially when the presence of an opposing Congress makes the passage of domestic
legislation that directly addresses such problems difficult. It can also be argued that
because leaders’ primary objective is political survival, that election proximity increases
these incentives, as well.
Such conclusions lead me to posit the following general hypothesis at the
conceptual level:
When confronted with an opposition legislature and domestic vulnerability,
leaders should be seen engaging in mediation behavior which is likely to help
improve their domestic standing.
Concrete, testable hypotheses stemming from this general conjecture are discussed in the
proceeding paragraphs.
Research on the economy, approval ratings, and voting suggest that voters
evaluate incumbents based on recent and current economic conditions as well as future
prospects of success for recent and proposed economic policies (e.g., Norpoth, 1996;
Clarke and Stewart, 1994; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Fiorina 1981). Voter
dissatisfaction with the economy due to sluggish growth, or higher than expected
unemployment or inflation, decreases incumbent parties’ vote share (Palmer and Whitten
2000). The need to show managerial competence provides leaders with incentives to
pursue foreign policy in an effort to reverse declining approval ratings (Tarar 2006;
DeRouen 1995; Morgan and Bickers 1992) or to divert attention from deteriorating
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economic conditions (e.g., Fordham 1998; Hess and Orphanides 1995). In other words,
democratic leaders can make trade-offs between economic performance and foreign
policy in their quest for votes (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Miller 1995). When the economy is
performing poorly, leaders expect electoral punishment; but foreign policy success may
reverse the leader’s dire political prospects if voters reward the leadership for competence
in foreign affairs (e.g., Richards, et al. 1993).

Thus, I posit the following testable

hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: Presidents are more likely to engage in mediations in response to
poor economic performance when confronted with an opposition legislature.
Because the president and his high-level deputies command a disproportionate
level of media attention, the rank of the mediator employed should increase in such
situations:
Hypothesis 1b: Presidents are likely to dispatch higher ranked mediators in
response to poor economic performance when confronted with an opposition
legislature.
In addition to these domestic political factors influencing the occurrence of
mediation, and who mediates, they are also likely to affect the way that mediation is
carried out. For instance, I have argued at some length that leaders are likely to try to
manipulate the payoffs for one or both conflicting parties in order to induce a peaceful
agreement to end hostilities, but also to do so in a way that leads to short term boosts in
their own prestige and credibility:
Hypothesis 1c: Presidents are likely to employ manipulative mediation strategies
in response to poor economic performance when confronted with an opposition
legislature.
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Mediation should also be an attractive policy for a president to pursue when faced
with declining approval and a hostile opposing Congress, due to the fact that it is a less
costly than other options available to him. Mediation can be a high profile endeavor that
gives a president exclusive media attention where Congress is largely absent. Thus, it is
an opportunity for the president and other high ranking officials within the executive
branch to appear competent as leaders and who are working toward policy success in
difficult or important policy areas. Such a rationale suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: Presidents are more likely to engage in mediations in response to
low approval when confronted with an opposition legislature.
In a parallel argument to that above, the president and his high-level deputies
command a disproportionate level of media attention. Because of this high level of
media coveragethe rank of the mediator employed should increase in situations where
declining approval and a hostile legislature necessitate a policy success through foreign
policy:
Hypothesis 2b: Presidents are likely to dispatch higher ranked mediators in
response to poor economic performance when confronted with an opposition
legislature.
Leaders also have incentives to manipulate in mediation when they face low
levels of approval and an opposition legislature, which limit their ability to move
domestic legislation:
Hypothesis 2c: Presidents are likely to employ manipulative mediation strategies
in response to low approval when confronted with an opposition legislature.
Due to the need for political survival, mediation is also likely to be seen as a
policy option when nearing elections necessitate policy victories. The primary avenue
through which the president should seek to build a record of policy successes is moving
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domestic legislation (Neustadt 1960; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Richards, et al. 1993).
However, as previously discussed, an opposition Congress can make the passage of
legislation to such ends difficult (Mayer 2001; Howell and Pevehouse 2005). In these
cases, the president should be seen addressing those issues which do not require
congressional cooperation.
A similar vulnerability is built into the political structure in the form of elections.
Similar to declining domestic performance, impending elections make presidents
vulnerable in that there is an increased focus on their behavior and thus a greater need for
policy success. Such a perspective is supported by the literature that suggests leaders are
less likely to use military force as the chances that they will be removed from office
increase (Chiozza and Goemans 2003; 2011; Gaubatz 1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003). Nearing elections create a situation where that scenario is more likely. Thus,
when confronted with both an opposition congress, which is likely to make the passage of
domestic legislation difficult, and an upcoming election, presidents have incentives to
focus on foreign policy to build this desired record of success.
Because presidents who use force as elections near are likely to be punished by
voters, they generally use military force early in their tenures (Gaubatz 1991). Thus, in
situations where domestic policy avenues are largely unavailable to the president, yet
nearing elections create a need for high-profile policy successes, mediating overseas
conflicts should be an attractive policy outlet. Because mediation is both high-profile and
low-risk, relative to other available policy options, a high payoff for a presidential
administration is likely:
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Hypothesis 3a: Presidents are more likely to engage in mediations as elections
near when confronted with an opposition legislature.
As I argued with regard to economic performance and approval, because the
president and his high-level deputies command a disproportionate level of media
attention, the rank of the mediator employed should increase in such situations where a
hostile legislature makes passing domestic policy difficult:
Hypothesis 3b: Presidents are likely to dispatch higher ranked mediators in
response to nearing elections when confronted with an opposition legislature.
Leaders also have incentives to manipulate in mediation when they confront
nearing elections and an opposition legislature, which limits their ability to move
domestic legislation:
Hypothesis 3c: Presidents are likely to employ manipulative mediation strategies
as elections near when confronted with an opposition legislature.
Each of these three sets of hypotheses suggests how presidential administrations
should act when confronted with domestic vulnerability that is best remedied through a
series of policy successes, but legislative institutional configurations make the passage of
domestic policy difficult or, at least, inefficient and cumbersome.

Such conditions

suggest that the president believes that he and his administration are likely to make
political gains as a result of engaging in mediation. Thus, understanding the extent to
which presidents actually benefit from such engagement is a key next step in
understanding the dynamics of how domestic concerns drive mediator/mediation
behavior. Because it has been argued that presidents use mediation endeavors to better
their political fortunes, an increase in presidential approval should be seen as a result of
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mediation occurrence.

Additionally, increases in mediator rank and manipulative

strategies should result in increases in presidential approval:
Hypothesis 4a: An increase in the highest rank of mediator employed in a given
quarter will result in an increase in presidential approval rating in the subsequent
quarter.
Hypothesis 4b: As the public’s attentiveness to foreign policy increases, the
positive effect of a mediator’s rank on presidential approval should also increase.
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Chapter 3: Data and Research Design

In this chapter, I outline the theoretical and practical aspects of my research
design and discuss my reasons for using particular research techniques. First, I discuss
my rationale for limiting my investigation to US mediations, as a starting point in the
analysis of how mediation is driven by domestic political factors. Secondly, I discuss the
structure of the proceeding empirical chapters. Then, I discuss the International Conflict
Management Dataset broadly, pointing out several of its strengths and weaknesses for
this type of analysis. Next, I describe the key dependent variables that I use to test the
propositions I have made about leader behavior in light of domestic political conditions.
From that point, I discuss the key independent variables that I argue are responsible for
driving the relationships that should be seen, the controls that I use and the estimation
techniques that I use and how the results should be interpreted.
In order to test the theoretical propositions that I outline in the previous chapter,
large-N quantitative methods are most appropriate. Because the goal is to make
theoretical generalizations about the relationship between domestic politics, leader
decision making, and foreign policy behavior, such techniques can help to explain realworld events across time and presidential administration, rather than at one single point in
time or in one case. Because there is a large literature suggesting that foreign policy is
substitutable, meaning that several policy avenues can be pursued to yield a desired
domestic outcome (Most and Starr 1984; Reed and Clark 2005), I specify models similar
to those used to test the influence of domestic politics on the decision to use military
force.

After making this argument, I go further to test whether such behavior has
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substantive effects on leaders’ popularity, which should help their domestic political
fortunes.
Case Selection
In this dissertation, I examine the decision to mediate in light of the policy
availability argument for cases of US mediation behavior from 1945-1995. The decision
to limit my analysis to the US case is largely based on matters of practicality and
feasibility. However, there are some theoretically driven reasons for doing so as well,
which I discuss below.
Pzeworski and Tuene (1970) famously argued that theory construction in the
social sciences should be conducted in such a way that proper names can be removed
from discussions, as they should apply to categories of phenomena, not just single cases.
Similarly it has been (Sartori 1970; Verba 1967) argued that theories should have
“travel,” meaning that they should be sufficiently generalizable to apply to similar
situations occurring in different places and times. As such, limiting the analysis to US
mediation behavior somewhat limits the extent to which empirical results support a more
general theory. However, given that the ultimate goal of studying mediation processes is
to better understand how to peacefully resolve conflict and that the United States engages
in an overwhelming proportion of international conflict mediation attempts (Bercovitch
and Schneider 2000), limiting analysis to just US cases for practical matters does not
necessarily hinder the attainment of such a goal.
As previously mentioned, practicality plays a large part in the decision to limit the
analysis to one country. The ICM dataset was originally conceived to construct theories
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about the factors contributing to mediation success.

As such, variables concerning

mediator identity were coded primarily by category, rather by individual or state.30
Information about the individuals’ identities and affiliations is contained in an appendix
and is not part of the main dataset. In turn, a great deal of energy must be put in to
coding mediator involvement, identities, ranks, etc. Limiting the analysis to the US
makes such a study more feasible, while producing results that shed light on the
plausibility that these relationships may exist across states, or, at the very least, across
powerful states. Ideally a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between
domestic politics and diplomacy can be undertaken in the future.
The policy availability argument, as posited, rests heavily on the interplay
between Congress and the president peculiar to the United States’ case. In the US, the
president has a disproportionate amount of unchecked formal power in the conduct of
foreign policy, relative to domestic policy. Congress is thought to be a veto player on
presidential action; although this is an ex post veto when it comes to matters of foreign
policy (Schultz 2001).

However, in several states, especially those employing

parliamentary systems, the executive and the legislature are more directly linked and
therefore a more unified decision-making process occurs. Thus, the incentives for and
constraints on foreign policy behavior for domestic gains are not as clearly defined
(Tsebelis 1999).31 This difference in institutional structures has led to several studies that

30

For instance, the ICM codes “functional mediator identity,” which codes individual mediators as “leader
of a powerful state,” “representative of a powerful state,” “leader of a weak state,” “representative of a
weak state,” “representative of an international organization,” etc.
31
Some scholars have argued that a similar relationship exists in parliamentary governments with minority
coalitions (Brulé and Williams 2009; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004; Prins and Sprecher 1999).
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have taken similar approaches, whereby only the US is examined (see Ostrom and
Job1986; Brule 2006; Foster 2006) or only parliamentary systems are considered (Prins
and Sprecher 1999; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004) and relatively few studies (see
Brulé and Williams 2009) address both government types at once. So, while limiting
analysis to cases of mediation within a single state might limit the extent to which
theoretical generalizations across states can be made from the results, it does not
invalidate the research.
Structure of Empirical Chapters
In Chapter 2, I posited three sets of hypotheses, each of which implies a
relationship between domestic politics and mediation behavior. I test and report each set
of hypotheses in a separate empirical chapter. Chapter 4 tests hypotheses 1a, 1b, and1c,
as well as hypotheses 2a, 2b, and, 2c. I chose to report these results together because
they both focus on how measures of the president’s domestic performance and the
makeup of Congress affect his decision making process. Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c, all
of which deal with the election cycle and decisions to engage in mediation, are tested and
discussed in Chapter 5. Hypotheses 4a and 4b, which focus on the extent to which
engagement in mediation helps to improve a president’s domestic standing, are tested and
discussed in Chapter 6.
My reason for structuring the empirical results in these three chapters is to present
three theoretically related models that are theoretically supported and empirically
plausible, rather than presenting a single model that has three parts.

As, such the

variables used as explanatory variables in one chapter are dependent variables in another.
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Because this is a relatively new avenue of research, especially with regard to mediation,
the goal is to present arguments that confirm the relationship between domestic and
international politics. Ideally, it paves the way for further, more refined research that can
specify the model more precisely, both in terms of theory and methodology.
Data
The International Conflict Management Dataset
The primary source of data on conflict resolution behavior is Jacob Bercovitch’s
International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset, which contains information about
mediation and other types of conflict management from 1945-1995. Additionally, I
introduce several independent variables commonly used in the foreign policy and linkage
politics literatures to measure how domestic politics is likely to influence leader behavior
in the international sphere.32 In this chapter, I begin by discussing my rationale for
examining US mediation behavior. 33 Then, I continue by describing the data and then
discuss my rationale for using such data in detail. From these discussions, I posit three
sets of concrete, testable hypotheses (each to be analyzed in a subsequent chapter) about
the relationships that should be observed, and then, finally discuss the statistical
techniques that I use to test them and how the results should be interpreted.

32

These variables include data on economic performance, presidential approval, the partisan composition
of Congress, the president’s ability to pass legislation, and the public’s attentiveness to foreign policy.
33
I purposely use the term “mediation behavior” to describe not only the offer/occurrence of mediation, but
also the strategy employed, official(s) sent, etc. which are likely to be calculated political decisions based
on the expected utility of such choices.
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The International Conflict Management dataset observes conflict management
attempts in conflicts from 1945-1995, with data collected from several sources.34 It
contains data about the nature of the conflict, the belligerent parties, and the conflict
management environment, including mediators. The dataset has several characteristics
that make it especially good for testing propositions about the effect of domestic politics
on mediation behavior. First, it focuses on process. Bercovitch (1986) developed his
contingency framework of mediation process, which identifies roughly 50 variables that
may affect mediation outcomes (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007). While some datasets, such
as the International Conflict Behavior (ICB) dataset, choose to focus on the conflict as
the level of analysis (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000), the ICM dataset allows scholars
to look at mediation from the perspective of the mediator, as well as the conflict, and thus
the perspective of two-level decision making. Similarly, the ICM dataset examines
mediation behavior in both international and civil conflicts at the same time. Such a data
structure allows for the testing of hypotheses concerning a leader’s decision calculus and
not merely characteristics of the conflict environment.
In addition to having the appropriate focus of data, the ICM dataset also draws
from a broader set of conflicts, including inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the same
dataset. Bercovitch and Fretter (2007; 148) define a conflict as “an organized and
continuous militarized conflict, or the demonstration of intention to use military force by
at least one state.” This characteristic, which differs from both the ICB and Militarized
Interstate Disputes (MID) datasets, recognizes that, from the perspective of the mediator,

34

A table listing the data sources is published in Bercovitch and Fretter’s (2007) International Negotiation
article outlining the dataset on pp. 150-151.
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decisions of when and where to engage in mediation are likely to be similar across
conflict type. While research has shown that civil conflicts are more difficult to mediate
than international conflicts (see Melin and Svensson 2009), the tools that mediators have
at their disposal in each case are the same. Beyond that, excluding one type of conflict or
the other introduces unnecessary selection bias, and interferes with the ability to test
hypotheses pertaining to leaders’ decision making, as mediation in one type of conflict
may preclude or otherwise influence the decision to mediate elsewhere.35
Additionally, the dataset has a lower threshold for an incident to be considered a
conflict, than several other datasets coding international conflict events. As such, no
minimum threshold for fatalities is used (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007: 153).

This

characteristic allows the examination of “conflict” where the resort to violence has not
yet happened in addition to occasions where it has. Such a differentiation recognizes that
all political “conflict” begins as some political disagreement and escalates through
various levels of animosity and violence—the highest of which is war—but also that
there is at least some potential for mediation at all levels (Dixon 1996; 656).
From such a framework, descriptive data were collected and coded with the
conflict management attempt being the primary unit of analysis.36 The data are divided
into three primary subgroups, conflict management variables, party variables, and dispute
variables. Conflict management variables deal with the conflict management process,

35

Bercovitch and Fretter (2007) outline their rationale for including both inter-state and intra-state conflicts
in the same analysis on pp154-155. Their reasons include the goal of establishing data that lead to broad
and generalizable analyses about conflict management. Thus, a wide number of conflicts that vary in terms
size/power of actors, international power structure, etc. are considered.
36
Each “line” of data in the original dataset is a conflict management attempt.
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including what type of mediator was involved, the strategies they employed, etc. Party
variables describe characteristics of and relationships between the disputing parties.
Dispute variables describe the nature of the dispute.
As Bercovitch and Fretter note in their 2007 article outlining and discussing the
merits of the ICM dataset, analysis is largely limited to formal mediations and offers
thereof.

Due to the sometimes secretive nature of foreign policy, the number of

mediations offered, but never accepted may be somewhat under-determined. Along these
lines, it could be argued that there was more or less a standing offer from the Clinton
administration to mediate between Israelis and Palestinians during his second term.
Therefore, the data may be somewhat skewed, leaving out offers of mediation.
My analysis focuses on how constraints and incentives created by domestic
politics influence the occurrence and strategy of mediation. Because these constraints
and incentives vary over time, using times-series analytical techniques are necessary.
Thus, I create a time-series of quarterly observations from 1945-1995 from which to
analyze the variation in US mediation behavior.37 Additionally, in order to test the
hypotheses, I create three new dependent variables which measure US mediation
behavior. I discuss these variables below and test this behavior in Chapters 4 and 5.
Finally, because I argue that engagement in mediation should help a president’s domestic

37

Of the 227 US mediation attempts over the data period, only 6 last 3 months (1 quarter year) or longer.
Consequently, the quarter is the most appropriate division of time to analyze. Because most mediation
attempts last less than 1 quarter, it is most likely that quarterly measures of the key explanatory variables
and controls will most validly influence the dependent variables within time period. For methodological
reasons, some independent variables are lagged to ensure temporal precedence to the dependent variable.
The rationale for such a decision is discussed later in this chapter.
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political fortunes, I test how engagement in mediation influences presidential approval in
chapter 6.
Dependent Variables for Chapters 4 and 5
Because Bercovitch’s dataset attempts to make broadly applicable conclusions
about mediation processes, the specific identities of mediators are relegated to an
appendix for reference. General categories, such as “leader of a powerful state” are
created in order to measure mediator characteristics. However, because my analysis
focuses on how domestic independent variables influence a state’s international conflict
management behavior, dependent variables must capture the state’s involvement in
conflict management. Accordingly, I use the information from Appendix 2 to create
three new dependent variables, which I use to test hypotheses sets 1-3: US Mediations,
US Mediator Rank, and US Mediation Strategy, which are described in greater detail in
the next three sections.
US Mediations
US Mediations is an event count variable that counts the number of new
mediation attempts that the United States becomes involved in or offers in a given
quarter. Care was taken to ensure that the mediator was sent on behalf of the US
administration and was able to negotiate on its behalf.38 Offers are included along with
actual attempts because the goal is to examine the extent to which the US administration
is focusing resources and attention on mediation.

38

Thus, instances in which Americans served as mediators in a private capacity, such as Jimmy Carter’s
work as head of the Carter Center, have been excluded. Conflicts in which the US is a party are excluded as
well, thus excluding mediation/negotiation attempts by the Rev. Jesse Jackson.
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Table 3.1 shows the distribution of US Mediations. The modal value is 1 new
mediation attempt per quarter, which occurs in 62 quarters from 1945-1995. The secondmost common value is 0, no new mediations in a quarter. Frequency of values tends to
decrease as the number of new mediation attempts/offers per quarter increases, with 48
quarters in which 2 new attempts/offers are made, 17 in which 3 are made, 6 in which 4
are made, 4 in which 5 are made, 1 in which 6 are made, 2 in which 7 are made, and 1 in
which 8 are made. So, while it is common for the United States to become involved
in/offer new mediations regularly, it becomes progressively less common for it to do so
as a number of mediations have already been offered/undertaken.39
By counting US mediations, the extent to which administrations focus on
mediation can be tested. However, because the theoretical argument being posited here is
that mediation is undertaken with the intent of inducing an increase in support for the
administration from the domestic public, more focused dependent variables that capture
the likelihood that mediation attempts are high in profile, as well as those capturing the
urgency and vigor with which the administration pursues successful conflict management
are appropriate.
US Mediator Rank
The second dependent variable that I use to capture US mediation behavior is US
Mediator Rank. This is an ordinal variable used to measure the level of commitment and
urgency with which an administration seeks to mediate, as well as the amount of media
coverage that such an endeavor will receive.

39

Because I argue that presidential

It should be noted that several attempts/offers can be made for the same conflict, within a given quarter.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of US Mediations
US Mediations per
quarter

Frequency

Percent

Cum. Percent

0

60

29.85

29.85

1

62

30.88

60.72

2

48

23.88

84.60

3

17

8.46

93.06

4

6

2.99

96.05

5

4

1.99

98.04

6

1

0.49

98.51

7

2

0.10

99.49

8

1

0.49

100.00

Total

201

100.00

Mean = 1.40
Variance = 2.04
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administrations seek to use mediation in order to generate the image of a policy success,
presidents should be seen mediating themselves, or sending high-level deputies to
mediate in their stead in order to garner the most media attention from such an endeavor.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of values for US Mediator Rank, codes the
highest-ranking new mediator in a given quarter. The rationale for using the highestranking mediator in a quarter is that the highest-ranking mediator employed by an
administration is likely to most accurately denote the extent to which any mediation
attempt is likely to be salient in the media and thus the extent to which the administration
is likely to benefit from such an attempt being portrayed as a success. Because the
president is visible at a higher level than any of his surrogates and he commands a great
deal more media attention, mediation attempts in which he serves as the mediator are
coded as a 3, the highest value for the variable. High-level surrogates of the president are
coded as a 2, the second-highest value for the variable. These officials include the vice
president, cabinet members, and special envoys sent by the president to mediate with his
authority. While these officials are likely to warrant some media coverage and their
efforts are likely to be discussed publicly, it will likely be at a lower level than that of the
president.

Low-level mediators, those who are likely to receive little to no media

attention are coded as 1.

These mediators included ambassadors, state department

officials, military officers, etc.

I argue that the administration can employ these

mediators strategically, using them in cases where high-profile mediation may not yield
positive feedback or to simply test the waters, after which higher-ranking mediators can
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Table 3.2: Distribution of US Mediator Rank
Highest
Rank

Mediator Frequency

Percent

Cum. Percent

No mediation/
offered only

103

51.24

51.24

Low-ranking
mediator

46

22.89

74.13

High-ranking
mediator

38

18.91

93.03

President mediator

14

6.97

100.00

Total

201

100.00
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come in if it is deemed that the effort will be billed as a policy success. Quarters in
which no mediations occur or mediation is offered, but not accepted are coded as 0.
US Mediation Strategy
Similar to the mediator rank variable is US Mediation Strategy. This variable is
an ordinal variable that codes the highest level (most involved) of mediation undertaken
by the United States in a given quarter, as defined by Zartman and Touval’s (1985)
typology of mediation strategies.

Stemming from the argument that presidents are

seeking mediation as a tool to engineer policy victories in light of poor domestic
performance and a hostile legislature, they should be seen using more manipulative
strategies in order quickly engineer a policy success. Corresponding to Zartman and
Touval’s (1985) typology, manipulation strategies, those in which the mediator seeks to
use his resources to manipulate the payoffs for one or both parties are coded as a 4, the
highest value. Occurrences of formulation strategies in which the administration seeks to
provide a venue for discussions and suggests potential compromises, but falls short of
guaranteeing the peace or inducing it through carrots and sticks are coded as a “3”.
Instances in which the US uses its good offices to provide credible information to one or
both sides are coded as a “2”. In quarters where no mediation if offered only, a “1” is
entered, and where no mediations occur a “0” is entered. (see Table 3.3)
Each of these variables is designed to capture an element of the extent to which
presidents seek to use mediation as a tool to better their domestic fortunes.

The

occurrence of more mediations suggests that the administration deems that such attempts
are the best likely to better these fortunes, relative to other available policy options. The
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Table 3.3 Distribution of US Mediation Strategy
Highest Mediation Frequency
Strategy

Percent

Cum. Percent

No Mediations

95

47.26

47.26

Offered only

8

3.98

51.24

Information
Strategy

30

14.93

66.17

Formulation
Strategy

8

3.98

70.15

Manipulation
Strategy

60

29.85

100.00

Total

201

100.00
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use of higher-ranking mediators and more manipulative mediation strategies suggests that
the administration is attempting to commit more resources to the mediation effort in the
hopes that it will be billed as a policy success, as well as engineer an agreement quickly,
thus boosting the president’s political standing.
Independent Variables for Chapters 4 and 5
Economic Performance
The frequency of mediation efforts is hypothesized to be a function of
congressional support and economic conditions. As a measure of economic conditions, I
include GDP growth.40,

41

gross domestic product.

GDP growth is the quarterly/annual rate of growth in U.S.
Lower rates of GDP growth are expected to provide the

motivation for presidents to seek policy success in the realm of foreign affairs when
efforts to address the domestic economy are forestalled by congressional opposition.
Presidential Approval
The frequency of mediation and the rank of the mediator dispatched, and the
strategy selected are hypothesized to be functions of congressional support and
presidential popularity. A measure of presidential approval is included to capture the
public’s evaluation of the president’s job performance.

Presidential approval is

measured as the quarterly average of all Gallup presidential job approval polls.42

40

The source for GDP the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (retrieved from
http://www.bea.doc.gov/).
41
In analyses not presented in this work, I also use measures of inflation, the misery index, and
unemployment as robustness checks. Each variable yielded similar results to GDP growth.
42
The Gallup polls ask “do you approve of the job (name of president) is doing as president?” These polls
were retrieved from The Roper Center via Lexis-Nexis.com.
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Measures of Divided Government
The analysis considers the influence of three measures of congressional support.
The first, Partisan support, takes account of congressional partisanship. As the number
of seats held by the president’s co-partisans declines, Congress should be less likely to
support the president’s proposals, leading the president to respond to poor economic
performance with a mediation attempt. Partisan support consists of the percentage of
seats held by the president’s co-partisans in the chamber of Congress in which the
president’s co-partisans hold the fewest seats.

For example, in 1978, when President

Jimmy Carter’s administration was brokering a peace agreement between Israel and
Egypt, the house of Congress with the fewest Democratic members (Carter’s party), was
comprised of 61% Democrats.43
The second measure of congressional support is Cohesive partisan support.
Partisanship alone is not always an appropriate indicator of shared preferences over
domestic policy. Southern Democrats frequently opposed the policies of Democratic
presidents during the period of study and supported the policies of Republican presidents
(see e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990).

Even when the president’s party constitutes a

majority of members, a lack of cohesion among the president’s co-partisans in Congress
may complicate presidential efforts to gain approval for his initiatives. Similarly, a
cohesive opposition majority party in Congress has the strength and incentives to thwart
presidential initiatives (e.g., Fleisher and Bond 2000; Fiorina 1992). Cohesive partisan
support is derived from the “legislative potential for policy change” (LPPC) scores

43

The value of 61% partisan support in congress is in roughly the 95 th percentile for values in years 19491995.
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(Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1977). LPPC scores are based on the size and cohesiveness
of the two parties relative to each other.44 Like Partisan support, the score from the
chamber with the lower cohesive partisan support score is included in the analysis.
Thus, in 1978, the cohesive partisan support measure for the house of congress
containing the smaller proportion of Democrats was 15.23, signifying a high level of
cohesive partisan support.45
The third measure, Presidential success, corresponds to the percentage of
congressional roll call votes that concurred with the president’s position.46 This is a
relatively direct measure of the president’s ability to pursue remedial policy and most
directly embodies the concept being tested when using measures of divided government
(see e.g., Foster 2006; Marshall and Prins 2011). Given that both chambers of Congress
must approve the president’s proposal, I use the score corresponding to the chamber in
which the presidential success score is lower. For the year 1978, for instance, the house
of congress passing fewer bills concurring with the president’s position, passed 69.6% of
bills concurring with the president’s position, signifying broad ability to pass legislation
in congress.47

44

Following Howell and Pevehouse (2005), Cohesive partisan support is computed as follows: President’s
party power = [(president’s party size in percent) X (cohesion of president’s party)] – [(opposition’s party
size in percent) X (cohesion of opposition’s party)]. Party cohesion scores are from Cooper and Young
(2002).
45
A cohesive partisan support score of 15.23 is in the 95 th percentile for values in years 1949-2000.
46
The source for Presidential success is Ragsdale (1998). Presidential success scores are available for the
time period 1953 through 1996.
47
A presidential success score of 69.6% is in slightly less than the 75 th percentile years 1949-1995.
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Measures of the Election Cycle
The introduction of the electoral cycle as a factor in the choice of foreign policy
options, suggests, however, that conflict initiation should be less likely leading up to
election day. Gaubatz (1991) finds that democratic leaders are most likely to use military
force early in their tenures, with that likelihood decreasing as elections near.

The

proposed explanation for such a conclusion is that democratic societies are likely to
punish leaders at the polls for pursuing policies that put lives at risk. Thus, impending
elections should cause US presidents to shy away from military conflict, regardless of the
need for policy success. Truman’s

and Johnson’s experiences in 1952 and 1968,

respectively, suggest anecdotal support for this conjecture, given that in both cases
Presidents involved in military conflict chose not to seek re-election in the face of
mounting public discontent with military conflict.
Such domestic considerations have been largely absent from explanations of how
and when non-military foreign policy occur, however. I argue that given this desire to
produce a record of policy success when confronted with impending elections and low
levels of support in Congress, presidents should be seen substituting non-military foreign
policy options, such as third-party mediation, for military force. As a result, I use three
measures of the election cycle, Election Year Dummy, Election Countdown, and
Campaign Quarters Dummy in order to test the influence of elections on mediation.
Because it has been argued that presidential administrations use policy success to help
their political fortunes, but secondarily those of their party, I examine mediation in as a
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function of all presidential election years and only those years in which an incumbent
president is running for re-election.
Election/Re-election Year Dummy
Because US Presidents are under increased scrutiny as elections near, it is likely
that the policy options that they pursue during such times are crafted to better their
chances of re-election and those of their co-partisans. However, it is plausible that these
efforts will take different shape when the president is running for re-election as opposed
to when he is not running. Thus, Election Year Dummy is coded as a “1” for each quarter
in a US presidential election year and Re-election Year Dummy is coded as a “1” for each
quarter of US presidential election years in which the incumbent is running for reelection. Although this is a fairly blunt measure of how elections might influence the
president’s decision making, it is a common starting point.
Election Countdown
Recent research has employed a variable that counts down from the time a
president takes office until the next election (see Koch 2009; Williams 2010). The
argument for using such a variable is that as elections near, policy choices are
increasingly chosen to directly influence the outcome of that elections. Thus, Election
Countdown is coded such that the first quarter in which is a president in office is entered
as “16” and counts downward quarter-by-quarter to “1,” the quarter in which the next
election occurs. The hypotheses suggest an inverse relationship between the time until an
election and the frequency and or magnitude of mediation behavior. Such a measure is
useful because it recognizes the increasing urgency with which a president must act as the
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election becomes nearer. However, given that incumbents, especially those running for
re-election, are most likely to spend a great deal of time campaigning as elections near,
mediation behavior might not be seen in the last few months.
Campaign Cycle Dummy
I also employ variables that account for the fact that presidential campaigns last
longer than the calendar year prior to the election and that presidential behavior is likely
to be different if the incumbent is running for re-election. Given that presidents and
political parties often launch their campaigns in the year prior to the election, it is to be
expected that presidents would seek to use mediations to their advantage in the year
before the election. Furthermore, because presidents, in the few months prior to the
election, especially those running for re-election, are likely concentrating their efforts
domestically, Campaign Cycle Dummy is coded as “1” for the last six quarters of a
presidential term where the incumbent is not running for re-election. In cases where the
incumbent is running for re-election, I code the penultimate five quarters of the
presidential term as a “1,” but code the final term, that in which the election is held, as a
“0.” My rationale for such using such a scheme is that presidents running for re-election
are almost certainly going to focus their attention domestically during the final months of
a campaign, regardless of domestic performance or the makeup of congress. However,
lame duck presidents are more likely to attempt to help their parties in an election via
foreign policy success when congressional support for his initiatives is low and the
impending election draws increased attention to the incumbent’s record. I also test these
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two phenomena separately, examining re-election campaign cycles and non-re-election
campaign cycles individually.
Control Variables for Chapters 4 and 5
To control for other processes that may be affecting the occurrence of mediation
behavior, I employ several control variables consistent with a “use of force” model. The
use of force model is most often specified to test how variation in domestic political
conditions influences the use of military force. Given that foreign policy is thought to be
substitutable (Most and Starr 1984; 1989) and my argument suggests that leaders are
substituting mediation, such a model is appropriate.
First, I include a variable indicating War, which taps U.S. war involvement. The
United States’ involvement in wars is likely to reduce the pool of available resources with
which presidents can address other crises. Thus, the analysis controls for the impact of
wars by including a dummy variable that takes on the value of “1” for years
corresponding to the Korean, Vietnam, and first Gulf War conflicts.
Similarly, I take account of quarterly and annual Uses of force. If presidents are
taking decisions to deploy military forces against targets abroad, they are likely to have
less time to consider peacemaking efforts. Consequently, as the number of uses of force
increases, presidents should initiate fewer mediation efforts. In the quarterly dataset,
Uses of force are drawn from the Blechman-Kaplan/Fordham list of U.S. uses of force
(Fordham 1998; Fordham and Sarver 2001).
To control for opportunities to offer mediation, I control for the “population” of
ongoing interstate disputes with a variable called World disputes. World disputes is a
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count of all new or ongoing disputes according to the MID data set in which the U.S. is
not a party. The values for World disputes correspond to the units of analysis – quarterly
count for the quarterly analyses and annual count for the annual analyses.
Because variables are observed quarterly, it is possible that observations of
independent variables and control variables that are discrete events (for instance uses of
force) occur later in the quarter than the mediation attempt. In these cases, it is not
possible that these events would have affected mediation occurrence or strategy.
Therefore, to protect against such a problem, I have lagged these independent variables to
ensure a proper temporal relationship for causality.
Estimation Techniques for Chapters 4 and 5
Because my dependent variables for these chapters are either event counts or
discrete ordinal variables, Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) estimators are in appropriate for
testing the hypotheses. US Mediations is an event count variable, meaning the number of
mediation attempts in each quarter is counted. The most basic regression model for
examining such variables is the Poisson regression model. The distribution of values for
US Mediations fits that of a Poisson distribution (Long 1997: 229-230). (See Table 3.1)
However, the Poisson regression model assumes the mean of the distribution is equal to
the variance (Long 1997; Wooldridge 2008), an assumption not met in this case (mean =
1.40, variance = 2.04). Thus, the negative binomial regression estimator, which relaxes
this assumption, is more appropriate.
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The other two dependent variables examined are ordinal variables, meaning that
“its categories can be ranked from low to high, but the distances between adjacent
categories are unknown.” For those, I use an ordered logit estimator (Long 1997: 115).
For each model, I cluster the standard errors on presidential administration to
account for variation in mediation across them. Such a technique is more efficient than
using fixed effects, which limits the degrees of freedom and essentially concedes that
each presidential administration is qualitatively different, without providing an
explanation of those differences.
Conditional Hypotheses and Interaction Terms
Because the hypotheses are conditional, the measures of executive-congressional
relations are interacted with GDP growth and presidential approval to assess the effect of
low public approval on mediation efforts conditioned by congress. All three measures of
the president’s support in congress are interacted with both measures of presidential
vulnerability as robustness checks. The marginal effects for the interaction terms should
indicate

a

relationship

between

low

public

approval/low

economic

performance/impending elections and an increase in the propensity for mediation during
periods in which congressional opposition is sufficient to block presidential domestic
policy reform.

Marginal effects should also indicate that approval is negatively

associated with mediator rank when congressional support is low. Such conditional
relationships are typically tested with a multiplicative interaction term.
Because of these conditioning effects, there are different effects of the
conditioned variable (public approval/low economic performance/impending elections)
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on mediation/mediator behavior as a result of different levels of the conditioning variable
(levels of congressional support). Because these hypotheses test conditional relationships
using multiplicative interaction terms, the coefficients and standard errors are not
sufficient for interpreting the results (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumeoller
2006; Kam and Franzese 2005). In order to interpret model models, I plot the marginal
effects along with the upper and lower bound 90% confidence intervals across the range
of the conditioning variable. The results are discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
Research Design for Chapter 6
Stemming from the argument tested in the previous two chapters, that leaders
have incentives to engage in mediation in when they need a policy victory to ensure their
political longevity, but domestic policy avenues are blocked, is the question of whether or
not leaders enjoy a boost in the level of public approval they enjoy as a result of such
behavior. While such a relationship is implied in much of the diversionary literature,
most studies have focused overwhelmingly on the presence of this leader behavior and
less on whether such behavior has the desired effect.
Mediation should be an attractive policy option for leaders, given minimal costs
and risks, relative to other policy options, both foreign and domestic. It is also important
to address the notion that the president enjoys an inordinate amount of sympathetic media
coverage, which can be directed toward those policies that he deems most likely to
generate the greatest domestic advantage (Bennett 1990). High level administration
officials enjoy an increased media profile as well, but to a lower degree than the
president.
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While I expect the dispatching of higher-ranking mediators to have a positive
effect on presidential approval, the positive effect of a mediator’s rank should be
magnified by the extent to which the public is attentive to foreign policy. Research
suggests that public sentiment about the salience of foreign policy should play a key role
in determining the extent to which the administration’s focus on such issues is likely to
be rewarded by an increase in approval rating (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995).
Although the president and his high-level surrogates command a great deal of media
attention, which they often manipulate well, focusing on foreign policy when public
attentiveness to such issues is high will likely yield a greater boost in approval. For this
reason, increasing the visibility of mediation attempts by employing higher ranking, and
thus higher-profile, mediators when the public is attentive to foreign policy should
compound the subsequent increase in approval rating.
Because foreign policy initiatives are less likely to be heavily criticized in
Congress, and because the president can make foreign policy with more autonomy than
he can domestic policy, mediation should be an appealing policy option to boost
presidential approval. Although a presidential administration is able to manipulate how
its image is portrayed with regard to a policy initiative, the extent to which the president’s
approval rating is likely to increase is tempered by the extent to which US voters deem
foreign policy to be an important issue area.
Dependent Variable for Chapter 6
I examine the effect of mediator’s rank on presidential approval after mediation
efforts from 1945-1995, where time is observed in quarters. The dependent variable,
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Approval is the Gallup Presidential Approval Score. This approval score is generated
from the proportion of respondents who responded positively to the survey question, “Do
you approve of the job (insert name of President) is doing as president?”48
Independent Variables for Chapter 6
The first key independent variable in the analysis is Mediator Rank, which was
coded from appendix 2 of Jacob Bercovitch’s (1999) International Conflict Management
Data Set Codebook. The appendix gives the names, ranks, and nationalities of individual
mediators associated with a given conflict. For the purposes of this analysis, only US
mediators working in an official US government capacity were included. The dataset
was then converted into a quarterly time series. US Mediator Rank is a four category
ordinal variable that captures the highest political rank of a US mediator in a given
quarter.49 Mediator rank is hypothesized to positively influence presidential approval
because of greater levels of media coverage afforded administration officials of higher
ranks and the ease with which these officials are able to influence how the media reports
on a mediation effort. Because of the hypothesized relationship between variables, the
value of US Mediator Rank for the previous quarter (t-1) is used to explain presidential
approval during quarter t0.
The second set of key independent variables that I use is the same measures of
mediator rank described above, but broken into dichotomous variables. Thus, in quarters
where the president is directly involved in mediating a conflict President as Mediator is

48

This survey data was retrieved from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of
Connecticut via Lexis-Nexis.com.
49
US Mediator Rank is described in detail earlier in this chapter.
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coded as “1” and all other quarters are entered as “0.” In quarters where the vice
president, a cabinet secretary, or special envoy is the highest-ranking mediator, Vice
President or Cabinet-level Mediator, is coded as a “1” and all other quarters are entered
as “0.” Quarters with lower-ranking mediators (below cabinet-level or special envoy)
have Lower-level Mediator entered as “1” and all other quarters entered as “0.” No
Mediation is used as the reference category. Similar to the rationale described above, the
variables are coded in such a way that captures the level of attention likely to be paid to
the mediation attempt.

Likewise, because of the hypothesized relationship between

variables, the values of these dichotomous variables for the previous quarter (t-1) are used
to explain presidential approval during quarter t0.
Finally, to capture the conditioning effect of the public’s foreign policy
attentiveness on the Mediator Rank, I create an interaction term with Foreign Policy
Salience.

50

The extent to which the public is attentive to foreign policy is thought to

condition the effects of Mediator Rank on presidential approval. Given the argument that
the President and his high-level deputies can dominate and manipulate the mainstream
news so that it portrays the administration favorably, the impact of diplomacy on
presidential approval should be greater when the public is particularly attentive to foreign
policy.
Control Variables for Chapter 6
Research on factors that influence presidential approval suggests that a primary
dimension upon which presidents are judged by voters and reflected in approval ratings is

50

Foreign Policy Attentiveness is the proportion of people who chose foreign policy as the most important
policy area. The source for Foreign Policy Salience is the Gallup Poll.
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economic performance (Lewis-Beck 1988, Mueller 1973, Anderson 1995). Leaders in
office during good economic times are viewed more positively by voters than their
counterparts who are in office during economic decline. Therefore, an important control
variable in modeling the effect of a mediator’s rank on presidential approval is a measure
of economic performance. I use three different measures of economic performance in
different models. The first measure, GDP growth¸ is the quarterly rate of growth in the
US gross domestic product.51 In subsequent models, I measure economic performance
with the variables inflation and unemployment, respectively. Inflation is the quarterly
change in the US consumer price index and unemployment is the quarterly average level
of unemployment in the US workforce.52
In addition, I control for war. War captures US war involvement and is coded
with a “1” for each of the quarters corresponding with the Korea, Vietnam, and first Gulf
War conflicts.

War is thought to reduce the number of available resources that a

president has at his disposal to commit to a mediation effort. Additionally, it is unlikely
that a president will personally mediate a conflict involving two other parties during a
time of war. Instead, his focus will be on fighting the war and attempting to manage the
risks and costs associated with that conflict. However, lower-level mediators may be
employed during these times. In terms of presidential approval, support for the president
is likely to be higher during times of war than during peace time.

51

The source for GDP is the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (retrieved from
www.bea.gov).
52
The source for both inflation and unemployment is the Bureau of Labor Statistics (retrieved from
www.bls.gov).
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Divided Government is a dichotomous variable that is coded with a 1 if either of
the houses of Congress is controlled by the opposing party to the president’s. Divided
government is likely to play a role in the overall calculation of presidential approval due
to the fact that Congress is thought to be a check on the president’s ability to successfully
make policy, although this is argued above to be less effective toward matters of foreign
policy (Howell and Pevehouse 2005, Schultz 1998). Thus, presidential approval is likely
to be lower when there is divided government.
Estimation Techniques for Chapter 6
The effect of mediator rank on presidential approval is analyzed using a PraisWinsten GLS regression model with semi-robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration.53 Because the dependent variable, Approval, is measured across time, the
presence of autocorrelation is likely. As signified by a significant spike in the first lag of
its partial autocorrelation function, the variable exhibits first order autocorrelations. (
3.1) The AR(1) specification of the Prais-Winsten estimator corrects for first order
autocorrelation.
Hypothesis 4b, which employs a multiplicative interaction term should be
interpreted graphically as discussed above in the section discussing interpretation of
interaction terms for Chapters 4 and 5.
Conclusion and Research Process
In this chapter I have discussed my rationale for using the ICM dataset and have
described the nature of the key variables that I use to test the hypotheses. Additionally I

53

Clustering standard errors on presidential administrations corrects for different average levels of
presidential approval across administrations (see Zorn 2001).
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have discussed the statistical techniques that I use to measure each dependent variable.
In the next three chapters, I revisit the arguments behind the hypotheses and then present
the results from regression analyses and discuss the implications of such results.
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Chapter 4: Domestic Performance and Diplomacy
In this chapter, I report and discuss the results from models testing hypotheses
concerning the effects of domestic performance and legislative configurations on
mediation behavior. Operating under the assumption that presidents seek to further their
own domestic political fortunes and those of their party, they should be seen seeking to
build a record of policy successes (Neustadt 1960). Domestic policy is thought to be the
most efficient method through which leaders can achieve such a success. However,
passing domestic legislation requires the support of congress. If congress is made up of a
majority of members from an opposing political party, it has incentives to block the
president from achieving such successes.

In these situations, where the president’s

primary avenue for addressing poor domestic performance is essentially blocked,
presidents should be seen seeking to portray themselves as competent managers of
complex political phenomena that do not require the stamp of Congress. Thus, it has
been hypothesized that US Presidents have incentives to seek out opportunities to
mediate overseas conflicts when poor domestic performance necessitates a policy victory,
but legislative configurations, mainly an opposition Congress, make the passage of
legislation difficult.

Because mediation has the potential to be a high reward endeavor

that incurs minimal risks, relative to other available policy options, it should be an
attractive policy choice. In addition, under such circumstances, presidents should be seen
mediating in ways most likely to garner ample media attention, in order to increase the
extent to which he benefits publicly from such actions, and in ways most likely to yield a
short-term settlement.
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Economic Performance and Mediation
Hypothesis 1a contends that as economic performance declines and in the
presence of an opposition congress, presidents should seek to engage in more mediation
attempts. This proposition is first tested in Models 4.1 and 4.2, shown in Table 4.1, using
the proportion of the president’s co-partisan’s in congress as a measures of the
president’s ability to pass legislation. Model 4.1 shows the effects of both GDP growth
and the partisan composition of congress on the number of US mediations undertaken,
independent of one another. With all other variables held equal, the negative binomial
estimates show that, on average, GDP growth has a negative and statistically significant
effect on the number of new mediations attempted. Partisan support in congress has a
positive and statistically significant effect on the number of new mediations. This finding
suggests that presidents see political value in engaging in mediation when the economy is
performing poorly, independent of their ability to move legislation through congress. It
confirms the notion that the president seeks to demonstrate managerial competence.
Additionally, the model suggests that presidents who enjoy broad support in congress are
able to focus on diplomacy. Such findings are also consistent with research suggesting
that congress acts as a constraint on the president’s foreign policy behavior (Schultz
2001; Tsebelis 1995; Mayer 2001). However, the two findings taken together pose an
interesting question: if domestic policy avenues are available to presidents, why would
they focus on diplomacy? Since diplomacy is likely to pay smaller political dividends
than domestic policy, it would seem rational for the president to focus on domestic policy
if available.
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Table 4.1: Effects on GDP growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by
Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

4.1

4.2

GDP Growth

-0.025
(0.009)***

-0.007
(0.048)

Partisan Support in Congress

2.531
(0.730)***

2.661
(0.821)***

GDP Growth x Partisan Support in _____
Congress

-0.037
(0.096)

Uses of Force (1 lag)

-0.004
(0.048)

0.004
(0.048)

War

-0.622
(0.187)***

-0.618
(0.185)***

Election Year

-0.087
(0.259)

-0.092
(0.261)

Approval

-0.006
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.007)

World Disputes

0.025
(0.025)

0.025
(0.025)

Constant

-0.442
(0.474)

-0.410
(0.447)

N

187

187

Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration in parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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The control variables in the model function largely as expected. Uses of force,
short of war, do not have a statistically significant effect on the number of mediations
initiated. However, quarters in which the US is at war, significantly fewer new mediation
attempts are undertaken. Because the president is likely to be focusing his efforts on
winning a longer-term conflict, which likely has high stakes for his political longevity, he
is less apt to seek out third-party mediation as a way to demonstrate his managerial
competence. Similarly, the president’s approval rating is shown to have no statistically
significant effect on the number of mediations undertaken. Such a result, coupled with
the negative effect of GDP growth, suggests that presidents may seek to use diplomacy to
address poor domestic conditions that will negatively affect him at the ballot box,
independently of his ability to move legislation through congress. Moreover, the lack of
correlation between approval and mediation, along with the presence of the negative
correlation between GDP growth and mediation, suggests that the president is attempting
to address poor performance, rather than merely divert public attention from scandals or
other reputation damaging behavior. On a related note, the president is not more likely to
engage in more mediation attempts in election years in order to engineer policy successes
that might help him in the upcoming election.
Finally, perhaps the most interesting of the null findings involves the number of
ongoing disputes, which can be viewed as opportunities to engage in mediation.
Specifically, as the number of opportunities to mediate increases, the president is no more
likely to engage in more mediation attempts. This result implies that the president and
his administration are focusing mediation attempts strategically, likely on those conflicts
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in which diplomatic success would yield the greatest domestic political benefit.54
Conventional wisdom suggests that president would focus his attention on domestic
policy to remedy the negative effects of poor GDP growth. However, these results
suggest that diplomacy is not necessarily a less preferred policy option for presidents
seeking to sure up their domestic political fortunes than domestic policy itself.
Model 4.2 shows the negative binomial estimates testing the conditional
relationship.

Because interaction terms are most easily interpreted graphically, the

marginal effects of Partisan Support in Congress on GDP Growth are plotted in Figure
4.1, along with 90% confidence intervals. For values of Partisan Support in Congress
from roughly 40 to 65%, the effect of GDP growth on the number of new mediations
attempted is both negative and statistically significant. Thus, it can be argued that when
the president has less than a majority of his co-partisans in congress, a declining economy
is likely to induce the administration to engage in more mediation attempts. While the
results in Figure 4.1 suggest some support for hypothesis 1a, they do not completely
conform as expected. First, given the weak-link justification for using the percentage of
the presidents co-partisans that is the smaller of the two houses of congress,55 it should
not be expected that a president has incentives to engage in more mediation attempts for
values of the variable up to 65%. According to the model, when each house of congress
is made up of at least 65% of the president’s co-partisans, declining economic growth
should induce the administration to attempt more mediation. However, with 65% support

54

Because such a finding is widespread throughout my analysis, I discuss its implications in greater detail
in the concluding chapter.
55
The weakest-link justification contends that because legislation must pass both houses of congress to
become law, the house with the fewer of the president’s co-partisans is where legislation is likely to be
blocked by the opposition. Thus, the value for the house of congress containing fewer of the president’s
co-partisans in used.
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from co-partisans in both houses of congress, the president should have more than
sufficient capabilities to pass legislation that directly addresses poor economic
performance and should not have to rely on the use of diplomacy to demonstrate
competence as a leader. However, given that Model 4.1 suggests that presidents engage
in more mediations when confronting poor economic performance, independent of
congressional support, the conditioning effect of congress shown here may be less
important.
A second peculiarity is the slope associated with partisan support’s conditioning
effect.

Higher levels of partisan support in congress, according to policy availability

theory, should decrease the extent to which a declining economy creates incentives for
mediation. However, in Figure 4.1, the slope of the conditioning effect declines as
partisan support in congress increases, calling into question the extent to which the model
supports Hypothesis 1a.
Scholars have argued, however, that the simple measure of partisan support in
congress does not accurately reflect the president’s ability to pass legislation efficiently.
As such, I employ two other, more refined measures of divided government that should
represent the president’s ability to move legislation through congress more accurately:
Cohesive Partisan Support and the Presidential Success Score.
The variable Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress, takes into account the extent
to which the president’s co-partisans are likely to vote along with him. As previously
discussed, Fleischer and Bond (1990) point out that southern Democrats in congress
routinely voted against the policy initiatives of democratic presidents, thus limiting their
abilities to move legislation despite having a legislative majority. In addition, a cohesive
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opposition has incentives to block presidential initiatives and the power to do so (e.g.,
Fleisher and Bond 2000; Fiorina 1992). Thus, such a measure should more accurately
demonstrate the extent to which the president can move legislation through Congress.
Models 4.3 and 4.4 (See Table 4.2) show the statistical results testing Hypothesis 1a
using the Cohesive Partisan Support variable. In Model 4.3, which, like model 4.1 above,
does not consider the conditioning effect of congress, GDP growth is inversely correlated
with the number of new mediation attempts. Cohesive partisan support is positively
correlated with new mediation attempts. Taken together, these results suggest, as argued
above, that presidents are seen focusing on mediation more when the economy is
performing poorly, but also when they enjoy a broad base of congressional support.
Thus, the use of such policy options to address declining economic performances, under
such conditions, is likely, but not likely to be conditioned by congress, which is contrary
to hypothesis 1a.
Model 4.4, like Model 4.2 above, considers the conditioning effect that Congress
is hypothesized to have on presidential incentives to engage in mediation. The marginal
effects of Cohesive Partisan Support are graphed in Figure 4.2 with a 90% confidence
interval. The results support Hypothesis 1a, in that where the president enjoys lower
levels of cohesive partisan support in Congress, the effect of GDP growth is negative and
statistically significant. Additionally, the slope of the marginal effects curve behaves
largely as expected, becoming less negative as Cohesive Partisan Support increases.
However, the slope remains negative and significant for higher values of Cohesive
Partisan Support than the hypothesis suggests. Although the marginal effects curve
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Table 4.2: Effects on GDP growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

4.3

GDP Growth
Cohesive
Congress

Partisan

Support

-0.022
(0.009)***
in 0.014
(0.005)***

4.4

-0.007
(0.048)
2.661
(0.821)***

GDP Growth x Cohesive Partisan _____
Support in Congress

-0.037
(0.096)

Uses of Force (1 lag)

-0.006
(0.048)

0.004
(0.048)

War

-0.615
(0.160)***

-0.618
(0.185)***

Election Year

-0.107
(0.273)

-0.092
(0.261)

Approval

-0.006
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.007)

World Disputes

0.028
(0.025)

0.025
(0.025)

Constant

0.805
(0.481)

-0.410
(0.447)

N

187

187

Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on
presidential administration in parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
one-tailed test)
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becomes statistically insignificant for extreme high values of Cohesive Partisan Support,
the models shows an inverse effect on GDP Growth where the president would likely
have the ability to move legislation through Congress. Therefore, the results suggest a
limited level of support for Hypothesis 1a, although ambiguities about its validity remain.
Finally, I test Hypothesis 1a using the presidential success score, which is the
percentage of roll call votes in Congress that concurred with the president’s opinion.
This measure is a fairly direct way of measuring the president’s ability to move
legislation efficiently and scholars have suggested that is perhaps the most appropriate
measure to use when examining the presidential incentives to focus on foreign policy (see
Marshall and Prins 2011). Similar to the previous two analyses, Model 4.5, which only
takes into account the independent effects of GDP growth and presidential success,
behaves largely as expected. GDP growth is inversely correlated but has no statistically
significant effects on US Mediations; the presidential success score is positively
correlated with US Mediations and is statistically significant. These results suggest that,
all other variables held equal, presidents and their administrations should be seen
mediating overseas conflicts when the economy is performing poorly and when they are
able to move legislation through Congress efficiently. Moreover, the control variables
behave as expected and in similar ways to those discussed in the models above.
Model 4.6 shows the effect of GDP growth on US Mediations, conditioned by the
presidential success score. The marginal effects curve, plotted in figure 4.3, behaves as
expected, becoming less negative as values of the presidential success score increase.
However, despite the fact that the presidential success score is the most direct measure of
the president’s ability to move legislation through congress, the model is only statistically
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Table 4.3: Effects on GDP growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by
Presidential Success in Congress
Independent Variable

4.5

4.6

GDP Growth

-0.011
(0.012)

-0.122
(0.103)

Presidential Success in Congress

0.007
(0.004)**

0.003
(0.005)

GDP Growth x Presidential Success in _____
Congress

0.002
(0.002)

Uses of Force (1 lag)

-0.044
(0.039)

-0.056
(0.046)

War

-0.511
(0.129)***

-0.528
(0.123)***

Election Year

-0.142
(0.293)

-0.110
(0.295)

Approval

-0.011
(0.008)

-0.012
(0.008)

World Disputes

0.024
(0.023)

0.027
(0.023)

Constant

0.651
(0.629)**

1.022
(0.760)*

N

172

172

Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration in parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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significant for a small range of presidential success score values: roughly 45-55%
success. Thus, the results only show limited support for the policy availability argument.
In order to further test the policy availability argument I use two different
dependent variables that are designed to better capture the urgency with which a
president should seek policy successes when confronted with poor economic performance
and an opposition legislature.
mediation strategy.

These dependent variables are mediator rank and

While a quarterly count of mediation attempts captures an

administration’s level of focus on diplomacy, it might not accurately convey the urgency
with which a policy victory is sought. Given the need to engineer a policy success to
counter the negative effects of poor economic performance, the president should be seen
committing a greater number of resources to mediation.

However, a simple count

variable treats each mediation attempt as if it is the same and therefore does not capture
effort and/or commitment to success. In some ways, an increased number of attempts
might actually detract from the urgency with which the president is seeking to show
managerial competence, or at least the public’s perception thereof, through diplomacy.
In order to magnify the extent to which demonstrating managerial competence is
likely to benefit the president, he should attempt to increase the mediation effort’s media
profile. One way that he can do this is to dispatch higher-ranking mediators, who are
likely to command a greater level of media attention. The US Mediator Rank variable is
an ordinal variable that codes for the highest ranking mediator employed by the US in a
given quarter.56

Thus, I posit Hypothesis 1b, which suggests that higher-ranking

56

Mediator ranks are divided into four categories based on the level of media attention the mediator is
likely to bring to the endeavor. The categories are: 0 = no mediation/ offered only, 1 = low-level
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mediators should be dispatched when an administration confronts both poor economic
performance and an opposition congress.
Models 4.7 and 4.8, shown in Table 4.4, use ordered logit regression to test
Hypothesis 1b. Model 4.7 shows the ordered logit results without the interaction between
cohesive partisan support and GDP Growth. It demonstrates a negative and significant
correlation between GDP growth and mediator rank. When the president must confront
poor economic performance, he should attempt to increase the profile of remedial
policies, or, in this case, the substituted policy. Cohesive Partisan Support, though, does
not achieve statistical significance in the model.

All other controls largely act as

expected. War has a negative and significant impact on the rank of mediator, which
suggests that the president and his high-level deputies are focusing their attention on
winning the war, as losing would cause them to incur high political costs, rather than on
diplomacy. Interestingly, however, uses of force short of war are positively correlated
with mediator rank and statistically significant, suggesting perhaps that high-ranking
mediators are employed as a part of a mixed foreign policy strategy, using both
diplomacy and military force. Since the measurement of the dependent variable is an
aggregated one, measuring the highest-ranking mediator in a given quarter, it is difficult
to make this conclusion with much certainty. More precise measures of the dependent
variable, as well as a time series-cross sectional data format, which could account for
characteristics of the conflict, would help to better clarify the nature of such a
relationship.

mediators, 2 = cabinet-level mediators, special envoys, and the vice president, 3 = president as mediator.
See chapter 3 for more discussion.
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Table 4.4: Effects on GDP growth on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

4.7

4.8

GDP Growth

-0.049
(0.036)*

-0.042
(0.360)

Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress

0.003
(0.014)

0.004
(0.023)

GDP Growth x Cohesive
Support in Congress

Partisan _____

-0.001
(0.003)

Uses of Force (1 lag)

0.183
(0.129)*

0.189
(0.129)*

War

-1.092
(0.466)***

-1.020
(0.448)**

Election Year

-0.338
(0.504)

-0.354
(0.474)

Approval

-0.017
(0.018)

-0.018
(0.018)

World Disputes

-0.043
(0.067)

-0.046
(0.069)

N

187

187

Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediator rank per quarter. Negative binomial
estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in
parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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According to the policy availability argument, mediator rank should be negatively
associated with GDP growth for low levels of cohesive partisan support in congress.
Model 4.8 tests this proposition directly, and the substantive results are shown
graphically in Figure 4.4. However, the relationship with GDP Growth is not statistically
significant for any value of cohesive partisan support.

Such a result suggests no

relationship between GDP growth and mediator rank and fails to provide evidence in
support of policy availability and policy substitution.57
Finally, the third test of the policy availability is done with a variable that
captures the highest (most manipulative) strategy undertaken by the United States in a
given quarter. Presidents in need of a policy victory to boost their domestic political
standing have incentives to commit a greater number of resources to mediation efforts to
increase the likelihood of engineering peaceful settlement, at least over the short term.
Manipulating the payoffs for the disputing parties should be an appealing way for
presidents to induce an agreement quickly and create a policy victory likely to help his
domestic political standing.
Hypothesis 1c suggests that when confronted with both poor economic
performance and low levels of support in congress, the president should be seen using
manipulative mediation strategies. Models 4.9 and 4.10 (See Table 4.5) show the results
for ordered logit regression models testing Hypothesis 1c.

Both models show no

relationship between GDP growth, congressional composition, and mediation strategy.

57

In addition to the models presented, I tested the effects of GDP growth on mediator rank with both
Partisan Support in Congress and Presidential Success Score as conditioning variables. Neither model
showed a statistically significant relationship between key independent variables and mediator rank. Each
behaved similar to the model presented above and are therefore, for the sake of brevity, omitted from my
discussion.

119

Table 4.5: Effects on GDP growth on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

4.9

4.10

GDP Growth

-0.027
(0.041)

-0.019
(0.040)

Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress

0.011
(0.012)

0.006
(0.017)

GDP Growth x Cohesive
Support in Congress

Partisan _____

0.0009
(0.003)

Uses of Force (1 lag)

0.043
(0.112)

0.025
(0.107))

War

-1.158
(0.457)***

-1.150
(0.447)***

Election Year

-0.418
(0.579)

-0.403
(0.559)

Approval

-0.017
(0.015)

-0.019
(0.014)*

World Disputes

-0.038
(0.063)

-0.033
(0.065)

N

187

187

Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediation strategy per quarter. Ordered logit
estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in
parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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Figure 4.5 shows the conditional effects of cohesive partisan support on GDP growth’s
effect on mediation strategy. It fails to achieve statistical significance for all values
cohesive partisan support.

Therefore, it does not support the policy availability

argument, nor does it support the more general managerial competence explanation.58
A probable explanation for the lack of support for hypothesis 1c is that
manipulative mediations are almost entirely unique to states. Given the unique ability
that states have to manipulate in mediation attempts, such strategies are likely used
regardless of the president’s domestic standing. In the US case, manipulation is the
strongest strategy used in roughly 30% of quarters, while information strategies are
employed only in only 15% of quarters; formulation strategies are most rare, being the
highest strategy employed only 4% of the time (see Table 3.3). Thus, while the ability to
engineer a policy success quickly might be appealing to a president, it is unlikely that
lesser strategies would have been considered or employed, even if the economy had been
performing better.
Presidential Approval and Mediation
While substantial research shows that presidents are judged overwhelmingly on
the performance of the economy, a more general measure of his public standing is his job
approval rating.59 The approval rating captures the aggregate voter sentiment and can
explain public dissatisfaction with the president, even when the economy is performing
well. Because presidents are thought to want to establish a record of policy successes in
58

In addition to the models presented, I tested the effects of GDP growth on mediation strategy with both
Partisan Support in Congress and Presidential Success Score as conditioning variables. Neither model
showed a statistically significant relationship between key independent variables and mediator rank. Each
behaved similar to the model presented above and are therefore, for the sake of brevity, omitted from my
discussion
59
Gallup asks respondents “How well do you think (insert president’s name) is doing as president of the
United States?”
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order to boost public approval, mediation is likely to be a low-risk, high-profile policy
option when approval numbers are low and congressional opposition makes passing
domestic legislation difficult.
Hypothesis 2a concerns the number of US mediations being undertaken in a
quarter, which I argue should increase in light of low approval ratings and the presence of
an opposition congress. Models 4.11 and 4.12 test this hypothesis; coefficients are
reported in Table 4.6. Presidential approval rating has no significant effect on US
mediations. The Cohesive Partisan Support Variable has a positive and significant effect
on the number of mediations attempted, suggesting, as with the models presented above,
that more mediations occur, all other variables held equal, when the president enjoys
broad support in Congress. As expected, control variables for war suggest a strong
negative and significant effect. Interestingly, this is one of the few models showing GDP
growth not having a statistically significant effect on US mediations. Similarly, controls
for election year and world disputes have no statistically significant impact. These results
suggest that presidents do not see mediation as a way to better their political standing
when their approval ratings are low.
Model 4.12 tests the hypothesized conditioning effect of the president’s ability to
move legislation through congress on presidential approval’s effect on US mediations.
The results are shown graphically in Figure 4.6, and are inconsistent with the hypothesis.
In fact, high levels of presidential success in congress are shown to negatively condition
presidential approval’s impact on US mediations, while lower levels of presidential
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Table 4.6: Effects on Presidential Approval on US Mediations, Conditioned
by Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

4.11

4.12

Presidential Approval

-0.006
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.006)

Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress

0.014
(0.005)***

0.036
(1.063)***

Presidential Approval x Partisan Support _____
in Congress

-0.024
(0.012)**

Uses of Force (1 lag)

-0.006
(0.048)

-0.0037
(0.049)

War

-0.615
(0.160)***

-0.608
(0.158)***

Election Year

-0.107
(0.273)

-0.103
(0.263)

GDP Growth

-0.023
(0.009)***

-0.021
(0.009)***

World Disputes

0.028
(0.025)

0.022
(0.025)

Constant

0.805
(0.481)**

-0.078
(0.477)**

N

187

187

Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts. Negative
binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in
parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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success have a positive, but statistically insignificant effect—the opposite of what is
expected from Hypothesis 2a. 60
Further tests of presidential approval’s effects on mediation behavior are
conducted using mediator rank and mediator strategy as dependent variables. Models
using the Mediator Rank variable demonstrated some support for the policy availability
argument. Models 4.13 and 4.13 show the ordered logit results testing the relationship
between presidential approval, cohesive partisan support and mediator rank and are
reported in Table 4.7. In Model 4.13, approval is not statistically significant, nor is
cohesive partisan support. GDP growth and war are both negatively correlated with
mediator rank and statistically significant, which is consistent with the other models
presented in this discussion.

Model 4.14 tests the conditional relationship between

presidential approval and cohesive partisan support in congress. The interaction term is
shown graphically in Figure 4.7. The conditioning effect of cohesive partisan support on
presidential approval’s effect on mediator rank is negative and significant for extreme
low levels of cohesive partisan support in congress. Additionally the marginal effects
curve behaves as the policy availability argument suggests it will: increasing as cohesive
partisan support increases and becoming statistically insignificant once the president has
sufficient support in congress to move legislation. Thus, the model shows some support
for the policy availability argument. However, as is with the other models presented,

60

Results for the models using partisan support in congress and presidential success score are omitted for
the purposes of brevity. They behave in the same manner as the models using cohesive partisan support in
congress and do not achieve statistical significance.
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Table 4.7: Effects on Presidential Approval on Mediator Rank,
Conditioned by Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

4.15

4.16

Approval

-0.017
(0.018)

-0.013
(0.018)

Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress

-0.003
(0.014)

-0.135
(0.072)**

Approval x Cohesive Partisan Support in _____
Congress

0.002
(0.001)**

Uses of Force (1 lag)

0.183
(0.130)*

0.025
(0.107))

War

-1.092
(0.466)***

-1.08
(0.488)***

Election Year

-0.338
(0.579)

-0.369
(0.414)

GDP Growth

-0.049
(0.036)*

-0.055
(0.037)*

World Disputes

-0.043
(0.067)

-0.060
(0.072)

N

187

187

Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediation strategy per quarter. Ordered logit
estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in
parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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perhaps the most theoretically salient finding is the negative correlation between GDP
growth and mediator rank, independent of cohesive partisan support in congress.61
Finally, I test the relationship between presidential approval and mediator strategy
in model 4.15 and introduce the conditioning effect of cohesive partisan support in model
4.16. Model 4.15 shows no significant variables except for the strong negative effect of
war.

The conditional effect of cohesive partisan support on presidential approval’s

influence on mediation strategy behaves as hypothesized. The interaction term is plotted
graphically in figure 4.8. For lower values of cohesive partisan support, the effect of
presidential approval on mediation strategy is negative and significant, but becomes less
negative and statistically insignificant as values of cohesive partisan support increase to
where the president has sufficient support in congress to move legislation. These results
support the argument that presidents commit more resources to mediation efforts when
they are politically vulnerable and do not have the ability to move legislation through
congress efficiently. 62
Summary and Discussion of Results
By and large, the results presented in this chapter fail to support the primary
general hypotheses posited: those expecting evidence of supporting the policy availability
argument.

Only four of the interaction models testing the conditional relationship

between domestic performance and the president’s ability to move legislation through
congress behaved as expected and thus provided support for the hypothesized

61

I also examined models using the Partisan Support in Congress and Presidential Success Scores, but
failed to obtain statistically significant results.
62
I also examined models using partisan support in congress and the presidential success score, but none
showed significant results and thus, they are not reported.
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Table 4.8: Effects of Presidential Approval on Mediation Strategy,
Conditioned by Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

4.15

4.16

Presidential Approval

-0.017
(0.0315)

-0.147
(0.016)

Cohesive Partisan Support

-0.111
(2.155)

-0.081
(0.053)

Presidential Approval x Partisan
Cohesive Support

_____

0.002
(0.001)**

Uses of Force (1 lag)

0.043
(0.112)

-0.012
(0.119)

War

-1.158
(0.457)***

-1.148
(0.468)***

Election Year

-0.418
(0.458)

-0.466
(0.561)

GDP Growth

-0.027
(0.041)

-0.034
(0.038

World Disputes

0.037
(0.063)

-0.049
(0.068)

N

187

187

Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediator strategy per quarter. Negative binomial
estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in
parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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relationship. Consequently, I can only contend that there is limited empirical support for
the policy availability argument as an explanation for why we see variation in the focus
on and level of commitment to conflict mediation across time.
The notion that mediation behavior is influenced by domestic politics is well
supported, however, as is the managerial competence explanation for the political use of
foreign policy.

In the models where the individual effects of GDP growth and

congressional support are measured independently of one another, the relationship
between GDP growth and the number of new mediations and the relationship between
GDP growth and mediator rank are negative in all model specifications. Accordingly,
there is support for the argument that presidents engage in a higher volume of mediations
in response to a poorly performing economy and use higher-ranking mediators to give the
efforts a high media profile, with the aim of demonstrating their ability to competently
manage complex international events and thereby improve their standing with the public.
However, results showing that presidents engage in more mediation efforts,
independently of congressional support, in response to poor economic performance bring
up the question of why presidents choose to focus on foreign policy in response to poor
economic performance when passing legislation that directly addresses the source of such
poor performance is an available policy option. Such a question cannot be directly
addressed with the results presented in this chapter. The models without an interaction
term, which consistently show this negative and significant relationship, do not suggest
that the president and his administration are not trying to pass domestic legislation as well
as focus on mediation.
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One potential explanation for why leaders would focus on mediation as well as
domestic legislation that directly addresses the sources of poor economic performance or
otherwise seeks to remediate it is that the different policy options have different time
frames over which they pay off politically. For instance, legislation aim at boosting the
economy might take some time to take root and thus the political benefits thereof would
likely be delayed, although they might be more durable, improving the president’s
political standing over the long term. Mediation, however, may function as a bridge in
these circumstances helping to boost the president’s domestic standing in the short term.
Lian and Oneal (1993) argue that diversionary uses of force often create short-term
spikes in the president’s approval rating, but that those increases regress to the mean
within a few months. Perhaps the same can be said of mediation behavior, which, given
its high profile and low threshold for success, is more likely to provide quicker
improvements to the president’s domestic political standing, even if they are smaller and
less durable over the long term. Thus, any subsequent research should attempt to control
for the volume of domestic legislation being pursued by the president as he pursues
mediation.
An additional interesting finding suggests that the makeup of congress may also
work as a constraint on the ability to pursue foreign policy initiatives. Given the robust
positive and significant coefficients describing the influence of congressional makeup on
mediation behavior, it appears that the president is less likely to engage in mediations or
attempt to increase the level of attention paid to them at times when he lacks ample
support in congress. This result is consistent with Howell and Pevehouse’s “party cover”
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argument, which suggests that in order for the president to be able to engage in foreign
policy for political gain he must have sufficient “cover” from co-partisans in congress.
Thus, such a finding could be attributed to the fact that mediation does not directly
address the sources of poor economic performance, something which a strong opposition
is likely to point out and criticize.
A final interesting finding presented in the models is the consistently insignificant
coefficient for world disputes. This result is important because it suggests that the
president is not simply seeking to mediate any conflict, as there is no variation in the
president’s propensity to engage in mediation based on the number of opportunities to do
so. We can thereby infer that, it is likely that the president and his administration are not
only choosing when and how to get involved in mediation, but where. Therefore, some
account of which conflicts the president is most likely to benefit from mediating should
be incorporated into further research. This ability would also allow for finer examination
of mediation behavior than the rather blunt measures used here allow.
In sum, I find strong support for the managerial competence explanation for the
political use of foreign policy to address declining economic performance. On average,
presidents engage in more mediation attempts, as well as mediate in a more high-profile
fashion, when GDP growth is low. I also find limited support for the policy availability
explanation, which argues that, on average, presidents engage in mediation behavior in
order to offset the negative political effects of poor economic performance when an
opposition congress is likely to make passing legislation difficult. To a lesser extent, I
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find empirical support for the policy availability argument as it pertains to declining
presidential approval ratings and mediation.
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Chapter 5: Election Cycles and Mediation
The policy availability research agenda has focused primarily on presidential
vulnerability due to poor domestic performance, arguing that presidents are limited in the
policy options available to address such poor performance when an opposition congress
can block the passage of legislation. However, in democracies, elections are a built-in
vulnerability that presidents must contend with at regular intervals. Thus, it can be
argued that as elections near, presidents should seek to build and highlight a record of
policy successes in order to be re-elected, or, when they are term-limited, help secure
election for a co-partisan. Presidents should seek to build such a record through passing
legislation. However, such endeavors can be difficult or inefficient when an opposition
congress can hold up or block the president’s initiatives. Because the president faces
time constraints, namely the need to establish his record of successes before the election,
he has incentives to circumvent congress by focusing on foreign policy, an area in which
he enjoys a greater deal of autonomy.
Research on diversionary conflict has shown that the president can seek to better
his standing with the public through the use of military force (Levy 1989; Ostrom and
Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Brulé 2006). However, the use of military force is
risky. Presidents who lose military conflicts are almost certain to be removed from office
and the costs of winning can be high, in terms of loss of life, controversy of motives, etc.
To this end, Gaubatz (1991) has shown that presidents shy away from military conflict as
their tenures in office progress, a trend that he argues occurs because presidents fear
punishment at the ballot box. So, as elections near, they become more risk averse,
seeking policy options that are less risky, even if the potential political reward is lower as
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well. Because an opposition congress serves as a check on the president’s ability to pass
legislation, however, there may come times when the president needs to engineer a policy
victory, but cannot move bills through congress and does not want to risk military
conflict because of nearing elections. I argue that mediation of overseas conflict should
be an attractive substitutable policy option confronting such situations.
Testing such a proposition presents several challenges, as creating a theoretically
justified measure of when elections are likely to incentivize foreign policy behavior is
difficult. On one hand, presidents have incentives to engage in mediation as elections
near, but, on the other, there are great incentives to be focusing on direct campaigning,
especially in the last few months leading up to an election. To address this ambiguity, I
employ several measures of the election cycle that are designed to capture windows of
time in which the administration is most likely to attempt to use mediation to boost their
electoral fortunes.
First, I employ the bluntest measure of the election cycle, the election-year
dummy variable. Each quarter of a presidential election year is coded as “1.” This
measure captures the notion that parties and presidential administrations focus an
inordinate amount of their time on elections in the year leading up to it. Additionally, I
use a similar dummy variable for re-election year, coding “1” for each quarter of
presidential election years in which the incumbent is running for re-election. However, it
can be argued that the “year” is an arbitrary measure, and that, in fact, parties and
administrations begin campaigning earlier. As such, the second measure that I employ,
campaign cycle, extends the election cycle to the final two quarters of the year prior to
the election or re-election. Then, a third measure, election countdown, employed in
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studies examining the relationship between elections and the use of force, counts down
the number of quarters from one election to the next, beginning at quarter 15, the quarter
after the election and in which the president takes office and counting down to zero.
While none of these measures can perfectly capture when the president is likely to seek
mediation as a policy option, relative to the elections, each captures theoretically
plausible scenarios that are easily testable.
Elections and Mediation Attempts
To test Hypothesis 3a, I employ negative binomial regression and the US
Mediations variable, which counts the number of US mediation attempts begun in a given
quarter as the dependent variable.

I use, Partisan Support in Congress, Cohesive

Partisan Support, and Presidential Success Score in separate models to measure the
president’s ability to move legislation through congress.
The influence of elections on mediation conditioned by congressional support is
assessed using negative binomial regression. Table 5.1 shows the negative binomial
estimates for the relationships between the congressional conditions, the election cycle,
and U.S. mediation efforts across quarters from 1945-1995. Models 5.1, and 5.2 assess
the effect of all presidential elections on the number US mediations initiated per quarter.
Model 5.2 contains a multiplicative interaction term, which is plotted graphically in
Figure 5.1. Model 5.1 shows that the election year variable has no statistically significant
effect on the number new mediation efforts made in a given quarter. However, the effect
of partisan support in congress is positive and significant, supporting Howell and
Pevehouse’s (2007) party cover conjecture. This conjecture suggests that the president is
able to focus on foreign policy because of the high level of support he enjoys in congress.
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Table 5.1: Effects on Elections on US Mediations, Conditioned by Partisan
Support in Congress
Independent Variable

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

Election Year

-0.084
(0.259)
_____

1.689
(0.951)***
_____

_____

_____

in 2.447
(0.755)***

3.251
(1.01)***

0.070
(0.257)
2.562
(0.730)***

1.768**
(0.783)
3.180
(0.871)***

Re-election Year
Partisan
Congress

Support

Election Year x Partisan _____
Support in Congress

-3.856
(1.792)***

_____

_____

Re-election
Year
x _____
Partisan Support in Cong.

_____

_____

-3.690
(1.671)**

Uses of Force (1 lag)

-0.002
(0.028)

0.007
(0.035)

-0.005
(0.024)

0.005
(0.030)

War

-0.612
(-0.618)

-0.570
(0.194)***

-0.619
(0.205)***

-0.620
(0.211)***

GDP Growth

-0.023
(0.009)***

-0.028
(0.009)***

-0.023
(0.009)***

-0.029
(0.010)***

Approval

-0.007
(0.007)

-0.007
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.010)

World Disputes

0.027
(0.026)

0.026
(0.026)

0.027
(0.027)

0.028
(0.027)

Constant

-0.397
(0.446)

-0.788
(0.591)*

-0.494
(0.387)*

-0.852
(0.508)***

N

188

188

188

188

Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.
Negative binomial estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration in parentheses. (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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As a result, congress’s constraint on presidential action is decreased, as is the
opposition’s ability to substantively criticize the policy choices. Additionally, controls
war and GDP growth are negatively correlated and significant, as expected. The results
suggest that, independently of one another, election years have no significant effect on
the number of new US mediations undertaken, while the level of partisan support in
congress that the president enjoys has a strong positive influence.
Model 5.2 shows the results of the interacted model, testing the extent to which
the president’s partisan support in congress conditions his decisions to seek out and
engage in mediation in election years. While the signs of the coefficients act as expected
and the significance level of the interaction term appears to support the hypothesis, the
levels of certainty calculated with the interaction terms’ coefficients and their associated
standard errors are unsuitable for testing hypotheses about marginal effects (e.g., Kam
and Franzese 2005; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). In order to properly assess
statistical significance, I plotted the marginal effects of elections and re-elections along
with upper and lower 90% confidence levels across the range of the presidential success
variable. Figure 5.1 shows the effect of election years conditioned by the president’s
level of partisan support in congress. The level of partisan support at which the upper
bound of the 90% confidence interval does not cross the zero line indicates that the
marginal effect of the election year is negative and significant when the president has
roughly 50% partisan support in congress. Such a result is indirectly supportive of the
hypothesis because presidents enjoying broad congressional support do not need to rely
on mediation for policy success. However, for values of the partisan support that are
lower than roughly 45%, the coefficients are positive, but decreasing, which is supportive

140

-1.5

-1

-.5

0

.5

1

Marginal Effect of Election Year on US Mediations with 90% C.I.

.3

.4

.5
Co-Partisans in Congress(%)

.6

.7

Figure 5.1: Effects of Election Year on US Mediations, Conditioned by Partisan
Support in Congress

141

of the hypothesis—but because the 90% confidence intervals cross zero, they are not
statistically significant and thus cannot be shown to support the argument. These results
demonstrate limited and indirect support for the policy availability argument because,
while presidents are not seen engaging in more mediation attempts during election years
because they lack partisan support in congress, presidents enjoying broad partisan support
in congress engage in fewer mediations.
Stronger support for the argument exists in Models 5.3 and 5.4, the latter of which
is shown graphically in Figure 5.2, which tests the argument using only the presidential
elections in which the incumbent president is running for re-election. Model 5.3 behaves
as expected, with re-election year having no independent effect on the number of US
mediations attempted. Control variables behave largely as expected with war and GDP
growth showing negative and significant effects. Model 5.4, which tests the conditional
effects of partisan support in congress on the president’s propensity to seek out and
engage in third-party mediation in re-election years, shows support for the policy
availability argument. Figure 5.2 shows that, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the effect of
elections is positive and significant for low levels of partisan support in congress
(roughly 40% and below). Thus presidents who lack broad congressional support are
likely to seek out mediation when running for re-election.

Additionally, similar to

Model 5.2, presidents who have broad support in Congress do not use mediation when
running for re-election, as demonstrated by the negative and significant values of the
marginal effects curve for levels of congressional support greater than roughly 65%.63

63

Hypothesis 2a was also tested using Cohesive Partisan Support and the Presidential Success Score. The
results are not reported for purposes of brevity. Results are supportive of Hypothesis 2a, nearly identical to
the results shown here.
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The presence of significant results in the model using only re-election years,
along with the lack thereof in the model using only elections, suggests that presidents
running for re-election seek to use their incumbency advantage to secure re-election by
engaging in diplomacy, which challengers are not able to do. Thus, while it can be
argued that presidents seek to establish a record of policy successes in order to better
their electoral fortunes and those of their party, the empirical results suggest that they do
so with a greater eye toward their own electoral fortunes.64
Because the election year and re-election year may not accurately capture the
period of time in which the president is seeking to shore up domestic support through
foreign policy initiatives before turning his focus to campaigning for re-election I employ
the two other measures of the election cycle discussed above and in Chapter 3. The
results for models using the Campaign Cycle variable, which codes a “1” for the final six
quarters of the presidential term, behave almost identically to those using the election
year and re-election year dummy variables.65
The Election Countdown variable which counts down the number of quarters until
the next election shows that partisan support in congress has a positive and significant
effect on the election cycle’s influence on the number of new mediation attempts made in
a given quarter. The results, which are reported in Table 5.2 (Models 5.5 and 5.6), show

64

It should be noted that President Bill Clinton’s lame duck attempt at mediating the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is outside the data period of the ICM dataset and thus not included in these models. Given that the
Clinton administration made a concerted effort at mediating this conflict, while facing strong opposition in
congress and knowing he would not for re-election, the results of these models could be different with more
current data.
65
For purposes of brevity, these results are not reported.
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Table 5.2: Effects of Time Until Elections on US Mediations, Conditioned by
Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

5.5

5.6

Election Countdown

-0.007
(0.017)

-0.134
(0.076)**

Partisan Support in Congress

2.626
(0.750)***

0.692
(0962)

Election Countdown
Support in Congress

x

Partisan _____

0.261
(0.143)**

Uses of Force (1 lag)

-0.005
(0.024)

0.003
(0.025)

War

-0.627
(0.198)***

-0.608
(0.204)***

GDP Growth

-0.024
(0.009)***

-0.029
(0.009)***

Approval

-0.006
(0.008)

-0.007
(0.007)

World Disputes

0.028
(0.027)

0.023
(0.027)

Constant

-0.491
(0.391)

-0.491
(0.615)

N

188

188

Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration in parentheses. (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)

145

that the amount of time remaining before an election has no independent effect on how
partisan support in congress affects the number of new mediation attempts undertaken.
However, the interaction term model, plotted in Figure 5.3, shows that for high
levels of partisan support in congress, the number of quarters until the next election has
an increasingly positive effect on the number of new mediations attempted, which is only
statistically significant for values above 65% partisan support. For low levels of partisan
support, as expected, partisan support in congress has a negative, but increasing marginal
effect on how the number of quarters remaining till the next election influences the
number of new mediations attempted. Thus, as the number of quarters till the election
decreases, the number of mediations should increase, when the president has low levels
of partisan support in congress. While these results behave as expected, they fail to
achieve statistical significance.66
Elections and Mediator Rank
Table 5.3 shows results for tests of hypothesis 3b, examining the marginal effects
of elections on the rank of the official chosen to mediate, as conditioned by presidential
success in congress. Given that the president’s policy initiatives are more likely to be
scrutinized in election years, he has incentives to send higher-level mediators to mediate
where he thinks the chances for success, or the likelihood that the administration’s efforts
will be portrayed as such, are high, so as to increase the level of media attention the
endeavor receives. In both models 5.7 and 5.9, which test the effects of election year and
re-election year, respectively, as well as, partisan support in congress independently of
one another, the results show no statistically significant relationship between key

66

Models were also tested using Cohesive Partisan Support and the Presidential Success Score, which
produced similar results not reported here, for purposes of brevity.
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Table 5.3: Effects on Elections on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Partisan
Support in Congress
Independent Variable

5.7

5.8

5.9

5.10

Election Year

-0.350
(0.458)

1.938
(3.684)

_____

_____

Re-election Year

_____

_____

0.057
(0.612)

3.811
(4.170)

Partisan Support in
Congress

-0.182
(2.155)

0.904
(2.916)

0.269
(2.241)

1.628
(3.125)

Election Year x Partisan
Support in Congress

_____

-5.102
(8.771)

_____

_____

Re-election Year x
Partisan Support in
Congress

_____

_____

_____

-8.464
(10.118)

Uses of Force (1 lag)

0.183
(0.122)*

0.193
(0.119)*

0.177
(0.107)**

0.197
(0.113)

War

-1.017
(0.413)***

-0.956
(0.420)**

-1.041
(0.431)***

-1.041
(0.447)***

GDP Growth

-0.038
(0.033)

-0.046
(0.032)*

-0.042
(0.036)

-0.052
(0.031)**

Approval

-0.018
(0.018)

-0.017
(0.018)

-0.017
(0.019)

-0.147
(0.020)

World Disputes

-0.043
(0.065)

-0.042
(0.069)

-0.040
(0.065)

-0.037
(0.072)

N

188

188

188

188

Note: Dependent variable is the highest ranking new mediator per quarter.
Ordered logit estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration in parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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independent variables and the rank of mediators. Controls behave largely as expected.
However, interestingly, US uses of force, short of war is positively correlated with
mediator rank and statistically significant, suggesting, perhaps, that mediation and the use
of military force are not mutually exclusive.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the marginal effects of election years and re-election
years on mediator rank, respectively, conditioned by the president’s level of partisan
support in congress (coefficients are shown in Models 5.8 and 5.10, respectively). The
models behave as expected in terms of sign, but are not statistically significant for low
levels of partisan support in congress. Such a result yields no support for hypothesis 3b.
However, such a result can be explained by the fact that the president, who occupies the
highest category of the mediator rank variable, has incentives to stay in the United States
during election years. Instead, he may be sending lower-ranking mediators to mediate
during these times. Furthermore, the president does not have to serve as the actual
mediator to draw attention to mediation efforts; he can simply make it a policy priority
and can highlight it through press conferences, media releases, and the White House
Press Office, among other ways, while continuing to campaign domestically.
Similar to the models above, the election and re-election year dummy variables
may not completely capture the period of time in which the president is likely to have
incentives to use diplomacy to boost his domestic standing before turning his focus
homeward and to the election campaign. To that end, I employ two other theoretically
plausible measures of when the election cycle might create incentives for the president to
mediate conflict overseas, or send high-level surrogates to do so in his stead. The first set
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of models, using the Campaign Cycle variable, does not produce statistically significant
results for either election campaigns or re-election campaigns. 67 Finally, I employ the
Election Countdown variable, which measures the number of quarters remaining till the
next election. Results are reported in Table 5.4. The results of the independent model,
shown in Model 5.11, yield no statistically significant results from key independent
variables, nor did the results from the interacted model shown in model 5.12. The
marginal effects curve, plotted in Figure 5.6 shows that the interacted model behaves as
expected with regard to sign, but failed to achieve statistical significance.
The absence of significant results for tests of mediator rank, but the presence of
them for tests of the number of mediation attempts, may suggest that while the president
sees political value in attempting to resolve overseas conflicts, there is an opportunity
cost incurred when serving as the mediator himself or when sending other high-level
officials. Given that elections are nearing, the president likely sees more benefit to his
campaign and those of his co-partisans to focus on domestic policy, regardless of the
makeup of congress. However, sending lower level officials to mediate has potential to
pay political dividends as well. And, as previously mentioned, the president has the
ability to use his office to bring attention to mediation attempts in which lower-ranking
mediators are working.
Elections and Mediation Strategy
Finally, I test hypothesis 3c, which focuses on the highest-level (most
manipulative) mediation strategy employed in a given quarter. Mediation Strategy is a 4value ordinal variable, which codes a “0” for cases in which no mediation occurs,

67

Results for these models are shown in not reported for purposes of brevity..
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Table 5.4: Effects of Time Until Election on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by
Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

5.11

5.12

Election Countdown

0024
(0.048)

-0.231
(0.2887)

Partisan Support in Congress

-0.177
(1.877)

-4.348
(5.464)

Election Countdown
Support in Congress

x

Partisan _____

0.541
(0.665)

Uses of Force (1 lag)

0.180
(0.119)*

0.192
(0.106)**

War

-1.024
(0.413)***

-0.970
(0.414)***

GDP Growth

-0.038
(0.040)

-0.047
(0.038)

Approval

-0.019
(0.018)

-0.021
(0.018)

World Disputes

-0.042
(0.063)

-0.050
(0.058)

N

188

188

Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration in parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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including times when it was offered, but not accepted. A “1” is coded when the most
manipulative strategy used in the information strategy, where the mediator uses his good
offices to bring the truth to light and add credibility to each side’s concessions. A”2” is
coded when the highest strategy employed in a given quarter in a formulation strategy,
where mediators provide a venue, set the agenda, and discuss potential terms, but stop
short of adding any of their own resources to the settlement. And, a”3” is coded when the
highest strategy employed is a manipulative strategy, where the mediator uses carrots and
sticks to manipulate the payoffs for one or both parties. According to Hypothesis 3c, the
president should seek to use more manipulative strategies as elections near, when
confronted with an opposition congress, so as to increase the likelihood that the carrots
and sticks used to induce the disputing parties will yield some type of settlement and thus
boost the president’s domestic standing. As in the models above, I test this argument
using measures of the president’s support in congress and measures of the election cycle,
which are likely to capture how the president’s incentives to focus on foreign policy
change leading up to elections.
Models 5.13-5.16, shown in Table 5.5, test the effects that election years and reelection years have on which mediation strategies are employed, given the president’s
level of support in congress. The independent models (Models 5.13 and 5.15) do not
show statistically significant results for any key independent variables.

Thus, the

presence of impending elections, and the partisan composition of congress do not
independently influence the decision of what mediation strategy to employ. Models 5.14
and 5.16 test the conditional effects of the president’s partisan support in congress on an
election year’s or re-election year’s influence on mediation strategies. In both cases, the
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Table 5.5: Effects of Elections on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by
Partisan Support in Congress
Independent Variable

5.13

5.14

5.15

5.16

Election Year

-0.417
(0.562)
_____

1.545
(3.003)
_____

_____

_____

in 1.188
(2.028)

2.174
(3.003)

-0.296
(0.484)
1.373
(2.126)

2.867
(3.171)
2.544
(3.047)

Re-election Year
Partisan
Congress

Support

Election Year x Partisan _____
Support in Congress

-4.303
(7.039)

_____

_____

Re-election
Year
Partisan
Support
Congress

_____

_____

-7.045
(7.571)

x _____
in

Uses of Force (1 lag)

0.032
(0.010)

0.046
(0.089)

0.033
(0.088)

0.058
(0.091)

War

-1.110
(0.434)**

-1.050
(0.452)**

-1.158
(0.448)**

-1.158
(0.480)***

GDP Growth

-0.021
(0.037)

-0.026
(0.034)

-0.022
(0.038)

-0.030
(0.033)

Approval

-0.007
(0.007)

-0.018
(0.015)

-0.017
(0.0016)

-0.014
(0.016)

World Disputes

-0.035
(0.063)

-0.036
(0.064)

-0.031
(0.064)

-0.029
(0.068)

N

188

188

188

188

Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediation strategy employed in a quarter.
Ordered logit estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration in parentheses. (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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marginal effects curve behaves as expected, with positive effects for low levels of
partisan support in congress that decrease and become negative as levels of partisan
support increase. However, the model fails to achieve statistically significant results for
all values of partisan support in congress (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8).68
Finally, I test the relationship between congressional support for the president and
elections using Koch’s (2009) Election Countdown variable, which measures the amount
of time, in quarters, remaining until an election. Results are presented in Table 5.9. In
Models 5.17 and 5.18, I use the Presidential Success Score as a measure of support for
the president in congress. Results are supportive of the policy availability argument.
While Model 5.17, which measures the effects of time remaining until an election and
presidential success in congress independently of one another, fails to show significant
results for the key independent variables, the interacted model behaves as expected.
Model 5.18, which is plotted graphically in Figure 5.7, shows the marginal effects
of time until the next election having a negative and statistically significant impact on
mediation strategy given low levels of presidential success in congress. Thus, as time till
the election decreases, when the president has difficulty moving legislation through
congress (roughly 40% success and below), the highest (most manipulative) mediation
strategy employed in that quarter is likely to increase. Such a result supports the policy
availability

argument

for

why

we

see

68

variation

in

mediation

strategy.69

Nearly identical results are found employing the Campaign Cycle variable, and, for the purposes of
brevity are not reported.
69
Similar models were tested using Partisan Support in Congress and Cohesive Partisan Support. These
models behaved as expected in terms of the sign and slope of the marginal effects curve, but they failed to
achieve statistical significance for all values of presidential support in congress.
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Table 5.9: Effects of Time Until Election on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by
Presidential Success in Congress
Independent Variable

5.17

5.18

Election Countdown

0.042
(0.058)

-0.267
(0.123)**

Presidential Success Score

0.008
(0.011)

-0.030
(0.018)**

Election Countdown x Presidential _____
Success Score

0.005
(0.002)**

Uses of Force (1 lag)

0.10
(0.107)

0.043
(0.102)

War

-1.10
(0.539)**

-1.13
(0.521)**

GDP Growth

-0.009
(0.052)

-0.024
(0.055)

Approval

-0.029**
(0.018)

-0.027
(0.020)*

World Disputes

-0.050
(0.057)

-0.060
(0.056)

N

188

188

Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration in parentheses. (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test)
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Conclusion and Discussion of Results
In all, the empirical results in these models produce varied levels of support for
the hypotheses. With regard to hypothesis 3a, there is some empirical support. In the
specific case of an incumbent president running for re-election, the models suggest that
the inability to move legislation through Congress conditions the president’s decision to
mediate overseas conflicts. The models also suggest that the number of mediations
attempted decreases in election years in which the president enjoys broad support in
congress and can thus add to his record of policy successes through domestic policy,
making endeavors in foreign policy risky and unnecessary. Such findings are particularly
interesting because they suggest that a president seeks to use foreign policy when he is
running for re-election, and thus trying to boost his own political fortunes, in ways that
are not used when he is a lame duck, and thus posturing to help elect a successor from his
party.
I find no empirical support for Hypothesis 3b, which suggests that elections
should lead to higher-ranking mediators being employed, when a president lacks the
wherewithal to efficiently move legislation through congress.

So, the fact that no

significant results are seen in such cases can be explained by the incentives that the
president and his administration have to focus on campaigning in election years. Because
the president spends much of his time in an election year on the campaign trail, it is
unlikely that he will serve as a mediator himself.

However, because presidential

mediations occupy the top category of the ordinal Mediator Rank variable, the results
might be skewed somewhat as a result. Similarly, the president can draw attention to
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mediation attempts that are likely to positively reflect his managerial competence even
when he is not the mediator. He can use the numerous resources of the executive office
and his high media profile to shed a positive light on mediation endeavors being carried
out by his deputies.
Such an explanation appears quite plausible when the lack of significant results in
models using Mediator Rank as the dependent variable is combined with the presence
thereof in models using US Mediations, an event count variable measuring mediation
volume, as the dependent variable (when a president is running for re-election). Taken
together, the results suggest that the administration makes more attempts at mediation in
re-election years, but does so with lower level officials, ostensibly because the president
is at home campaigning. Thus, in order to benefit politically from these mediation
attempts, the president would have to project media attention to them by discussing them
in campaign speeches, press conferences, etc.
Finally, I find limited support for hypothesis 3c, which contends that more
manipulative mediation strategies are likely to be employed as elections near, when the
president is unable to efficiently move legislation through congress. Given that state
actors use manipulative tactics most often, this result is less novel than the other findings
in the chapter. However, it provides support for the policy availability argument, which
suggests that politically vulnerable presidents have incentives to focus their attention on
foreign policy when congressional composition makes the passage of legislation difficult.
Given the need to secure policy victories before election day, the president should
commit more resources toward political endeavors as the elections near. Thus, he is more
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likely to try to induce disputing parties to come to an agreement for which he can take
credit, even if it is only successful in the short term.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the lack of significant findings for the World
Disputes control variable is an interesting one that suggests that mediation efforts are
strategically aimed at conflicts where the president would benefit from the creation of a
peaceful settlement. While such an argument is to be expected given the assumption that
the president is a rational actor, the data, in its current format, is incapable of testing such
a hypothesis. As such, the creation of a data-set that can account for the president’s
domestic political standing and motivations as well as specific characteristics of
individual conflicts is necessary for this research agenda to progress.
The results presented in this chapter provide support for the more general premise
that this dissertation seeks to address: domestic politic structures and motivations affect
the offer, occurrence, and process of third-party mediation. Similar to the suggestion
made above, research examining the outcomes of mediation efforts in light of mediators’
domestic political standing would yield increased support for the arguments presented
here, and is thus a necessary next step in the research program.
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Chapter 6: Mediation and Presidential Approval
Several studies in the foreign policy research program suggest that US presidents
have incentives to use foreign policy in order to boost their domestic political standing
(see Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Miller 1995; Foster and Palmer
2006; Brulé 2006, etc.) However, in nearly every case, the research focuses on the
presence of foreign policy behavior and not the result. Lian and Oneal (1993) test the
substantive impact of the rally-round-the-flag effect and argue that the net benefit of the
political use of force over time is roughly a zero percent increase in the president’s
approval rating. Scholars have since sought to show that the use of foreign policy for
domestic political gains is not about inducing rallies around the flag, but rather an
opportunistic attempt to demonstrate managerial competence when handling complex and
highly salient political issues (Tarar 2006), much the same as any other policy initiative.
However, attempts to test whether the president enjoys domestic gains from such action
have been few.

In this regard, to this point, I have argued that the president has

incentives to engage in higher levels of mediation behavior given domestic vulnerability
and, in some cases, an uncooperative legislature. In this chapter, I test the effects of
mediation behavior on the president’s approval rating, perhaps the most basic indicator of
his domestic political standing.
The dependent variable, Approval, is the Gallup Presidential Approval Score.
This approval score is generated from the proportion of respondents who responded
positively to the survey question, “Do you approve of the job (insert name of President) is
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doing as president?”70 Such a measure is thought to reflect the president’s chances at reelection as well as his ability influence policy and set the political agenda. By engaging
in mediation, the president and his administration are seeking to demonstrate their ability
to lead, to build consensus and to make peace, thus creating the image that the president
is doing his job well.
Mediation appears to be a well-suited policy area for presidents to portray
themselves as capable leaders. It is unique in that it is a policy endeavor that has
numerous outcomes, nearly all of which can be framed as a success for the mediator. For
instance, the mere occurrence of peace talks between two long disputing parties at the
behest of a third is likely to be heralded as a positive step toward a more durable peace
agreement, even if no such agreement is forged. Similarly, the mediating party is likely
to be heralded as a leader and a peacemaker, despite the fact that no long-term agreement
has been made. Such an image might not be a lasting one, but it is likely to pay political
dividends in the short term. Thus, the perception of the mediator and how mediation
efforts are portrayed to the public are likely to play a major role in how the public reacts
to such efforts. Leaders seeking to enhance their political fortunes likely act strategically
when making decisions about when to mediate, who mediates, and how they mediate.
Mediation Volume, Strategy and Presidential Approval
In Chapters 4 and 5 I find limited evidence that presidential administrations
engage in a greater number of mediation attempts per quarter in response to domestic
vulnerability. Such a finding may suggest that presidents expect to see political benefit
from focusing on conflict resolution. However, it is unlikely that a mere increase in the

70

This survey data was retrieved from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of
Connecticut via Lexis-Nexis.com.
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volume of mediation attempts, all other variables held equal, will yield an increase in the
presidential approval rating. The increased number of mediation attempts made likely
reflects an increased commitment to finding a suitable agreement in key conflicts around
the world.

In this vein, an escalation of mediation strategy is unlikely to increase

presidential approval on its own. An escalation of strategy should increase the likelihood
of success, which is, in turn, likely to increase presidential approval. Because of the
structure and format of the data, though, it is difficult to test these relationships, as the
ICM dataset has imprecise data about the timing of mediation successes/ end points. As
such, I propose to test hypotheses concerning these variables in further research, when
more precise data about the timing of mediation outcomes is available.
Mediator Rank and Presidential Approval
Higher ranking mediators, however, are argued to increase the profile of the
mediation effort so as to portray the president as successful.

Given the media’s

dependence on the administration for information, the president can use his office to
increase the media profile of a mediation attempt when and where he believes it will help
him politically. Additionally, he can use low-ranking mediators in situations that are
likely to be cumbersome, that have low prospects for success, or that will be politically
unpopular. Thus, conflict resolution is a policy area in which simply increasing the
profile is a rational move that a president is likely to make when he sees the potential to
gain politically from focusing his attention there.
To test this hypothesis, I examine the effect of mediator’s rank on presidential
approval after mediation efforts from 1945-1995.

The first key independent variable in

the analysis is Mediator Rank, which was coded from Appendix 2 of Jacob Bercovitch’s
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(1999) International Conflict Management Data Set Codebook. The appendix provides
the names, ranks, and nationalities of individual mediators associated with a given
conflict. The dataset was then converted into a quarterly time series. Mediator Rank is a
four category ordinal variable that captures the highest political rank of a US mediator in
a given quarter.

Mediator rank is hypothesized to positively influence presidential

approval because of greater levels of media coverage afforded administration officials of
higher ranks and the ease with which these officials are able to influence how the media
reports on a mediation effort.
Recall from the previous chapters that the Mediator Rank variable is coded in
such a way that measures the level of media attention paid to mediation efforts in a given
quarter. The highest-ranking new mediator employed in a given quarter is coded. 71 The
coding scheme is as follows: due to the fact that presidents’ actions command a higher
level of media attention than other officials, presidential mediation attempts are
categorized separately. A “3” is entered if the president himself mediated an overseas
conflict in a given quarter. Those mediators who are high-level representatives of the
president, and whose actions are thus likely to command significant media attention, are
grouped into their own category. A “2” is entered if the highest ranking mediator was the
vice president, a cabinet secretary, or a presidentially appointed special envoy. Finally,
low-level mediators, whose actions are likely to go unnoticed or receive little media or
public attention, are categorized together.

71

US officials such as ambassadors,

The ICM dataset codes for individual mediation attempts within a conflict, based on the date each
attempt begins. Thus, if a high-level mediator enters as mediator where a lower-ranking mediator has been
previously employed, the higher-ranking mediator is coded for the quarter in which the higher-ranking
mediator becomes involved. Of the 227 US mediation attempts over the data period, only 6 last 3 months
(1 quarter year) or longer.
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undersecretaries of state, and military officers are coded with a “1.” Quarters without a
new mediation attempt are coded as “0.” Because of the hypothesized relationship
between variables, the value of Mediator Rank for the previous quarter (t-1) is used to
explain presidential approval during quarter t0.
Research on factors that influence presidential approval suggests that a primary
dimension upon which presidents are judged by voters and reflected in approval ratings is
economic performance (Lewis-Beck 1988, Mueller 1973, Anderson 1995). Leaders in
office during good economic times are viewed more positively by voters than their
counterparts who are in office during economic decline. Therefore, an important control
variable in modeling the effect of a mediator’s rank on presidential approval is a measure
of economic performance. I use three different measures of economic performance in
different models. The first measure, GDP growth¸ is the quarterly rate of growth in the
US gross domestic product.72 In subsequent models, I measure economic performance
with the variables inflation and unemployment, respectively. Inflation is the quarterly
change in the US consumer price index and unemployment is the quarterly average level
of unemployment in the US workforce.73
In addition, I control for war. War, captures US war involvement and is coded
with a “1” for each of the quarters corresponding with the Korea, Vietnam, and first Gulf
War conflicts. The control for war is thought to reduce the number of available resources
that a president has at his disposal to commit to a mediation effort. Additionally, it is
unlikely that a president will personally mediate a conflict involving two other parties

72

The source for GDP is the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (retrieved from
www.bea.gov).
73
The source for both inflation and unemployment is the Bureau of Labor Statistics (retrieved from
www.bls.gov).

169

during a time of war. Instead, his focus will be on fighting the war and on attempting to
manage the risks and costs associated with that conflict. However, lower-level mediators
may be employed during these times.
Divided Government is a dichotomous variable that is coded with a 1 if either of
the houses of Congress is controlled by the opposing party to the president’s. Divided
government, is likely to play a role in the overall calculation of presidential approval due
to the fact that Congress is thought to be a check on the president’s ability to successfully
make policy, although this is argued above to be less effective toward matters of foreign
policy (Howell and Pevehouse 2005; Schultz 1998).
The effect of mediator rank on presidential approval is analyzed using a PraisWinsten GLS regression model with semi-robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration.74 The results are reported in Table 6.1. Because the dependent variable,
Approval, is measured across time, the presence of autocorrelation is likely. As signified
by a significant spike in the first lag of its partial autocorrelation function, the variable
exhibits first order autocorrelation.

The AR(1) specification of the Prais-Winsten

estimator corrects for first order autocorrelation. Model 6.1 shows the Prais-Winsten
estimates of the effect of mediator rank on presidential approval. The coefficient for
mediator rank, the key independent variable, is positive and significant, suggesting that
increases in mediator rank have positive effects on presidential approval. These results
support Hypothesis 4a.

Additionally, consistent with the literature, GDP growth is

positively correlated with presidential approval and statistically significant, as the public

74

Clustering standard errors on presidential administrations corrects for different average levels of
presidential approval across administrations.
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Table 6.1: Effect of Mediator Rank on Presidential Approval
Independent Variable

6.1

6.2

6.3

Mediator Rank
(1 lag)

1.277**
(0.511)

1.153**
(0.533)

1.242**
(0.500)

GDP Growth
(1 lag)

0.248*
(0.153)

____

____

Inflation
(1 lag)

____

-0.494
(0.526)

____

Unemployment
(1 lag)

____

____

-1.18
(1.100)

War

0.998
(2.381)

0.762
(2.483)

-0.098
(2.311)

Divided Government

-7.841*
(5.274)

-7.39
(5.033)

-7.773*
(5.407)

Constant

57.78***
(5.398)

60.378***
(6.716)

65.642***
(10.737)

N

188

188

188

R-squared

0.1121

0.1027

0.1002

Rho

0.813

0.789

0.807

Note: Prais-Winsten Estimates. Dependent variable is the Gallup Presidential
Approval Score. Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on
presidential administration. *p<.01, **p<.05, ***.10, one-tailed tests.
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should react positively to a growing economy. Further, divided government is negatively
correlated with presidential approval and statistically significant, as divided government
is thought to be an obstacle to presidential success. In terms of substantive effects, the
results from Model 6.1 demonstrate that a US president can significantly improve his
approval rating by serving as a mediator by or sending high-level representatives to do
so. According to the model, direct presidential involvement in conflict mediation will, on
average, increase the president’s approval rating by nearly 4 percentage points. Thus,
mediation becomes a useful tool in times of economic decline, when poor economic
performance begins to negatively affect the public’s perception of the president and his
administration. For instance, in a situation where the GDP growth rate is two standard
deviations below its mean (-4.86), and the president is faced with an opposing Congress,
engagement in mediation is likely to lift his approval rating in the subsequent quarter
from 48.7%, with no mediation, to 52.56%. This result suggests that the president can
use mediation as a strategic policy instrument to shift attention toward an issue area
where he can portray himself as a successful leader, and thus stop falling approval ratings
or perhaps overcome institutional hurdles to policy success, such as an opposition
Congress.
Because presidential approval is thought to be primarily influenced by economic
conditions, Models 6.2 and 6.3 have been employed using different economic indicators
as robustness checks. In Model 6.2, the sign of the coefficient for inflation is negative, as
is the coefficient sign for unemployment level in Model 6.3. While the signs in both of
these models behave as expected, neither is statistically significant. However, the overall
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results from this set of models suggest robust support for the theoretical argument that
increases in mediator rank have a positive effect on presidential approval.
The second set of key independent variables that I use are the same measures of
mediator rank described above, but broken into dichotomous variables. Thus, in quarters
where the president is directly involved in mediating a conflict President as Mediator is
coded as “1” and all other quarters are entered as “0.” In quarters where the vice
president, a cabinet secretary, or special envoy is the highest-ranking mediator, Vice
President or Cabinet-level Mediator, is a coded as a “1” and all other quarters are entered
as “0.” Quarters with lower-ranking mediators (below cabinet-level or special envoy)
have Lower-level Mediator entered as “1” and all other quarters entered as “0.” No
Mediation is used as the reference category. Similar to the rationale described above, the
variables are coded in such a way that captures the level of attention likely to be paid to
the mediation attempt.

Likewise, because of the hypothesized relationship between

variables, the values of these dichotomous variables for the previous quarter (t-1) are used
to explain presidential approval during quarter t0.
The results for this additional test of Hypothesis 4a are reported in Table 6.2. A
Prais-Winsten GLS model is used for the reasons described above, as the dependent
variable has not changed. By using dichotomous variables in this model, the individual
effects of the various mediator ranks on presidential approval are tested. Thus, while the
models in Table 6.1 assume a linear increase in the effect of mediator rank on presidential
approval, the models in Table 6.2 test the different categories of mediator rank for
varying magnitudes of effect. Consequently, Model 6.4 is specified similar to Model 6.1,
but includes the three dichotomous mediator rank variables as the key independent

173

Table 6.2: Effect of Mediator Rank on Presidential Approval:
Dichotomous Variables (Quarterly Data, Prais-Winsten GLS Estimates)
Independent Variable 6.4
6.5
6.6

President as Mediator
(1 lag)

3.196**
(1.646)

2.651*
(1.700)

3.020*
(1.650)

Vice
President/ 3.662**
Cabinet-level Med.
(1.356)
(1 lag)

3.605***
(1.208)

3.681***
(1.241)

Lower-level Mediator 0.224
(1 lag)
(0.945)

0.120
(0.925)

0.207
(0.881)

GDP Growth
(1 lag)

0.241*
(0.150)

____

____

Inflation
(1 lag)

____

-0.518
(0.538)

____

Unemployment
(1 lag)

____

____

-1.149
(1.154)

War

0.727
(2.468)

0.768
(2.464)

-0.080
(2.382)

Divided Government

-7.990*
(5.410)

-7.557*
(5.183)

-7.941*
(5.541)

Constant

57.962***
(5.824)

60.592***
(6.867)

65.585***
(11.224)

N

189

189

189

R-Squared

.1243

.1106

.1129

Rho

0.8185165

0.7951502

0.8128555

Note: Prais-Winsten Estimates. Dependent variable is the Gallup Presidential
Approval Score. Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on
presidential administration. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *.10, one-tailed tests.
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variables. The model suggests that both presidential and vice-presidential/cabinet-level
mediators are positively correlated with increases in presidential approval, but that lowranking mediators are not.

More interesting is that the model suggests that vice-

presidential/cabinet-level mediators have a greater positive impact on presidential
approval than do presidential mediators.75 Substantively, presidential mediations are
likely to yield a 3.2 percentage point increase in approval, while vice-presidential/
cabinet-level mediations are likely to yield a 3.7 percentage point increase in approval,
with all other variables held constant. Because the equality of two variables test suggests
that the substantive impact of presidential mediators and vice-presidential mediators is
roughly the same, these results do support the theoretical argument more generally,
suggesting that high-profile mediations should lead to increases in presidential approval
and that administrations can seek to manipulate public opinion by engaging in diplomacy.
The substantively equal positive impact of vice-presidential/cabinet-level
mediations on presidential approval can likely be explained by the presence of an
opportunity cost associated with the president acting as a mediator.

Because the

president must focus on so many issue areas, committing to mediate an overseas dispute
may detract from his ability to focus on domestic policy, success at which likely yields
greater political dividends than successful diplomacy. Additionally, the fact that the
president is not directly involved in negotiations with the disputing parties does not mean
that he is not making public comments on the matter or directing the media attention paid

75

I conducted an equality of two variables test to see if indeed the vice-presidential/cabinet-level mediators
had a greater positive effect on presidential approval in subsequent quarters. For the hypothesis H0:
Presidential mediator – vice-presidential/cabinet-level mediator = 0, F=0.14, p(F) = 0.72. Thus, I fail to
reject H0; vice-presidential/ cabinet-level mediator has the same substantive impact on presidential
approval as a president acting as mediator.

175

to his office to a mediation effort that is being spearheaded by one of his top-level
representatives. Such a rationale is also consistent with Burbach’s (2004) finding that
presidential speeches concerning peace-making creates a “dovish” foreign policy image
for his administration and leads to increases in his approval rating. Thus, the president
can drive the initiative while one of his top deputies engages in negotiations on the
ground.
This model is also consistent with several cases of US mediation where the
president has dispatched a top-level deputy to lead the administration’s diplomatic effort,
and has used his office to spotlight the goings on. For instance, Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger’s series of shuttle diplomacy attempts between Israel and its Arab neighbors in
the 1970s was portrayed positively in the media and resulted in substantive, albeit brief,
increases in presidential approval for the Ford administration. Similarly, Secretary of
State Alexander Haig’s attempt at mediating the Falklands Crisis between the United
Kingdom and Argentina coupled with his successor’s, George Schultz’s, mediation
attempts between Israel and various factions involved in the Lebanese Civil War, led to
spikes in presidential approval in early 1983 and again in early 1985 with the negotiation
of the partial Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
In addition to its consistency with real world events, model 6.4 suggests that lowlevel mediations have no systematic substantive effects on presidential approval. Given
that these mediation attempts are carried out by low-level diplomats, and other
administration officials who do not command the same level of media attention as their
higher-ranking colleagues, their efforts alone are unlikely to have an impact how the
public views the president.
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Models 6.5 and 6.6 are employed as robustness checks, similar to models 6.2 and
6.3.

As seen above, inflation and unemployment level are signed in the direction

expected, but lack statistical significance. In all, these controls lend support to the
theoretical argument.
Finally, I test Hypothesis 4b, which suggests that mediator rank’s effect on
presidential approval is likely to be conditioned by the public’s attentiveness to foreign
policy.

In order to capture the conditioning effect of the public’s foreign policy

attentiveness on the Mediator Rank, I create an interaction term with Foreign Policy
Salience.

76

The extent to which the public is attentive to foreign policy is thought to

condition the effects of Mediator Rank on presidential approval. Given the argument that
the President and his high-level deputies can dominate and manipulate the mainstream
news so that it portrays the administration favorably, the impact of diplomacy on
presidential approval should be greater when the public is particularly attentive to foreign
policy.
The results for the test of Hypothesis 2 are reported in Table 6.3. This hypothesis
contends that different levels of foreign policy attentiveness by the public conditions the
effect of mediator rank on presidential approval. Thus, there are different effects of
mediator rank’s effect on the approval rating for different levels of foreign policy
salience. Because this hypothesis tests a conditional relationship using a multiplicative
interaction term, the coefficients and standard errors are not sufficient for interpreting the
results (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumeoller 2006; Kam and Franzese
2005). In order to interpret model 6.7, I have plotted the marginal effects of mediator

76

Foreign Policy Attentiveness is the proportion of people who chose foreign policy as the most important
policy area. The source for Foreign Policy Salience is the Gallup Poll.
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Table 6.3: The Effect of Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Foreign Policy
Salience, on Presidential Approval
Independent Variable

6.7

Mediator Rank
(1 lag)

0.560
(0.524)

Foreign Policy Salience

0.162
(0.155)

Foreign Policy Salience x Mediator Rank

0.029**
(0.015)

GDP Growth
(1 lag)

0.256*
(0.151)

War

-2.213
(2.971)

Divided Government

-7.317*
(5.16)

Constant

53.808***
(6.323)

N

189

R-squared

0.1418

Rho

0.792

Note: Prais-Winsten Estimates. Dependent variable is the Gallup Presidential
Approval Score. Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on
presidential administration. *p<.01, **p<.05, ***.10, one-tailed tests.
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rank in Figure 6.1 along with the upper and lower bound 90% confidence intervals across
the range of the foreign policy salience variable. The graph in Figure 1 shows the
coefficients for mediator rank’s effect on presidential approval given the range of values
of foreign policy salience. The upper and lower bounds of the 90% confidence interval
do not cross the zero line for values of foreign policy salience above roughly 15%. This
result means that the coefficients for mediator rank are significant at the 90% confidence
level for values of foreign policy salience above roughly 15%.
Model 6.7 suggests that as more voters become focused on foreign policy, the
greater influence an increase in mediator rank will have on presidential approval. Thus,
presidents can magnify the increase in their approval rating by dispatching higher level
mediators to engage in diplomacy when foreign policy salience is high. The substantive
implications of this conditioning effect are great. A one standard deviation increase in
foreign policy salience (about 20%) from its mean of roughly 28% doubles the extent to
which mediator rank influences presidential approval (the coefficient for mediator rank
increases from about 1 to 2). Given this relationship, a president can use the resources
and characteristics of his office to his advantage, by choosing to engage in diplomacy
when the voting public is most likely to react positively to such an action. Additionally,
the administration can employ higher ranking mediators at politically critical times,
should it need to, to maximize its domestic political return on a mediation effort. The
findings are also consistent with those found by Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch (1995)
arguing that for issues to substantively effect the president’s approval rating, they must be
politically salient.
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Figure 6.1: The Effect of Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Foreign Policy
Salience, on Presidential Approval
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Overall, these analyses support my hypotheses and theoretical argument that US
presidents are primarily driven by the desire to stay in office and seek to use foreign
policy to enhance their electoral fortunes (Ostrom and Job 1986; Bueno de Mesquita et
al. 2003). To that end, presidents can capitalize on the great amounts of media attention
paid to them and their high-level surrogates by engaging in diplomacy when they are
most likely to be successful and at those points in time when such actions are most likely
to elicit a positive response from voters.
Conclusions and Discussion of Results
This analysis suggests that unlike suppositions underlying the “rally effects”
explanation for political uses of force, the mechanism by which the president gains in
domestic support from foreign policy initiatives is tied to policy success, or at least to the
image thereof, being communicated to the public through media. Thus, as with domestic
policy, the president seeks to use foreign policy to build a record of success and to appear
competent as a leader in order buttress and bolster his level of domestic support. Because
of the president’s prominent role in foreign policy issues and his ability to manipulate
media portrayals of his administration, mediation is a policy option whereby he can
efficiently seek to improve his domestic standing. It is important to note, though, that
results show mediator rank influences presidential approval because high-ranking
officials acting as mediators are paid a disproportionate of attention by the media. Thus,
the president and his top deputies are likely to mediate those conflicts from which they
expect to gain a significant political benefit, a benefit that is magnified by this heightened
level of media coverage.
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These results provide empirical support for theories suggesting that Presidents’
use foreign policy actions to improve their domestic political standing. Taken with the
results found in previous chapters, the findings presented here suggest that engaging in
mediation is likely a useful short-term remedy to boost the president’s approval rating.
Such boosts may be critical as elections near or at times when poor economic
performance requires presidential actions and legislation that would directly address the
economy might take some time to bear fruit.
More generally, these results begin to reconcile theories of mediation with more
general theories of foreign policy.

This theoretical reconciliation has important

implications for the conflict resolution research program and suggests several avenues for
further research, a few of which I will mention here. To this point, few studies of
mediation have heeded Saadia Touval’s (2003) suggestion that mediation should be
considered an instrument of foreign policy and, as such, motivations for engaging in
mediation should be treated like motivations for other foreign policy engagement.
However, given that domestic political considerations have been shown to be a major
driving factor in the nature of the mediation process, states should not be considered
unchanging unitary actors in studies attempting to explain mediation success. In addition
to mediator rank, the extent to which engaging in mediation is likely to enhance leaders’
domestic political fortunes could be argued to drive the strategy selected by a mediator,
as well as the decision to choose mediation from the number of foreign policy options at
a leader’s disposal.
In addition to suggesting avenues for new research, this theoretical perspective
can be further incorporated into what is already thought to be known about mediation
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processes and better inform those findings. Since most mediation attempts end in failure,
and because many “successful” attempts lack durability, with violence returning after an
agreement, it seems appropriate to pursue an examination of whether leaders driven by
the desire and the need to improve their domestic political standing choose to engage in
mediation in ways that are more conducive to quick, short-term successes that improve
domestic standing—perhaps at the expense of lasting peace abroad. Moreover, Greig’s
(2005) finding that mediation is most often offered at times when it is least likely to be
successful could be examined further, specifically to see how domestic political
objectives influenced the decision to offer mediation at a time when the conflict is highly
visible to the public, but not amenable to peaceful negotiations. Such forays would do a
great deal to both improve understanding of the conflict resolution process and to
integrate the conflict management literature with mainstream theories of foreign policy.

183

Chapter 7 - Conclusion
This dissertation set out to address the question of why mediation by state actors,
despite characteristics suggesting that such mediations are likely to be successful,
regularly ends in failure.

I have argued that domestic politics plays a key role in

providing state leaders with incentives and constraints to focus on mediation as a policy
option and that short-term, domestic political goals often preclude these leaders from
mediating conflict in ways that lead to durable long-term peace agreements. Moreover,
such an argument begins to reconcile the conflict resolution research program with the
mainstream foreign policy decision making research program, which, up to this point,
have largely developed independently of one another. This work builds on research
suggesting that conflict resolution is a political endeavor and not an altruistic one. Even
in cases where leaders have strong moral convictions driving them to seek resolution of a
given conflict, by acting through the state apparatus, they are constrained and
incentivized by domestic political considerations. Therefore, the need to secure reelection and maintain office is likely to determine when and how leaders are likely to
engage in mediation, which, in turn, is likely to explain the results of mediation attempts.
In this chapter, I briefly revisit this argument and discuss my findings. Then, I
proceed to discuss the implications of these findings, both empirically and theoretically,
and point to shortcomings and limitations of the research. From this point, I evaluate the
state of both the conflict resolution and foreign policy decision making research programs
and make suggestions for further research in light of the findings that I have presented.
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The Conflict Resolution Research Program
Up to this point, research on conflict resolution has largely been conducted
independently of the foreign policy decision making research program. Because of its
normative goal of finding ways to peacefully resolve conflict, mediators have largely
been thought to be altruistic in their motives, or, at the very least, unchanging in their
motives. However, a large literature has emerged that focuses on the motivations of state
leaders (see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003; Ostrom and Job 1986, etc.), suggesting that
they use foreign policy in the same way they use domestic policy, to improve their
domestic political fortunes. Such a rationale suggests that the motivations that a leader
has to seek mediation are likely to influence how that mediation effort is carried out, the
number of resources committed to it, and the extent to which the mediator is likely to see
the effort through to a durable peace settlement. This argument also suggests that while
states might have the greatest ability to engineer peace agreements through mediation, the
incentives and constraints state leaders face from their domestic audience are likely to
create incentives for engaging in mediation, but also limit the extent to which they likely
to be committed to ensuring a long-term settlement. Thus, as leaders’ incentives and
constraints change, based on domestic political issues, mediation behavior should as well.
The results found in the preceding chapters are largely supportive of this argument,
although they vary in their robustness.
Key Empirical Findings in Chapter 4
Chapter 4 examines the extent to which domestic performance influences
mediation behavior.

I use two key independent variables to measure domestic
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performance, the rate of GDP growth, which is a strong indicator of overall economic
performance, and the presidential approval rating, which captures a broader measure of
how voters view the president’s performance. In addition, I test how this influence is
conditioned by the makeup of congress. I draw upon literature suggesting that presidents
have incentives to focus on foreign policy when domestic conditions are poor,
necessitating presidential action, and when low levels of support make passing legislation
that more directly addresses these poor conditions is difficult (Brulé 2006; Oneal and
Russet 1993; Marshall and Prins 2011). Because congress has a less direct check on
foreign policy than on domestic policy, low-risk foreign policy options like diplomacy
should be appealing to presidents, as domestic policy avenues are not available.
I find evidence for my general argument, contending that domestic politics drives
mediation behavior, as well as for more specific arguments contending that leaders use
mediation to demonstrate managerial competence of complex political events to their
constituents. Support for the policy availability argument, specifically, is more limited.
There is some evidence suggesting that the president’s ability to move legislation through
congress conditions the extent to which economic performance influences mediation
behavior. However, the most salient finding in the dissertation is the negative correlation
between GDP growth and mediation, which occurs independently of the makeup of
congress. Such a result is found using multiple dependent variables that are indicators of
mediation behavior. Such a finding is novel, because presidential administrations are
thought to prefer to seek domestic policy avenues to address poor economic performance.
This negative correlation, independent of the makeup of congress suggests that presidents
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are using mediation in response to poor economic performance even when domestic
policy avenues are open to them. Future research will need to address the reasons for
such a finding. One plausible argument is that legislation seeking to improve economic
conditions may take time to bear fruit, even if passed easily. Successful diplomacy might
be a stop-gap measure that pays quick dividends, even if they are short-lived, as research
on the political use of foreign policy suggests (see Lian and Oneal 1993). The results for
models measuring the extent to which presidential approval has an effect on mediation
behavior yield few significant results, indicating that low approval ratings do not induce
the president to take action the way that poor economic performance does.
Scholars have argued about the causal mechanism operating behind the political
use of foreign policy. Because most studies on the subject focus on the use of military
force, rally-round-the-flag effect arguments have been made. Such an argument contends
that vulnerable leaders seek to use military force to divert attention from poor domestic
performance and induce a rally in levels public support by invoking patriotism against an
external enemy. A competing claim, the managerial competence argument, suggests that,
as with any other policy initiative, the president seeks to demonstrate his competence as a
leader through foreign policy.

The presence of this inverse relationship between

economic performance and mediation behavior lends support to the managerial
competence argument. First, because rally-round-the-flag effects involve an appeal to
patriotism in the face of an enemy, it is unlikely that mediation would induce such an
effect. However, because protracted overseas conflicts are complex political phenomena
which can be portrayed as relevant to voters, it is more likely that the president will seek
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to use them in order to develop a record of success, especially when poor domestic
performance presents the need for quick policy victories.
A second interesting finding is the positive correlation between congressional
composition and mediation behavior. Such a finding suggests support for Howell and
Pevehouse’s (2007) party cover hypothesis, which suggests that higher levels of partisan
support in congress provide the president cover to focus on foreign policy. Thus, more
foreign policy behavior should be seen when the president has significant partisan
support in congress. Such an effect is found to occur directly with more robustness than
the conditional policy availability argument.

This finding is interesting because it

suggests that foreign policy is used most often when the president can diffuse
responsibility for the effort across branches of government. To this end, it is likely that
mediation endeavors undertaken when the president lacks ample support in congress may
not be seen through to completion, as he is not likely to expose his administration to
criticism. The presence of empirical support for the party cover conjecture also suggests
that congress not creates incentives for engaging in mediation, but also that it can serve as
a constraint, limiting the extent to which a president can pursue conflict resolution as a
policy option.
In sum, the results support the notion that domestic politics play a key role in how
and when mediation occurs, and thus such factors must be taken into consideration when
attempting to identify and explains the conditions under which mediation is likely to be
successful. Because states are not likely to be unitary actors when it comes to foreign
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policy, as the incentives and constraints associated with engaging in foreign policy
change, so too should the practice of mediation, and thus, perhaps, its success.
Key Empirical Findings from Chapter 5
Chapter 5 tested a similar argument, which contended that elections were simply
built in vulnerabilities with which the president must deal regularly. As a result, his
policy record is likely to come under greater scrutiny as elections near and the president
should seek to shore up support through a series of policy successes. However, an
opposition congress can make such an endeavor difficult. To that end, the president
should be seen substituting foreign policy, an area in which he has increased autonomy,
in order to build such a record of successes. However, given the fact that policy failure is
likely to negatively affect the president leading up to an election, he should be seen
selecting policy options that are low-risk, relative to other available policy options.
Because the use of military force is risky, given the potential for loss of life or the lack of
a victory prior to election day, it is unlikely that such policy options will be employed as
elections near (Gaubatz 1991). Mediation is a policy option which is relatively low-risk,
but still has the potential to be billed as a high-profile policy success.
There is strong evidence that presidents seeking re-election engage in more
mediation attempts as elections near, when confronting an opposition congress. Such a
finding supports the policy availability hypothesis, suggesting that presidents have
incentives to focus their attention on foreign policy when vulnerability requires action,
but the lack of congressional support makes passing domestic legislation difficult or
inefficient. However, when incumbent presidents are not running, no such relationship is
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present. In cases when the president is not running for re-election, he engages in fewer
mediation attempts, when he enjoys broad support in congress. This finding provides
indirect support for policy availability.
No support is found for the notion that presidents employ higher ranking
mediators when elections are near and opposition in congress makes the legislative
process cumbersome. A mitigating factor that is likely to contribute to this finding is the
fact that the president has incentives to devote an overwhelming amount of his time to
campaigning during the months leading up to an election. Moreover, especially in cases
when the president is not running for re-election, the media pay more attention to the
campaign than on the sitting president, making mediation a less-beneficial political tactic
for the president’s party.
Of the three major questions addressed in this chapter, the one pertaining to
elections and mediation has yielded the most ambiguous findings. However, given the
aggregated nature of the data, such findings are perhaps to be expected. The measures of
the election cycle may not properly capture the window of time in which the president
has incentives to focus his energy on foreign policy. Additionally, the president may feel
the need to keep his focus on domestic politics during the campaign cycle and thus any
international policy initiatives from which he hoped to benefit would have been carried
out earlier in the term. Due to these ambiguities, it is difficult to argue in support of the
hypotheses suggesting that elections have a major impact on mediation behavior.
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Key Empirical Findings from Chapter 6
In Chapter 6, I test one of the major assumptions underlying the analysis in the
previous chapters. In each of the previous chapters, it is assumed that presidents are
likely to enjoy a rally in public support by demonstrating competence in managing
overseas conflict. The models shown in Chapter 6 show support for this assumption
when mediator rank is used as the independent variable. However, no such support is
found for the other two independent variables, the number of new mediations and
mediation strategy. Because the ICM dataset is vague about when mediation outcomes
occur, it is difficult to directly test when mediation success leads to increases in
presidential approval.

Therefore, these three independent variables are proxies and

perhaps indirect tests of effects of mediation on presidential approval ratings.
The models using mediator rank variable demonstrate that the higher media
profile associated with higher-ranking mediators leads to increases in presidential
approval. Such a finding suggests that the president and his high-ranking deputies have
significant command over the media and can induce rallies in support of the
administration independent of success.

Additionally, the effect of mediator rank’s

influence on presidential approval is magnified when people are paying more attention to
foreign policy. These findings, taken together, further support the notion that domestic
political sentiment introduces both incentives for and constraints on an administration’s
decision to engage in mediation. Furthermore, leaders can use this domestic focus to
their advantage engaging in high-profile mediations at times when the public is most
likely to respond positively to such endeavors.
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While high-profile mediation is shown to lead to an increase in presidential
approval, it is unclear from the results presented here how durable or long lasting such an
increase is likely to be. Further research is necessary to understand leaders’ short-term
and long-term motives for engaging in mediation. For instance, if the president is
engaging in mediation in response to poor economic performance, but is also able to pass
legislation that directly addresses the source of such economic problems, mediation is
most likely a stop gap measure. However, if the president lacks efficient access to the
legislative process, engagement in mediation is likely to be a move of desperation.
Theoretical Implications of the Research
Despite the variation in robustness of results, the empirics taken together strongly
suggest that domestic politics is likely to condition the occurrence and practice of thirdparty mediation by state actors, as well as the likelihood that the mediation will. As such,
states cannot be considered unitary actors when attempting to construct theories about the
likelihood that mediation will succeed in bringing about peace.

Instead, leaders’

domestic political circumstances must be taken into account, as should the range of
policy options that are likely to be available to the leader. In the case of the US president,
he is likely more driven by shorter-term, domestic political goals than durable long-term
peace agreements overseas. Thus, he is likely to focus on mediating conflict when he
sees it as politically advantageous to do so, but is also likely to shift his focus away from
such efforts when policy options that pay higher political dividends become available or
when he has achieved such goals as re-election, and thus can focus on other policy
preferences.
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Similarly, focusing on foreign policy, even in low-risk endeavors such as
mediation, involves an opportunity cost. The evidence shown here suggests that the
president is more likely to engage in mediation when he has sufficient “party cover” in
congress, meaning that his co-partisans can shield him from major criticism, or at the
very least, ensure that public criticism has minimal political effects. However, there is
also some evidence for the policy availability argument.

In extreme cases, where

congress has essentially blocked the president’s ability to move legislation and poor
economic performance, low approval ratings, or nearing elections require a policy
success, the president becomes more risk accepting and engages in more diplomacy.
These findings, as previously mentioned, can also be applied in order to help
better explain what is already thought to be known about conflict resolution processes.
For instance, Yuen and Werner’s (2005) finding that manipulated outcomes are likely to
relapse into conflict can be explained by the fact that the mediating party was focused on
generating a policy success in the short term to boost his domestic political fortunes, and
thus less concerned with the longer-term ramifications of the effort. In this vein, and
perhaps most clearly, the finding that mediators seek to intervene when conflict is most
fierce, but also most visible internationally, can be explained by the fact that political
leaders see the potential to benefit domestically from an attempt to quell the violence that
is absent at lower levels of intensity and visibility. And, finally, the mere observation
that most mediation attempts are unsuccessful suggests that leaders engage in mediation
with other political goals in mind. Otherwise, mediation would be carried out in ways
more likely to guarantee long-term peace.
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The results also provide support for the notion that the president’s goal in
focusing his attention on foreign policy is much the same as that of domestic policy: to
demonstrate his competence as a leader and build a record of policy success. The fact
that we see presidents using diplomacy to build support for themselves while domestic
conditions are poor cannot be explained by the rally-round-the-flag effect, which suggests
that the president is attempting to divert the public’s attention from these poor conditions
by invoking patriotism and shifting animosity toward an outside adversary.
Suggestions for Further Research
Like so much empirical research, this project was limited by the data. In turn, the
creation of a dataset that allows researchers to test both mediator characteristics, such as
their domestic political circumstances, and conflict characteristics is necessary for the
research agenda to move forward. The consistent null finding for world disputes suggests
that there is no variation in the number of new mediation attempts undertaken by the US
in light of the number of opportunities available for mediation. Thus, it is likely that the
US is returning to the same enduring conflicts, which are of strategic or political
relevance to the administration. Such research is also likely to help explain why the
president chooses mediation over other foreign policy options when seeking to boost
domestic support.
Additionally, this research approach can be extended to other non-military foreign
policy options such as the provision of foreign aid and the use of sanctions. Given that
military conflict has the potential to be costlier than these non-violent, less-coercive
policy options, it is likely that vulnerable, risk-averse leaders will consider employing
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such policies to shore up domestic support, or at least stop the deterioration thereof.
Moreover, given the observation that most mediation attempts are unsuccessful and many
of those that enjoy success over the short term see relapses in violence later, mediation
should be studied in a signaling framework. Due to the fact that powerful states are
thought to have the wherewithal to guarantee peace, the process and strategy of mediation
is likely to signal the level of commitment that the state’s leader has for engineering a
peace agreement. Similarly, domestic political institutions likely constrain leaders who,
motivated by preferences, are likely to attempt to mediate conflict.
Concluding Remarks
The findings presented in this dissertation present a bleak outlook for mediation
success, despite the need for such efforts around the world and the thought that states are
equipped with the characteristics and capabilities to best resolve conflicts. Given that
political leaders are incentivized and constrained by their domestic political sphere,
which is the arena that ultimately keeps them in power, it is likely that successful
mediation will always be subordinate to domestic politics. In addition to the need for
better understanding of mediation processes, such a scenario suggests that a great deal
more attention should paid to improving informal mediation and creating
international and regional institutions to help create and maintain peace.
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